2024-03-30 00:46:50
Those who are trying to understand the current American policy towards the war in Gaza have the best explanation in the book of the former American ambassador to Lebanon and former Deputy Secretary of State, David Hale, regarding American diplomacy towards Lebanon, over more than half a century, interspersed with several Israeli invasions, foreign interventions, and repeated crises from the era of President Eisenhower. To Biden. Hill provides a good and detailed analysis of the reason behind the ebb and flow of this policy from frenzied intervention to resounding neglect, its fluctuating and unstable nature, the factors that determine its course, strategic mistakes, and the responsibility of the American parties, and in Lebanon and the region that often lead to tragedies and disasters. A geopolitical price paid for by Lebanon and the region. Hill explains how half a century of attempts to confine Lebanon’s crises within its borders so as not to hinder American interests in the region ended up allowing Iran and Hezbollah to control Lebanon and weakening America’s influence in the region.
Hill says that Lebanon has never been a country ranked first or second in the priorities of American foreign policy and national interest, except in certain occasional moments that occur only when the situation there threatens American policy in the region, or when Washington wants to use Lebanon as an early test for its policy in the region. Like what happened between 1943 and 1945, Lebanon was used to test the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter there. America is not the reason for what Lebanon has become, Hill says, but its policies contributed to it.
The American intervention in Lebanon and the landing of Marines in Beirut in 1958 came within the framework of President Eisenhower’s principle, which focused on the credibility of the United States and the importance of its role in the region in confronting the Soviet threat. In Hill’s opinion, this intervention was rapid, with specific and successful goals. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun requested the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine, providing an opportunity for this application. Hill recounts in his memoirs that Eisenhower told him that Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami told him when he visited him in Washington that it would have been better to send his envoy Robert Murphy to resolve the situation, rather than send in the Marines. Eisenhower commented: “One man might not narrow the differences that were tearing Lebanon apart.” He was quoted as wondering: “How can a country be saved from its leaders?”
The second American intervention was following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and Iran’s entry into the Lebanese arena, which prevented America from achieving its goals in the region, according to Hill, as its alliance with Syria defeated the peace deal between Israel and Lebanon.
Lebanon became a priority for the administration of President Ronald Reagan for a short period between 1982 and 1984. The goal was to prevent the outbreak of a Syrian-Israeli war, and to ensure that the recklessness of the situation in Lebanon would not hinder the “strategic consensus” initiative of the Reagan administration, which focused on reaching a consensus between itself and the countries of the region to confront the danger. Soviet. The picture that Hill conveys of the method of American decision-making during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to eliminate the threat of the Palestine Liberation Organization is very similar to what is happening today in Gaza. Israel told Washington that it would carry out a limited operation and it reached Beirut. Secretary of State Alexander Haig refused to pressure Israel to cease fire, but in the end President Reagan stopped the war when he called Israeli Prime Minister Begin and warned him that the American-Israeli relationship was at stake if Defense Minister Sharon did not stop the bombing of Beirut. The bombing stopped and Begin withdrew from Sharon the authority to use the Israeli Air Force. But America’s reassurances to the Palestinians did not prevent the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
Hill says that Reagan had good intentions in the 1980s, but he did not target the source of the problem in Damascus and Tehran. Israel and America limited their military action to Lebanese territory only, so Lebanon paid the price and it did not cost Iran and Syria anything. Reagan did nothing following the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, or the Marine headquarters, and the Reagan administration did not have a strategy to confront the entry of Iranian power into the Levant, especially since Washington’s policy towards Iran was to win it over.
Hill believes that the siege of Beirut gave the Iranian Revolutionary Guard the opportunity to set foot in Lebanon and create Hezbollah.
President Bill Clinton’s policy was to see Syria as the strategic key to the region and to peace with Israel. American officials appeased President Al-Assad, and considered Syria’s presence in Lebanon a necessary evil to deal with the Hezbollah threat. Policy towards Iran was characterized by fluctuations and instability, moving from hostility to unilateral flirtation. This policy strengthened Syria’s role in Lebanon and strengthened Hezbollah.
President George Bush’s policy succeeded in achieving its limited goals in Lebanon in 2004-2008, as it worked with France to withdraw Syria from Lebanon, carry out an international investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and hold elections as part of the freedom agenda that it was adopting. But the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 clashed with the agenda of freedom in Lebanon. This war reduced America’s influence in Lebanon and was unable to deal with the Hezbollah problem. After 2008, America’s policy returned to neglect and instability in Lebanon.
President Obama left office without any tangible results for his ambitions for peace in the Middle East. But his change of heart from his red lines and retreat from punishing Syria for its use of chemical weapons “shocked America’s allies in the region,” and Hill quoted Richard Haass as saying that this was “the end date for America’s supremacy in the Middle East.” His secret negotiations with Iran and signing the nuclear agreement with it also worried America’s allies in the region.
President Donald Trump arrived “with no specific agenda” other than to reconsider America’s power in the region. The policy of realism that characterized his administration led to “the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the recognition of the annexation of the Golan.” According to Hill, the Abraham Accords were “a recognition that the path to Arab-Israeli peace does not pass through Ramallah, but rather through a common security approach to deal with the common threat posed by Iran.” In a position aimed at restoring America’s reputation, Trump’s response to the Syrian forces’ use of chemical weapons was to destroy the air base from which these weapons were launched, in contrast to what Obama did.
Hill believes that President Biden’s administration “succeeded in reaching an agreement on the maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel, but American officials will find it tempting to resort to a policy of neglect until a crisis erupts that threatens the supply of energy in the Mediterranean.” This neglect did not last long due to the Gaza war and the fear that it would spread to Lebanon and turn into a regional war.
The lack of stability in American policy is due to the change of administrations and factors related to internal politics, from elections to the role of Congress and pressure circles. This change sends a message to external parties, especially in the Middle East. If you are suffering from American policy, Hale says, you can expect a change following 4 or 8 months. Years. He believes that this reality is the price of democracy and the rotation of power.
1711768530
#ebb #flow #American #politics
