It was a resounding victory. As results began to trickle in from around the country, they showed the opposition winning by a margin of more than two to one. The once formidable political machine in power was now proving to be no match for millions of voters who sent a clear message to their authoritarian leader: your time is up.
But despite the resounding victory, the ruling party ignored the will of the people and the leader’s allies proclaimed him president.
These events happened in Poland in 1989, under the government of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. But they could also have described Venezuela after the presidential elections on July 28. The cases differ in key ways: unlike Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, Jaruzelski was never accused of distorting the election results (as Maduro is believed to have done), and the elections in Poland were for the legislature, which then appointed Jaruzelski president. But I think there is something to be learned from this comparison, and especially from its consequences.
As the international community contemplates how to react to Maduro’s apparent electoral fraud, observers who would hope to see an end to his long, corrosive and undemocratic rule have grown weary. After all, it seems either the international community or the opposition has tried it all. Targeted sanctions against regime officials? That’s been done. Oil sanctions to deprive the government of resources? Same. Easing sanctions as an incentive to hold free elections? Neither worked. Putting a $15 million bounty on him to stop him? Trying to provoke a military uprising? Both were tried. Nothing worked.
All of these attempts had one main goal in common: to remove Maduro from power. And of course, since the problem with dictators is that they hold power illegitimately, wanting to remove them makes perfect sense. But we don’t always get what we want.
This is where the Polish example comes in. Instead of resigning after the humiliating defeat in the parliamentary elections, Jaruzelski reached an agreement with the opposition Solidarity movement. Jaruzelski would formally continue to lead the government as president, and his communist party would also retain control of the interior and defence ministries. A Solidarity leader would become prime minister, with the power to appoint his cabinet.
The deal was harshly criticized by many in the opposition. They argued that sharing power with a dictator who repressed and tortured them was morally unacceptable. But the deal worked in practice. Jaruzelski largely refrained from using his executive powers, and it laid the groundwork for one of the most successful transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe, heralding the end of communism in that region of the world.
A starting point for thinking about what a national unity government in Venezuela might look like was drawn up by the United States government in March 2020. Called the Framework for Venezuela’s Democratic Transition, the plan called for the creation of a Council of State, a body that would have representation from several parties and act as the executive branch while new elections were organized.
The framework was proposed too late in that phase of the Venezuelan crisis, after the United States had spent more than a year unrealistically demanding that Maduro cede power to opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who has proclaimed himself the country’s legitimate interim president.
But today it serves as a useful starting point. The contours of a workable power-sharing arrangement in Venezuela would likely include a division of responsibilities within the executive branch. The opposition and nonpartisan experts would be better suited to fill the ministries responsible for economic and oil policy. Chavistas — the name given to followers of Maduro’s mentor, Hugo Chávez — could remain at the helm of ministries overseeing security and domestic relations. The sides would need to agree on a plan of action to address the country’s humanitarian and economic emergency, while the international community could pledge financial support for the new government’s economic reconstruction efforts.
There is time before the next presidential term begins on January 10 to negotiate and present to voters in a referendum a draft constitutional reform that would enshrine the necessary guarantees for a national agreement to work. The agreement should limit the current powers of the presidency to subordinate other branches of government to its decisions, and thus offer a firm and credible commitment that an incoming government will abide by and respect the separation of powers.
Facilitators who have tried to help negotiate a deal for a peaceful transition in Venezuela have stressed that effective safeguards for the losers are a vital part of such a deal. But only the Venezuelan state can guarantee the protection of thousands of pro-government leaders who fear reprisals and the loss of political rights in the event of a change of government. The best way to provide that guarantee is by ensuring that Chavista officials remain in charge of the security forces and the prosecution service, and by having the incoming government give up the power it currently has to dissolve the judiciary by convening a constituent assembly. President Joe Biden should offer to back up this deal with a commitment to grant clemency to Maduro and other government officials currently indicted for narcoterrorism in the United States.
A post-election power-sharing agreement can act as a political truce that allows a country to move beyond the deadlock of a disputed election. After post-election violence left hundreds dead following a disputed 2007 election in Kenya, the two sides reached an agreement to share ministerial posts equally, ultimately leading to effective governance and important reforms. Closer to home, both Venezuela and Colombia used power-sharing agreements to bring stability to their nascent democracies in the 1950s.
Would Maduro agree to a power-sharing deal? Perhaps not. But leaders almost never give up power voluntarily; they are forced to do so when faced with a fracture in their governing coalition. Until now, Maduro’s coalition has coalesced around him largely out of fear of retaliation if the opposition comes to power. A power-sharing deal would allow them to continue to participate in the country’s political life with reasonable guarantees. Left-wing political leaders in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, whose political movements were partly inspired by Chávez, are best placed to signal to Maduro’s allies that they can reclaim their movement’s legacy by helping to build a way out of the country’s current political impasse.
CONTENT FOR SUBSCRIBERS
Resistance to a power-sharing deal can also come from the opposition. Many in the opposition will see a power-sharing deal as unfair and unacceptable. Maduro lost the election, they may argue, and the only negotiation the world should have is about his departure from power.
But the question opposition leaders must confront at this juncture is how they can fulfill their commitment to bring democracy and prosperity to Venezuela. Venezuela must avoid a descent into what could be the country’s darkest period of authoritarianism. Let us hope that Edmundo Gonzalez, Maduro’s challenger for the presidency, and Maria Corina Machado, the charismatic leader of the opposition movement, have the fortitude and vision to understand the compromises that must be made to make Venezuelans’ dreams of democracy a reality.
#agreement #save #Venezuela
