The issues facing China are not limited to the Taiwan issue. It is the same as the world that suffers from the Ukraine crisis.
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Chinese Embassy in Ukraine immediately issued a warning. “When traveling by car, put up the Chinese flag in a conspicuous place on the vehicle.”
It was aimed at over 6,000 Chinese residents. Ukraine is a key point in the “One Belt, One Road” initiative of the Xi Jinping administration. It is a nodal point for freight transportation to Europe, and has accumulated local investment in fields such as agriculture and communications. Many of the popular corona vaccines are made in China.
He was confident that he might act as a bridge between Ukraine and Russia.
Two days later, however, the embassy changes course. “Chinese citizens should not reveal their identity.” As major countries intensify their criticism one following another, China repeats words and deeds to protect Russia. In China, which is supposed to have strict information control, there are also internet posts that look down on Ukraine. Anti-Chinese sentiment in the area suddenly increased.
China aims to surpass the United States not only in terms of economy, but also in terms of international influence. The Xi administration does not hide its challenge to the conventional order under the slogan of “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” Even in the Ukraine crisis, it keeps a distance from the West.
Extending its own diplomacy to Africa and the Pacific is part of that. But so far it’s bad. This is because the “strong Russia” that they rely on is becoming a thing of the past.
At a press conference in June, Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University and an international political scientist representing China, pointed out: “The United States no longer sees Russia as a threat on par with Iran, Syria and North Korea.”
The U.S. is also rapidly launching measures to keep its distance. On July 27, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for Russia to be recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism. If approved by the State Department, Russia will join the “new axis” following Syria, Cuba, Iran and North Korea.
The opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, in which Mr. Putin was invited as the guest of honor, was shown around the world. The closer I got, the heavier the burden.
Roasted liver is also shaken.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) headquarters in Beijing, March. “We will suspend the projects for Russia and Belarus for the time being and reconsider.” President Jin Liqun held an emergency internal meeting and made a declaration. AIIB moves to help Russia. That’s because rumors spread.
In the U.S. Congress, there is a proposal to add China-led AIIB to the sanctions list. More lending to Russia might spark a fire. It was Mr. Kim’s remark that took the initiative. However, “Russia is the third largest investor. We can’t turn it down.” AIIB officials are troubled.
Mr. Xi, who is regarding to enter an unprecedented third term as party general secretary, is steadily consolidating his power. Too strong “1 strong” causes surrounding thinking stop on the contrary.
“I can’t let you be with Mr. Putin. You should cut your hands quickly.” In March, Hu Wei, vice chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the State Council Counselor’s Office, who is an adviser to the government, is said to have spoken frankly to high-ranking party officials. The result was a continuation of the conventional policy.
Contradictions are unacceptable in “major power diplomacy.”
A town on the border with Russia, Heihe in Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China. On June 10, countless red flags symbolizing China were fluttered over the road bridge across the Amur River (Chinese name: Heilongjiang).
It was opened at an investment of approximately 50 billion yen to transport 4 million tons of cargo and 2 million passengers to Russia annually. A nearby museum displays a photo of the Chinese and Russian leaders holding hands at the Russian presidential palace.
The China-Russia border, which stretches over 4,000 kilometers, has long been a source of conflict. The area around Blagoveshchensk, which faces Heihe, was once part of the Qing Dynasty. It is rapidly changing into a symbol of reconciliation. “Russia is our greatest ally. Mr. Chen Ning (53, pseudonym), who grew up in his hometown, maintains a serious expression.
The master-servant reversal progresses, and the possibility of China becoming an economic vassal state of Russia is becoming more likely. It supports satellite nations under its umbrella, both implicitly and explicitly. The scenery seen somewhere like that is regarding to be repeated.
Yasuhiro Matsuda, a professor at the University of Tokyo, has a foresight. “China has no choice but to carry the big North Korea, which is Russia, on its shoulders.” The era of Greater China is also the dawn of greater turmoil.
Xi’s ‘complete dictatorship’hardens
shake in coronaParty Congress
Xi Jinping’s seemingly rock-solid regime is shaken by the response to the new coronavirus. Even if he assumes the post of general secretary of the Communist Party of China for a third term at the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which will be held this autumn, it is unclear whether he will be able to solidify the top leadership with only executives who are Xi’s protégés.
Two important meetings held on May 5 symbolize this. One is the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo, the supreme leadership of the Communist Party of China, which was presided over by Mr. Xi as general secretary, and the other is the Standing Committee held by the State Council (government).
Xi ordered the thorough implementation of “zero coronavirus countermeasures” and declared, “We will resolutely fight once morest any words and deeds that question or deny our country’s quarantine measures.”
On the other hand, Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who made a speech at the Executive Committee of the State Council, pointed out the current economic difficulties and announced support measures for small and medium-sized enterprises such as tax cuts and expanded loans, but support for Mr. Xi and zero corona. did not say
Mr. Xi’s inauguration as party general secretary for a third term is the established course, but that does not mean the power struggle is over. It can be said that the battle over how much the new regime can be solidified is still ongoing.
From 2012, Xi’s first term as general secretary focused on eliminating the Jiang Zemin faction in the name of an anti-corruption struggle.
Zhou Yongkang, former vice-president of the People’s Republic of China and said to be the top oil clique, and Sun Zhengcai, who was seen as the next prime minister and former Chongqing Municipal Party Committee secretary, were arrested one following another.
In his second term, he pushed hard to centralize the power and interests that he had taken away from the Jiang faction executives. The current seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee are not completely under Mr. Xi’s influence, but none of them directly oppose him. The collective leadership system has become nameless.
Although Mr. Xi is a member of the “Prince Party,” which includes the second-generation members of the party’s executives, he had little power of his own until he became general secretary. He has focused on excellent human resources who have held successive posts such as the top of Fujian Province, Zhejiang Province, and Shanghai City, and has raised them one following another as he has been promoted.
Representative examples include former subordinates Ding Xuexiang, head of the Party Central General Affairs Office, Li Qiang, Party Committee Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Government, Chen Min’er, Party Committee Secretary of Chongqing Municipal Party Committee, and Huang Kunming, Director of Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee. Li Xi, secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, who was at the top of the list in places related to Mr. Xi, is also mentioned.
Speculation spread that Mr. Xi will not only select the senior members of the pro-democracy party as candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee, but also overturn party conventions and forcibly choose the prime minister from among them, who are not even deputy prime ministers.
It was the new corona that broke such a scenario. The zero-corona policy will deal a fatal blow to the Chinese economy, and dissatisfaction will spread.
The extent to which Mr. Xi can get his way across is also unclear. Deputy Prime Minister Hu Chunhua, former first secretary of the Communist Youth League, who has been kept at a distance, may once once more emerge as a candidate for prime minister.
If, like Xi, the custom of age restrictions on the Standing Committee is abolished, a scenario emerges in which Han Zheng, who is currently serving as the head of the Standing Committee, will remain on the Standing Committee and become prime minister to avoid Mr. Hu. Mr. Han is from Shanghai and is not affiliated with Mr. Xi, but he is said to have a good relationship with Mr. Xi.
Prior to the autumn party convention, important personnel matters are said to be finalized at the “Beidaihe Conference” where party elders and cadres gather in August. Even following Shanghai’s two-month lockdown, infections spread sporadically throughout the country, and it will be difficult to stage an economic recovery before the Beidaihe conference. Under the surface, the power struggle has entered a phase of further intensification.
“The Age of Great China” Interview Team Tetsuya Abe, Kazuhiro Kuda, Manabu Shimada, Wataru Iwasaki, Daisuke Harashima, Kensaku Ihara, Toru Tsunashima, Iori Kawate, Tomoyuki Doi, Shunsuke Tabeta, Nozushi Hata, Ryotaro Yamada, Yuji Kihara, Shin Watanabe, Yuri Momoi, Hisashi Kawakami, Yusuke Hinata, Satsuki Kaneko, Kazuya Manabe, Anna Nishino, Minori Sato, Yuhei Kobe, Yutaka Nakamura, Tomoyo Ogawa, Tomoko Wakasugi, Kennao Motowaki, Setsuo Otsuka, Naoki Matsuda, Ken Kobayashi, Composed by Kiji Sato.
