More than two weeks after the Ukrainian incursions in the Kursk region, Putin’s reactions seem to be oriented towards a deferred response, towards a retaliation that lays bare, if there was still any need, the unavailability of fresh forces to be allocated to sealing the borders, left exposed to the substantially unchallenged raids of Zelenski’s troops.
The Russian choice was therefore not to leave the Donbass front unprotected – as perhaps the Ukrainians hoped – and to put together additional contingents from scratch to be allocated to the northern front. And Putin also gave a deadline for the reconquest of its territories, by October 1st.
It will be interesting to see how in little more than a month a new war front can be covered, what resources one thinks one can resort to after having already clamorously broken the pact made with the citizens not to employ conscripts in arms: because there is no doubt that the many dozens of soldiers who surrendered to the Ukrainians without fighting in the Kursk region were conscripts.
More generally, the conclusion of this new and unexpected phase shows that Ukraine has temporarily created a buffer zone close to its borders, as well as an undoubted success in terms of image, a significant blow to Russia’s reputation, already tarnished by its crude, outdated and blatantly inadequate military capabilities to achieve the objectives that Putin’s generals consider within reach but in reality unrealistic if not utopian.
An inadequacy that is difficult to explain to its citizens, even taking into account the disinformation and misleading propaganda, both in full swing to hide such disappointing results. Putin will also have to explain to the mothers of those boys why he sent to the slaughter, contrary to what he promised, so many young people completely unprepared to face war scenarios.
As far as armaments are concerned, it does not seem that Putin can count on anything new, capable of changing the balance, even if once again he tried to spread fears and apprehensions by speaking, on the sidelines of a Security Council, of “new technical solutions”. Even on the Ukrainian side, men seem to be the major penalizing factor, perhaps the detrimental one. Zelenski has also been scraping the barrel for some time, resorting to every expedient in order to keep organics at acceptable levels. And yet a non-secondary factor plays in his favor, such as the modernization of weapons systems and their progressive and growing debut in the theater of operations.
Zelenski is right when he urges donor countries to continue, if anything to increase, the supply of modern systems. He is right because he is still paying for delays, distinctions, reservations and various hesitations at a time when it is not at all certain that aid can continue or even cease from some countries.
The F16s were being talked about a few weeks after the start of the conflict and perhaps only now are the first systems making their debut in offensive and defensive air operations; and however things go, the fleet will never reach the size needed to achieve air superiority worthy of the name. Also, once again, due to the lack of pilots. Not to mention, as mentioned, the absurd limitations on using the armament within its own borders.
A machine that therefore moves forward in fits and starts, with the serious risk of jamming and with little hope of ever reaching full capacity.
Ultimately, there do not seem to be the conditions to get out of the stalemate into which the war has fallen immediately after its start. Nor is it possible to evaluate the impact that the novelties on the battlefield (such as the raids on Russian territory) as well as those that may arise, could have on the start, -finally- of a negotiation phase, the only solution, today more than yesterday, to put an end to this senseless and far too long war.
#plan #Ukrainian #advance #Tempo
2024-08-22 23:27:31
