2023-04-21 01:24:55
image source,Archyde.com
Xia Baolong, executive deputy head of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Leading Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, “investigated” Hong Kong for six days from April 13 to 18, and attended 36 research activities. Historic scene.
This is the first visit to Hong Kong by Beijing officials as a “party organization” after the Chinese government announced the reorganization of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office.
BBC Chinese interviewed experts and scholars to sort out five political meanings.
1. The leading position of the “Party Central Committee” has been concretized
image source,Getty Images
During Xia Baolong’s six-day visit to Hong Kong, most of the itinerary was kept very secret in advance, and no media interviews were arranged, and those who participated in the meeting were not even allowed to bring mobile phones into the venue.
During Xia Baolong’s six-day visit to Hong Kong, Hong Kong Chief Executive Lee Ka-chao accompanied him almost the entire time, even the regular meeting of the Executive Council scheduled to be held on Tuesday had to “give way”.
“Compared to the previous visits by Beijing officials to Hong Kong, this time there is a state of dominion over the world, which shows that the central government is firmly in control. Hong Kong officials should not try to play around the corner or try to violate the law. It also represents the vertical leadership of the central government and a concrete manifestation of the central government’s overall governance power. Hong Kong current affairs commentator Liu Ruishao told BBC Chinese.
He pointed out that Xia Baolong’s visit to Hong Kong in the name of “inspection” reflected the administrative subordinate arrangement. “In terms of Chinese political culture, ‘inspection’ has a top-down meaning, and the higher level is ‘inspection’. will use.”
Just one month before Xia Baolong’s visit to Hong Kong, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council announced the “Party and State Institutional Reform Plan”, which reorganized the “Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council”, which was originally an administrative agency of the State Council, into the “Central Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office” directly under the administrative agency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. work office”.
In other words, in the past, the administrative counterpart of the SAR government was the “Central People’s Government”. After the reorganization, Hong Kong and Macau affairs will be transferred to the leadership of the “Party Central Committee”, and the color of the “Party” will no longer be shunned.
“I don’t mind showing you the issue of name and reality. It’s the party that manages it.” Liu Ruishao explained that since the State Council released the white paper “The Practice of “One Country, Two Systems” in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” in 2014, the central government has “comprehensive governance power” over the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. , and wrote into the party’s document at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 2019 Central Committee, and promulgated the “Hong Kong Version of the National Security Law” by 2020, “The party has a firm grasp of Hong Kong and has been doing it all the time. Now it is only gradually superficial.”
Li Zhilan, a professor of political science at the Department of Public and International Affairs of the City University of Hong Kong, also pointed out to BBC Chinese that in China’s political system of “integration of the party and the government”, the party organization already has supreme power. It highlights that the central government is watching Hong Kong more closely.”
She believes that there should be some personnel changes after the reorganization, and Xia Baolong’s trip “is also to follow up and straighten out internal affairs.”
2. Redefining the Legislative Council
image source,HMO
Xia Baolong was the first official of the Party Central Committee to enter the Hong Kong Legislative Council Chamber to meet with members. During his visit, the Legislative Council’s “立” sign on the rostrum disappeared, but the reason is unknown.
Xia Baolong stood in the center of the Hong Kong Legislative Council chamber and took a group photo with all the members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. In the photo, the “立” sign symbolizing the Legislative Council on the rostrum disappeared—this scene is full of symbolism.
He is the first party central official to enter the chamber of the Legislative Council to meet lawmakers.
Beijing officials used to avoid visiting the Legislative Council in order to avoid the feeling of interference. For example, in 2016, Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the National People’s Congress, communicated directly with four pan-democratic Legislative Council members in the form of a reception. Wang Guangya, Director of the Affairs Office, invited all members of the Legislative Council to meet, but chose to hold it in Shanghai.
According to reports, Xia Baolong stayed in the Hong Kong Legislative Council for about 4 hours this time, and had closed-door exchanges and lunch with more than 80 lawmakers.
Leung Kwan-yen, Chairman of the Legislative Council, told the media afterwards that without the “Hong Kong National Security Law” and “patriots governing Hong Kong”, no one would dare to make such a “historic” arrangement. Legislative Council member Ip Lau Sook-yee, who is also the convener of the Executive Council, described that in the past, the Legislative Council had “difficult steps” in arranging exchanges with central officials. This meeting is “a milestone in bringing order out of chaos.”
DAB Legislative Council member Chen Yong quoted Xia Baolong repeatedly mentioning “benign democracy” in the meeting, saying that the National People’s Congress is the highest authority, while the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is a democratic consultation. , MPs should negotiate more with the government, and should not “learn from the opposition for eyeballs” when exercising supervisory powers.
Liu Ruishao, a current affairs commentator, analyzed that Xia Baolong redefined the role of the Legislative Council to be on par with the legislature in mainland China. In addition, Beijing officials also rarely described Legislative Council members as “patriots” and members of the governance team. “Beijing officials seldom say this. In the past, there were opposition parties in the Legislative Council, and powers would not be distributed to the Legislative Council. Now the Legislative Council’s functions are not only to cooperate with the government’s work, but also to carry out the tasks of the central government.”
Xia Baolong’s remarks “changed” the nature of the Legislative Council, but it seems that it did not arouse much reaction from Hong Kong people. In fact, citizens pay little attention to the current Legislative Council. The latest survey by the Hong Kong Institute of Public Opinion found that half of the respondents could not name any member of the Legislative Council, and the awareness rate fell to the lowest level after the handover of sovereignty in 1997.
Zhong Jianhua, a Hong Kong sociologist who now lives in the UK, told BBC Chinese that the Legislative Council has low recognition after Beijing “improved the electoral system” and has lost its role as a check on the government. “Now Xia Baolong is only using the will of the executive to improve legitimacy.”
In addition to the Legislative Council, Xia Baolong also contacted people from the judicial circle, went to the Court of Final Appeal to meet Chief Justice Zhang Juneng, and then went to the Legal Center to meet behind closed doors with representatives of the Law Society and the Bar Association.
Li Zhilan, a professor of political science, pointed out that in the past, the counterparts between the central government and Hong Kong were administrative organs. Beijing emphasized executive leadership and relied on the chief executive to lead everything. Now it “not only speaks to the chief executive, but also directly to the legislative and judicial organs.” It is also in line with Beijing’s statement that it opposes the “separation of the three powers” and advocates the “coordination of the three powers”.
3. Article 23 legislation and the general election in Taiwan
image source,Getty Images
Xia Baolong’s only public speaking occasion
Xia Baolong’s only public speech during the six days in Hong Kong was the opening ceremony of the “National Security Education Day for All” at the Wanchai Convention and Exhibition Center on April 15.
In his speech, he said, “Although the Hong Kong version of the ‘color revolution’ over the legislative amendment turmoil did not succeed, it is a scar that will never be erased in Hong Kong’s history, and it is our eternal pain. It is hanging over our heads from time to time. We must always be vigilant against the resurgence of street violence, soft confrontation and covert riots, and overseas riots in Hong Kong pouring back into Hong Kong.
He mentioned that the central government supports the improvement of the judicial system and legal system of the SAR, including the completion of the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.
Chief Executive Lee Ka-chao told the media afterwards that the SAR government will enact legislation on Article 23 as soon as possible, hoping to complete it within this year at the earliest and next year at the latest.
This timetable is different from the previous voices of the establishment faction. Lu Wenduan, vice chairman of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, who is regarded as a pro-Beijing authority, wrote in Ming Pao in February that Taiwan will enter a sensitive moment in the presidential election in the second half of this year. The Article 23 legislation has sparked controversy, and it is very likely that the DPP will “find the gun” again, taking the opportunity to smear “one country, two systems” to defraud votes and continue to govern and pursue “Taiwan independence.”
“Hong Kong’s enactment of Article 23 may affect Taiwan’s general election, but Taiwan’s general election may also constitute a risk factor for Hong Kong’s national security. Which one is more important to policymakers?” said Li Zhilan, a political science professor. “Now it seems that 23 It is imperative to implement this clause within this year, reflecting (Beijing’s view) that Hong Kong’s national security is more important than Taiwan’s election situation.”
Liu Ruishao also said that for the Chinese Communist Party, whenever Article 23 is enacted, the DPP will oppose it, and the KMT will also oppose it.
Zhong Jianhua believes that this reflects the current state of cross-strait relations, “Beijing also knows that one country, two systems has no appeal for Taiwan, and now (for Taiwan) it wants to show its muscles.”
Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law stipulates that the Hong Kong government shall enact legislation to prohibit seven types of acts, including treason, secession, sedition, subversion of the Central People’s Government, theft of state secrets, foreign political organizations or groups conducting political activities in Hong Kong, A Hong Kong political organization or group establishes ties with a foreign political organization or group.
In 2003, the Hong Kong government enacted local legislation on Article 23, which aroused public concern that civil liberties would be compromised. 500,000 people took to the streets to protest, and the Hong Kong government was forced to withdraw the legislative process. In 2019, the anti-amendment movement broke out in Hong Kong. In 2020, Beijing promulgated the “Hong Kong National Security Law”, which covers two of the 23 crimes, namely, splitting the country and subverting the Central People’s Government. The rest is left to the Hong Kong government to legislate on its own.
“The absence of Article 23 is a demon in Beijing. It feels that if there is no legislation, there may be troubles every day,” Liu Ruishao said. “Xia Baolong’s constant emphasis on national security and external forces during his visit to Hong Kong is creating an atmosphere for the legislation of Article 23.”
4. Restriction of right to parade
image source,Getty Images
After the epidemic, “hanging rope parades” in Hong Kong have become the new normal, and the freedom of assembly is accused of being compromised.
Xia Baolong publicly stated that “the parade is not the only way to express interest demands”, saying that the parade “is easily used and manipulated by people with ulterior motives, and even the interests of the people’s livelihood are distorted into political issues, which in turn induces social confrontation.”
As soon as this remark came out, the Hong Kong-Kowloon Federation of Labor Unions (Federation of Labor Unions), a pro-Beijing labor group, immediately announced that it had withdrawn its application to hold a May Day parade, saying it was worried that the parade would be hijacked.
Li Zhilan, a professor of political science, believes that Xia Baolong just reiterated Beijing’s attitude towards the parade, “confirming that it will continue to be tight, but he did not say that further tightening is needed.” However, judging from the reactions of some groups canceling the application for the parade, “objectively, it has constituted a (tightening) effect”.
Tan Yaozong, vice president of the Hong Kong and Macau Studies Association of China, interpreted in an interview with the TV station that Xia Baolong’s speech may indicate that future demonstrations will be “avoidable or avoidable.” Chief Executive Li Jiachao also told the media that he agrees with Xia Baolong’s remarks, saying that organizers of public events must consider whether they will affect others, and canceling the parade if they are worried about being hijacked “is a responsible approach.”
In the past month, the Hong Kong police re-approved the parade and assembly activities after nearly three years, but added a number of new rules and “national security provisions”, including requiring participants to wear neck number cards, hold designated items, etc. for identification, and Ask the pickets to set up blockades along the road.
Sociologist Chung Jianhua pointed out that the relevant practices have no legal basis and deprive citizens of the right to assemble, but the new normal has formed, “Beijing is constantly redefining, distorting the concepts of democracy and demonstrations, and drawing new circles for Hong Kong people.”
Liu Ruishao also said that the “Basic Law” guarantees freedom of assembly, and it is expected that demonstrations will still be allowed in the future. “However, the implementation will vary according to people, individual cases, and political climate. The power is entirely in the government.”
5. Economic soft, political hard
image source,Getty Images
Xia Baolong’s constant emphasis on national security risks has been accused of paving the way for the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.
At the opening ceremony of the “National Security Education Day for All” on April 15, in addition to emphasizing national security and Article 23 legislation, Xia Baolong also said this sentence: “I hope that Hong Kong will hold conventions and exhibitions every day, engage in innovation and technology, fight for the economy, race horses, dance, You can make (make) a lot of money by speculating in stocks.”
Two days later, Zheng Yanxiong, director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, said in a speech at a forum that Hong Kong may be the most leading region in the country, and it is a “super contact” and a “super import port” for countries and regions around the world to share opportunities for Chinese-style modernization. “In terms of culture, “the horses run according to the rules, the dances follow the dances, the stocks follow the stock speculation, the foreign languages are taught according to the foreign names, and the foreign names are called according to the rules, and take the road of internationalization”.
Current affairs commentator Liu Ruishao said that Beijing believes that Hong Kong has entered the stage of “governance and prosperity” from “turning from chaos to governance”. The current position is that the system, philosophy, and actions must be “mainlandized”, and the economy, people’s livelihood, and lifestyle can be preserved. A certain degree of freedom and activity, “Guide Hong Kong people to the right track and encourage everyone to concentrate on making money, but in fact it is meaningless. It is just a matter of routine. Political relaxation cannot be achieved through governance and prosperity.”
How tense the political atmosphere is at present can be seen from the details of Xia Baolong’s visit to Hong Kong. Most of his itinerary is kept very secret and no media filming is arranged. In the only public event held in Wan Chai, the media planning to attend the event had to fill in the application form distributed by the Government Information Office and be screened by the prescription. The Journalists Association pointed out that many media organizations received the government’s notice of application on the day of the event Rejected, not allowed to attend the interview.
On the day of Xia Baolong’s visit to the Legislative Council, reporters could only conduct interviews outside the building. Even members of the Legislative Council who entered the conference hall to participate in the exchange meeting were not allowed to carry mobile phones and had to temporarily store them in a locker outside the door.
“It’s very opaque. Beijing used to play tricks, but now it doesn’t care at all, and it doesn’t care what Hong Kong people think. This reflects the current political atmosphere.” Liu Ruishao said.
He continued to point out that Xia Baolong did not show his closeness to the people like previous leaders. For example, Lu Ping, the former director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the handover of sovereignty, widely posted heroic posts to hold public hearings when he visited Hong Kong. In 2003, Wen Jiabao visited “SARS” families in Amoy Gardens. In 2011, Li Keqiang visited middle-class families in Laguna City, Lantian. Several Beijing officials also met with pro-democracy lawmakers. “Xia Baolong has a wide range of contacts, but is the depth enough?”
During Xia Baolong’s historic visit to Hong Kong, mainstream media in Hong Kong reported extensively, but there was almost no discussion among the people. Sociologist Zhong Jianhua said: “Hong Kong people have no feelings for this visit. Everyone is used to cold treatment and responds with indifference.”
BBC Documentary: The Battle for Freedom in Hong Kong (Part 1)
1682195727
#Xia #Baolongs #6day #visit #Hong #Kong #investigate #political #signal #convey #BBC #News #中文