The war in Ukraine has finally reached a standstill: neither side can mount a major operation without expending an unacceptable amount of resources on it—equipment, ammunition, but most importantly, people. In discussions about the future strategy of the Ukrainian forces, instead of “counterattack” another term is increasingly used – “strategic defense”.
In an interview with the BBC, the former commander of the Ukrainian forces, Viktor Muzhenka, said that it is necessary to switch to strategic defense, and according to him, Kyiv retains “a potential opportunity to defeat the occupying forces on the territory of Ukraine” if it is able to competently develop and implement such a strategy.
The transition to the “year of strategic defense” is also mentioned in a large report prepared by the Ministry of Defense of Estonia.
A positional war, that is, a war in which the front line does not change significantly at any intensity of combat, is a forced state.
However, it can be used when there is nothing else to do. Although the leadership of any military usually prefers maneuver warfare, which, in fact, is what all modern armed forces are designed for, says the BBC.
A war of position can be called a war of attrition for its purposes. Unlike maneuver warfare or “lightning” warfare, its objectives are not the defeat of the enemy’s army, the defeat of captured cities or territories, access to any strategically important positions, but the combat effectiveness of the enemy’s army and the defensive capacity of its entire state, its people and its army to resist reduction.
At the same time, a positional conflict by itself cannot end in victory – it either leads to a situation where an exhausted country agrees to make concessions, or it creates conditions for moving to a more active and maneuverable war.
From 2022 autumn until 2023 at the end of the summer, many politicians and military people in Ukraine and the West talked about the necessity and importance of the summer offensive, and it was clear that this was the decisive blow that they intended to win on the front.
However, with the end of this offensive, which did not achieve its goals, it became clear that this strategy did not work and Kyiv would have to engage in a war of attrition.
At the same time, the Kremlin is convinced that Russia’s military, economic and demographic potential is greater than that of Ukraine. In addition, the Russian leadership is convinced that foreign aid to Ukraine will probably stop soon and that the West will tire of this war faster than Russia.
This confidence was particularly evident during the December 14 Vladimir Putin’s “Hotline” when he said that Russia’s financial and economic system is strong and its military is ready to fight, in contrast to Ukraine, which, in the words of the Russian president, is “trying to keep something there, but producing almost nothing”: “everything is imported, everything is imported for free. But this free support can end at some point, and it looks like it’s running out little by little.”
The future of aid to Ukraine remains uncertain – the fate of this US aid will be decided by Congress in January, and Europe has also not yet been able to approve new funding for Ukraine.
As noted by many experts, especially from the US Institute of Military Studies, “the abrupt cessation of Western aid will likely sooner or later lead to the loss of Ukraine’s ability to deter the Russian military.”
Ukraine and its partners are trying to address this problem by developing a plan that would at least help Western policymakers put some perspective on military aid to Kyiv.
Uncertainty and the absence of more or less clear prospects greatly hinder the congressmen from approving the aid package – they simply do not understand how long they will have to spend money to support the Ukrainian armed forces in a war whose victory is not clear.
As the New York Times wrote in early December, Ukraine and the United States are working on a strategy whose main goal is to keep the territories under the control of Ukrainian forces.
According to the newspaper, the Americans propose to focus on this main objective, while the Ukrainians want to conduct more active combat operations using long-range precision weapons.
Now, the idea of playing the game that Russia is forcing on Ukraine, which is to start a war of attrition instead of preparing a new major offensive, is gaining more and more supporters. And this is logical – there is simply no other way out yet.
“A war of attrition is useless to anyone and never, it is undertaken only when there are no opportunities to start a more active war, but in this case it is more useless to Ukraine than to Russia: no losses at the front, millions of refugees, missile strikes throughout the country, destroyed infrastructure and economy, uncertain all states prospects – so since the attack and the break of the trend failed, we need to think again about the future”, – this is how Israeli military expert David Handelman described the current situation in an interview with the BBC.
Reuters/Scanpix photo/Ukrainian soldiers near Avdijivka
This has already happened
In fact, neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian armies intended to bury themselves in the ground and turn to a war of attrition.
in 2022 In February, Russia attempted a classic “blitzkrieg” by storming the capital and occupying a good half of Ukraine.
After failing to capture Kyiv and stopping the offensive in the south, Russia launched an offensive in Donbass, which was also quite fatal both in its nature and goals: Russian troops sought to surround and destroy a large group of Ukrainians, but also unsuccessfully – in the south, it was not possible to break through the “pincers” of Ukrainian defenses , and everything ended in defeat in the north.
in 2022 At the beginning of September, Ukrainian forces, taking advantage of the low concentration of Russian troops in the Kharkiv region, were able to plan and conduct an autumn offensive, liberate a large area, and then force Russia to withdraw its troops from Kherson to the left bank.
However, both sides have subsequently failed to plan and execute any major operations and achieve the kind of success that Russian troops in southern Ukraine did at the beginning of the invasion, or Ukrainian forces in 2022. in autumn
During 2023 during the summer offensive, Ukrainian troops penetrated the Russian defense 30 km, but did not achieve their goals – to reach the Sea of Azov or at least to liberate the city of Tokmak, which is halfway there.
So this war is already in 2023. in the winter-spring, it became positional, and the summer offensive of the Ukrainian forces only clearly showed how difficult it is to change this situation.
Zuma press/Scanpix/War in Ukraine
Why the impasse?
There are several reasons why the war has gotten to this point, according to the BBC.
After the mobilization of the Russians, groups of proportional size appeared on both sides of the front, and their number allowed to sufficiently saturate the defensive units to exclude the possibility of a breakthrough by small groups.
Such a breakthrough is made even more difficult by the fact that during the long period when the front line did not change, each side had time to prepare for defense: dig trenches, install firing points, install minefields and shell them.
In addition, each side uses the full arsenal of intelligence to control the territory occupied by the enemy, constantly improving skills and techniques.
Given how well the close rear is now visible, it is very difficult for small groups to sneak up and break through. Sometimes artillery takes only a few minutes from detection to hitting the target.
Breaking through large groups also proved almost impossible. It is theoretically possible to assemble a strike group and create numerical superiority in a certain section of the front, but even here intelligence does not allow it to be done covertly.
Both sides actively use drones for reconnaissance, and other types of reconnaissance have become more effective. For example, agents in enemy territory can transmit data much faster than before.
Modern electronic intelligence systems have also become more sophisticated. Ukraine has gained access to information from Western satellites and spy planes, while Russia is actively using its own intelligence tools, such as radars and drones.
Thus, deploying a large group covertly became practically impossible – the enemy reveals the plan and has time to react to the threat, withdrawing the reserves from his side to the place of the future breakthrough.
In the end, neither side proved capable of handling large groups in an all-arms battle involving the close cooperation of the various components of a strike group—engineers, tanks, motorized infantry, rocket artillery, and aviation.
Partly because there are so many new military technologies in this war that their use is still very poorly understood and the tactical ways to combat them are not perfected.
And because of the lack of combat experience and skills at all levels, from the rank and file to the leadership, the casualties are too high.
At the same time, combatant armies gain new combat experience, making fewer and fewer mistakes that the enemy can take advantage of.
What does Ukraine need for defense?
The general objectives of the transition to strategic defense, which, by the way, were laid out in the order discussed in the above-mentioned analytical report of the Estonian army, do not allow us to understand what tactics the Ukrainian forces will follow during the campaign, says the BBC.
It will be associated with the supply of foreign weapons and military equipment. On the one hand, these supplies will be based on the needs of Ukraine, on the other hand, they will limit the freedom of action of the Ukrainian forces.
If the soldiers really in 2024 will not try to carry out another attack, but will switch to defense, the nomenclature of Western supplies will have to change.
Military expert David Handelman emphasizes that Ukrainian forces need artillery ammunition first, because “both defense and offense in the Russian-Ukrainian war depend on it.”
“There is a need to strengthen air and missile defenses, especially with the start of another winter infrastructure strike campaign, which also involves the delivery of another Patriot battery from Germany.” It is necessary to start supplying aviation in real terms – both as a second wind for the Ukrainian Air Force in the future, and as a counterweight to Russian aircraft, especially when launching UMPK correction bombs, against which air defense is ineffective. Armored vehicles are less important for defense than for offensive operations, but they are also needed for the future,” said an Israeli expert.
However, the most important thing, according to D.Handelman, is to mobilize the Ukrainian economy and the state. “First of all, it is related to the transfer of the state to military tracks, the start of the military industry and, in general, the mobilization of material and human resources for the war. So far, Russia is doing better than Ukraine, although it seems that Ukraine is more passionate about it and more progress can be expected,” he said.
D. Handelman believes that Ukraine should make maximum efforts to develop its military industry, which would reduce its dependence on Western supplies.
“The problem with supply is that the Western military industry is also not turning up fast enough, and physical shortages are felt in many areas […] So everything again depends on Ukraine’s own capabilities and efforts,” he believes.
Maneuver or trench warfare?
A document prepared by the Estonian military sets out the goals and objectives that Ukrainian forces could set if they decide to fight Russia in a war of attrition.
These include strikes on communications to disrupt the supply of troops on the front lines, pressure on the Black Sea Fleet to reduce its activity, and airspace defenses to prevent Russian aircraft from occupying it.
In addition, Ukrainian forces are asked to continue to stop Russia’s slow offensive while inflicting the greatest possible losses on the Russian military.
The Ministry of Defense of Estonia believes that Russia can train no more than 130,000 soldiers in six months. Estonians believe that if irreparable losses (killed and wounded, unable to return to service) reach 50,000 in six months, this will overload the Russian mobilization system and send less trained soldiers to the front, which will reduce Russia’s combat effectiveness.
These general principles, set out in the report in the form of discussions, do not allow us to understand what tactics the Ukrainian armed forces will choose. It is likely that even the commanders of the Ukrainian army do not know this yet.
A defensive strategy does not mean that troops will not maneuver and attack.
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2024-07-26 05:12:43
