Rabat, November 15, 2018. King Mohammed VI of Morocco VI (left) greets French President Emmanuel Macron (right), who winks, as he leaves the train station after inaugurating a high-speed rail line.
CHRISTOPHE ARCHAMBAULT / AFP / POOL
Is Western Sahara really as distant from the Palais Bourbon as is often thought? This unexpected closeness becomes apparent following one of Emmanuel Macron’s rare summer political statements, which diverged from his usual engagements with French Olympic medalists.
On July 30, three weeks after the second round of the legislative elections that resulted in a three-way split in the Chamber of Deputies (Macronist, New Popular Front, National Rally), the President of the Republic sent a letter to King Mohammed VI on the occasion of Throne Day. In this letter, he unambiguously aligned himself with the Moroccan stance regarding the resolution of the Sahrawi issue, which has persisted for nearly fifty years.
The present and future of Western Sahara are part of Moroccan sovereignty. I affirm the inviolability of the French position on this matter, which is of national security for your Kingdom. France intends to uphold this position on both national and international levels. For France, autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the framework within which this issue must be resolved. Our support for the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2007 is consistent and unwavering.
A Forgotten Self-Determination Referendum
Overlooked is the UN resolution that mandates consulting the inhabitants of the region to decide their future. As a non-self-governing territory, Western Sahara should still, in principle, be subject to a self-determination referendum.
What repercussions might the presidential letter have? Probably none. On the ground, Morocco controls three-quarters of the territory, and sporadic military actions by the Polisario Front, which has received support from Algeria since 1977, fail to disrupt the status quo. The United Nations remains committed to the self-determination of Western Sahara, as reiterated by its spokesperson the day after the presidential letter was made public. Diplomatically, two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, continue to oppose any alteration in position.
The sole foreseeable consequence is a new Franco-Algerian crisis, coinciding with a gradual decline in France’s soft power in its three former territories across the Mediterranean. In the Algerian market, China and Turkey have surpassed French exporters, while Italy competes fiercely for third place under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who aims to replace Paris throughout North Africa. ENI, the prominent Italian company, is significantly increasing its share of Algerian natural gas, while Russian grains are increasingly challenging the position of Beauce cereal growers in Algeria’s soft wheat supply, which sustains the daily bread of over 44 million Algerians. If the anticipated visit to Paris by Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is likely to be re-elected on September 7, 2024, is canceled, it will mark only the third or fourth instance of such a cancellation, but represents the first significant diplomatic tension since 2020.
Appeasing the Right
Why did the President of the Republic risk an inevitable Franco-Algerian crisis? Why jeopardize his grand strategy of reconciliation pursued since 2017, based on a shared, palatable historical narrative for both nations? Since July 8, the political landscape has altered significantly. His primary focus is no longer Ukraine, the European Union, or New Caledonia, but rather the preservation of the supply-side policy established under François Hollande and intensified during Emmanuel Macron’s tenure. This approach emphasizes robust support for companies and their shareholders, even at the expense of the welfare state (schools, hospitals, social budgets) through revenue reduction and severe scaling back of initiatives. The majority of voters have rejected these choices, and with the National Assembly divided into three factions, it cannot continue in this manner. However, the Elysée Palace is banking on the unity of the 47 Republican deputies with the 166 members from the three Ensemble groups and the support of the 126 extreme right representatives to secure a quasi-majority, thus safeguarding the bulk of its economic and financial agenda, including the recent pension reform.
Is this yet another illusion? Probably, but the letter to Mohammed VI represents an additional gesture aimed at appeasing the right, which identifies closely with the Cherifian monarchy and harbors visceral animosity towards Algeria, stemming from memories of a colonial war and longstanding opposition to the pro-Algerian policies of Charles de Gaulle, which were backed by the extreme left at the time. Today, the Gaullists have vanished as a parliamentary force, and the communists only hold 9 seats (out of 577). The remainder of the left criticizes the authoritarianism of the Algerian regime, which has cracked down on the popular Hirak movement and incarcerated numerous journalists.
The 1968 agreements between the two countries were already the subject of extensive deliberation by the end of 2023, including participation from National Rally, Les Républicains, and Édouard Philippe, former Prime Minister under Macron. These agreements were designed to facilitate economic immigration and address labor shortages during the Trente Glorieuses (1945-1974), allowing Algerian nationals free movement between the two countries. However, over the years, the agreement has lost much of its significance concerning migration flows; yet, the right has mobilized to repeal it, waving its fears of “invasion.” The government of Gabriel Attal promptly placed its renegotiation on the agenda, a provocative move for Algiers, which values the agreement’s symbolic importance. The reality is more mundane; the latest concession to Algerians allows their students in France to establish themselves as traders!
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Rabat, November 15, 2018. King Mohammed VI of Morocco VI greets French President Emmanuel Macron (right), who winks, as he leaves the train station after inaugurating a high-speed rail line.
CHRISTOPHE ARCHAMBAULT / AFP / POOL
Emmanuel Macron’s Political Intervention on Western Sahara: An Overview
Is Western Sahara as far from the Palais Bourbon as is usually imagined? One may wonder about this unexpected proximity following one of Emmanuel Macron’s rare summer political interventions, outside of his regular effusions with French medalists at the Olympic Games. On July 30, three weeks after the second round of the legislative elections and the arrival of a Chamber of Deputies split into three major blocs (Macronist, New Popular Front, National Rally), the President of the Republic wrote a letter to the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, aligning himself without much nuance with the Cherifian position regarding the settlement of the Sahrawi question which has been raised for almost fifty years.
The present and future of Western Sahara are part of Moroccan sovereignty. I therefore affirm the inviolability of the French position on this issue of national security for Your Kingdom. France intends to act in accordance with this position at the national and international levels. For France, autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the framework within which this issue must be resolved. Our support for the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2007 is clear and constant.
A Forgotten Self-Determination Referendum
Forgotten is the UN resolution that the inhabitants of the region must be consulted to decide their future. A non-self-governing territory, Western Sahara must still in principle be the subject of a self-determination referendum. What will be the repercussions of the presidential letter? Probably none. On the ground, Morocco holds three-quarters of the country, while the rare acts of war carried out by the Polisario Front, supported since 1977 by Algeria, are incapable of challenging the status quo.
The United Nations remains committed to the self-determination of the Sahara, as its spokesperson reiterated the day after the publication of the presidential letter. At the diplomatic level, at the Security Council of the HIM, two of its five permanent members, China and Russia, will still be able to oppose any change in position. Its only foreseeable effect is a new Franco-Algerian crisis, which occurs with a slow fading of French soft power in its three former departments across the Mediterranean.
The Rise of Competing Influences in Algeria
On the Algerian market, China and Turkey have overtaken French exporters, with Italy under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni fiercely contesting the third spot. ENI, the large transalpine company, is capturing the bulk of Algerian natural gas, while Russian cereals are increasingly challenging the prominent place of Beauce cereal growers in Algeria’s supply of soft wheat. If the anticipated visit to Paris by Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who will undoubtedly be re-elected on September 7, 2024, is canceled, it will mark another downturn in diplomatic relations since 2020.
The Diplomatic Risks of Macron’s Letter
Why did the President of the Republic take the risk of an inevitable Franco-Algerian crisis? Why endanger his grand design pursued since 2017, aimed at reconciling the two countries based on a shared historical narrative acceptable to both sides? As of July 8, the geopolitical landscape has shifted. Macron’s main front is no longer Ukraine or New Caledonia, but the preservation of the supply-side policy initiated under François Hollande and intensified during his reign. This policy aims at strongly backing companies and their shareholders, even at the expense of vital welfare state elements.
The majority of voters condemned these choices. With a divided National Assembly, composed of three distinct blocs, the Élysée is grasping at straws to maintain its economic and financial heritage, particularly in light of the controversial pension reform.
Appeasing the Right: Political Calculations Behind the Stance
Another layer of complexity arises from the necessity to appease the right-wing factions within the legislature. Macron’s overture to Mohammed VI serves as a gesture to soothe those who share a connection with the Cherifian monarchy and harbor deep-seated animosity towards Algeria rooted in historical conflicts. The landscape has changed drastically: the Gaullists have disappeared as a parliamentary force, while the French left condemns the authoritarian regime in Algeria.
Impacts on Migration Agreements
The 1968 agreements between France and Algeria were previously the focal point of a full-scale offensive by the National Rally and Les Républicains at the close of 2023. Originally intended to facilitate economic immigration and address labor shortages during the Trente Glorieuses (1945-1974), the agreement has been steadily diluted over the years. Currently, the right mobilizes against it, exploiting fears of a perceived “invasion.” This prompts the government of Gabriel Attal to renegotiate the agreement, further straining relations with Algiers, who holds the symbolic value of the agreement in high regard.
Implications for Franco-Algerian Relations
| Factor | Implication |
|---|---|
| Political Alliances | Increased tension between France and Algeria; potential diplomatic fallout. |
| Economic Partnerships | China and Turkey gaining influence in the Algerian market at France’s expense. |
| Public Sentiment | Growing resistance against Macron’s policies among voters. |
| Historical Context | Revisiting colonial narratives complicates diplomatic efforts. |
The adjustments to migration agreements—initially a means to facilitate labor in France—echo a historical reality, reflecting current political shifts where the focus has moved towards controlling immigration amidst rising political pressures.
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