The Unintended Consequences of a Trump Presidency on European Defense
The return of Donald Trump to the White House is likely to have a profound impact on European defense, particularly in regards to the continent’s efforts to reduce its dependence on American-made defense equipment. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign affairs will heighten the appeal of U.S.-made defense equipment, making it even harder for European countries to resist the temptation of "buying American." In fact, European experts have long argued that purchasing signature U.S. platforms and munitions is essential for increasing the bloc’s bargaining power and preventing even worse security policy outcomes for the old continent.
The Challenges Facing European Defense Firms
Trump’s enthusiastic promotion of U.S. arms exports will narrow European firms’ home and potential export markets, posing a significant challenge given Europe’s already fragmented market and European defense companies’ export dependence. This is particularly concerning when compared to their more self-sustaining U.S. counterparts. As a result, despite renewed calls for European defense to become more serious and autonomous, the continent will become even more dependent on the United States for its security. Warnings over Trump’s volatile and erratic character and America’s unreliability as an alliance partner will be glossed over by the continued allure of buying American weapon systems.
A Look Back at the Common Security and Defense Policy
During Trump’s first term, E.U. officials rekindled the then-dormant field of the bloc’s Common Security and Defense Policy by launching instruments such as the European Defense Fund. However, this initiative was met with resistance from Trump administration officials, who denounced efforts to exclude non-E.U. entities from funding opportunities as a "dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector." This sentiment is ironic, given that European defense industry representatives have long lamented the one-way-street dynamic of the transatlantic defense sector.
The Failure of the "Family of Weapons" Agreement
A remedy proposed by then-Under Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, the "family of weapons" agreement, aimed at ending competitive development among allies by fostering licensed production of standardized systems. This approach included a U.S. concession of the Western short-range air-to-air missile market to a British-West German missile. However, unmet commitments on U.S.-licensed production of the Franco-German Roland air defense system, coupled with increasing U.S. protectionism in arms production, led to the agreement’s eventual failure.
The Inherent Tension in European Arms Production
European defense firms face an inherent and inescapable tension between equipping their armed forces with market-available defense equipment from the world’s leading military power and securing their long-term industrial capacities. Recent analysis reveals the enduring reality of the one-way street in arms procurement, especially for the most technologically complex weapon systems such as fighter aircraft. Even when Europeans can sell their products to the United States, they face the oligopsonist market power that requires technology transfer as well as significant U.S. shares in production.
The Impact of U.S. Arms Exports on European Defense
A U.S. government that loosens arms export restrictions and actively promotes arms sales as a tool for strengthening alliances complicates Europe’s efforts to achieve the economies of scale necessary to make its defense projects viable. Signature European defense programs, vital for developing next-generation capabilities, face severe funding challenges. Officials have made it clear that these programs ought to rely on exports to achieve meaningful success. However, the U.S. promotion of arms sales undermines these efforts, forcing Europeans to reconsider their priorities.
The Dilemma for U.S. Grand Strategy
The material foundation of the trans-Atlantic alliance presents a strategic dilemma for U.S. grand strategy, challenging both proponents of restraint and advocates of deep engagement. For the latter, this entails accepting a more balanced trans-Atlantic defense-industrial competition, even if it requires surrendering some market share. Allowing European defense firms a larger portion of their own market may help address proliferation concerns by reducing Europe’s reliance on non-European markets, thus opening the door to a trans-Atlantic arms cartel. However, a Trump administration driven by a transactional approach could inadvertently intensify Europe’s dependence on the United States as a security provider.
The Paradox of European Autonomy
Despite Trump’s insistence on cutting down on U.S. security commitments to Europe, the incoming president’s transactional approach will likely exacerbate existing dependencies, pushing European countries to prioritize U.S. procurement over building autonomous capacities. While European defense spending may increase, the strategic alignment of those resources could drift toward reinforcing bilateral ties to Washington, rather than fostering a genuinely integrated and self-sustaining European defense industry.
