2024-02-24 13:50:44
The fronts are heading towards a stalemate… and a decisive victory is a difficult dream for both sides
As the war in Ukraine enters its third year on Saturday morning, February 24, the world is recalling those decisive moments, when Russian television channels cut off their regular broadcast early in the morning two full years ago, to broadcast a recorded message from President Vladimir Putin, in which he announced the start of a “military operation.” In particular, it aims to achieve three main goals: “protecting the population of Donbass, eradicating Nazism, and disarming Ukraine.”
Over two years of fierce battles that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands on both sides, the displacement of millions of refugees, and the destruction of hundreds of cities and towns, the features of Russian demands in the neighboring country gradually became clear, by devoting the trend to dividing Ukraine and tightening control over important parts of it. And re-engineering the strategic security map in Europe, to ensure the interests of the Kremlin.
The war, the decision to launch which shocked many, and raised enormous fears over the course of two years, when it approached on more than one occasion to the brink of a direct, broad conflict between Russia and NATO, the Russian generals had built their plans to be a lightning and quick war. Security and political reports that leaked later did not hide the conviction that Moscow initially expected that Kiev would quickly be forced to sign a surrender instrument, which would impose a new security, military and political reality in Europe that would push the West to sit at the negotiating table to conclude a comprehensive deal.
But the “special military operation” quickly turned into a comprehensive hybrid war between Russia and the West, in which both sides used all kinds of weapons and tactics. It took the Kremlin two full years to acknowledge at the beginning of 2024 that the confrontation had become “a complete war between Russia and the West,” and that its repercussions extended to include all aspects of life. It had also become a turning point for redrawing maps of influence and balances of power, including changing alliances, building blocs, and restructuring political and military plans. And economic.
Field maps
After two years, the direct field results can be summed up in expanding the scope of Russian military control within the territory of Ukraine by regarding 5-fold, given the area of territory currently controlled by the Russian army. In exchange for the control of the pro-Moscow separatists over limited parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the eve of the outbreak of war, Russian forces, with the help of the separatists, began to extend complete and tight control over regarding two-thirds of the Donetsk territory, 95 percent of the Luhansk territory, regarding 75 percent of the Zaporizhya region, and a little more. From half of the Kherson region. In addition, there are pockets of Russian control in the south of the Kharkiv region to the east and several areas in the center and west.
Polish border guards patrol alongside the strip wall on the Belarusian border (AP)
These results are not completely satisfactory to the Kremlin, of course, as it had pledged to quickly extend control over the entire Donbass region (south-eastern Ukraine), and to tighten its grip on all of Zaporizhya and Kherson, forcing the division of Ukraine into two complete parts, but the task seemed difficult and arduous. Russia needed to fight fierce battles for 224 days to achieve victory in the small town of Bakhmut last May. It also needed to fight fiercely for 5 months later to achieve a new breakthrough in the stalemate of the fronts by tightening its grip on the city of Avdiivka in Donetsk last week.
Despite the importance of the development, because Avdiivka has always been the center of the strongest Ukrainian garrison in the south of the country, the advance of only 31 kilometers following fierce battles for months reflected the level of difficulty in achieving major breakthroughs for both sides in a way that radically changes the maps of the field.
An archive photo of the Russian landing ship “Tsar Kunikov,” which Kiev announced was sunk (Reuters)
On the other hand, with the lines of contact almost stagnant, it seemed that the maps of confrontations had changed significantly over the course of two years, as Russia was no longer alone in launching continuous attacks on Ukrainian cities. In contrast to the situation during the first year of the war, Ukraine succeeded, with strong armed support from the West, in extending the scope of battles to include deep into Russian territory. Areas near the border are now exposed to almost daily attacks using missile systems and drones. The strikes also affected areas far inside Russia, including the capital, Moscow. Although Kiev failed to impose the “balance of terror” equation and shook the confidence of the Russians, who began to feel that the shrapnel of war was falling near their homes in areas far from the lines of contact, the development was of special importance because it made the Russians feel the burden of prolonging the confrontation.
Firefighters work among burning cars following a bombing in Belgorod, Russia (AP)
5 gains for the Russians
However, Russian military and security experts list five main gains that Moscow achieved as a result of the second year of the war, the most important of which is the development of Russia’s attacking capabilities and its success in reducing the extent of the expected danger from the other side. In this sense, Russia’s security from medium- and short-range missiles was guaranteed through an important network of air defense umbrellas.
Experts say that NATO is “unable to deploy its missiles dangerously close to our borders, and that our missile defense system works successfully once morest other types of weapons.” If this conclusion is correct, it will give Russia greater confidence that expanding NATO by annexing Finland and Sweden and mobilizing tens of thousands of soldiers and military equipment in Poland near the borders with Russia and Belarus will not have an impact on the strategic level of the country’s security.
From a previous Ukrainian attack targeting the Crimean Bridge linking the Russian mainland to the peninsula (AP)
The Russian Defense Ministry says it has created the most experienced army in the world in Russia’s Northern Military District. There are more than 650,000 contract soldiers in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Among them are 300,000 mobilized in 2022, who have already undergone combat coordination, and many of them have gained real combat experience. Moreover, the experience of modern warfare has been developed, which the vast majority of Western armies may not possess.
The second element lies in the steadfastness of the Russian economy despite being under the yoke of unprecedented sanctions packages. Experts say that the burden of military operations on the country’s economy did not conflict with comprehensive development plans. According to government estimates, the gross domestic product in Russia for the year 2023 has grown by 3.6 percent (Rosstat), which is higher than all expectations that have been made, and also higher than most Western countries, many of which did not record growth, but rather entered into recession. .
This includes redirecting the Russian economy, replacing transportation and supply routes to avoid sanctions, and restructuring productive sectors by relying on new suppliers such as China, North Korea, and other Asian countries. In general, a whole map of new economic alliances was built that mitigated the negative effects of Western sanctions.
Residents of Rostov on a tank at the beginning of the “Wagner” rebellion last summer (AP)
The third gain, according to Russian experts, is evident in the internal social dimension. Moscow has succeeded in confronting the escalating state of internal anxiety and gathering the support of the majority of Russians in the face of the “global war on Russia.” This was evident through the extremely weak reaction to the military mobilization decisions and the decisive process in confronting the Wagner Group’s rebellion, and the death of opposition leader Alexei. Navalny is in prison, as well as many unpopular decisions.
It is true that large numbers have left Russia (regarding a million people), but these are described as “people who were mentally rooted in the Western value system,” and therefore, according to the conviction of government circles, their absence does not constitute a weakness but rather a strength on the internal level. Their departure was exploited to stimulate the unification of the volunteer movement, which permeated the entire Russian society from top to bottom.
Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev (right) with the late Prigozhin in a video clip from Rostov urging the head of “Wagner” to reconsider his actions (AFP)
Therefore, experts place this among the gains because it helped to re-form “a new elite in our country – with a national mentality, who understands why and for whom it works, and knows who they can rely on and who they cannot depend on.”
Experts also place among the gains that Russia has become “richer” thanks to the fact that the most fertile sea on the planet, the Sea of Azov, was transformed with the tightening of control over southern Ukraine into a Russian lake.
Those with this logic say that Russia obtained deposits of ore, coal, and gas in Donbass and “Novorossiya,” (New Russia), and “we obtained the largest nuclear power plant in Europe (Zaporizhia). All of these are resources and opportunities for the future development of these regions and the country as a whole.”
“Novorossiya” also brought important economic gains, thanks to which Russia’s grain harvest might increase by at least a third. This makes Russia the largest player in the global wheat market.
Also, “with the return of 4 regions to Russia, the number of Russians increased by 8 million people,” whom Russia desperately needs to confront its severe demographic crisis.
As for the fifth gain, according to the Russian expert community, it becomes clear as the confidence of the Europeans and the West in general in the possibility of achieving a strategic victory over Russia is shaken. They point this out to the results of a recent poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which showed that only 10 percent of Europeans now believe in the possibility of achieving a victory for the Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield. The survey was conducted in January 2024 once morest the backdrop of the debate in the US Congress over additional funding for Ukraine and before the European Union’s decision to provide financial aid to Kiev worth 50 billion euros. The report’s authors point out that the survey results might also have been influenced by the failed counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On the other hand, the number of Europeans who believe in Russia’s victory in the war is 20 percent greater than the number of those who believe in Ukraine’s victory. It is true that this number is also modest, but it is important for Russia, and indicates the level of the widespread internal crisis in European societies due to the war.
Two Ukrainian men walk in front of buildings burning due to bombing in Borodyanka, northwest of Kiev, on April 4, 2022 (AFP)
Other accounts by opponents of the war
On the other hand, opponents of the war in Russia, whose voices are barely heard in public, believe that in the long run, Moscow has incurred a huge loss due to the difficulty of re-normalizing relations with Europe and the West in general, and more importantly, it has become militarily surrounded by de facto following Sweden and Finland joined the war. NATO, in exchange for its control over the Sea of Azov, completely lost the Baltic Sea, which is almost turning into an Atlantic lake. With the loss of “Ukraine forever,” they believe that Russia has lost the ability to rearrange its regional environment, especially in the former Soviet space, where “the republics are seeking to jump off the train,” and following Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova and Armenia are currently facing a similar situation. It is sufficient as an example that Armenia announced on the eve of the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Ukrainian war that it would freeze its membership in the Collective Security Organization led by Moscow. While the Central Asian republics began to adopt special policies in isolation from the Kremlin, based on finding balances in the relationship with Russia on the one hand, and the West on the other hand.
Firefighters work among burning cars following a bombing in Belgorod, Russia (AP)
Among the losses that opponents say is that Russia will face an internal situation that is more closed and isolated than that of the Soviet Union, which will affect Russian society for many years to come. Also, the possibility of reaching comprehensive deals that end the war seems more distant, especially with the Kremlin’s tendency to abandon the principle of partial deals to settle security and political issues and agree on settlements for regional crises, in exchange for focusing more on the idea of integrating all controversial files into a comprehensive framework. In this sense, what is required in practice is to open channels of dialogue to reach a major, comprehensive deal, and this is something whose premise and circumstances do not appear to be close to maturity.
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