2023-09-26 09:57:03
Hello Ouille,
It’s not stupid. It’s a good question and this Nigerien episode brings it to the surface in a much more acute way than in the case of Mali or Burkina Faso. While the end of “Barkhane”, in 2021, had been desired for a long time by the Head of State and an entire part of the military apparatus, the departure of the special forces from Burkina Faso, in February, was less been experienced as a failure rather than an opportunity to be seized to redeploy more discreetly elsewhere, the forced withdrawal from Niger is a real blow for the entire military institution. Both for operational, cultural and structural reasons. Africa has always been seen as a means of training units for real combat, whereas in Estonia or Romania today, the troops deployed are more confined to surveillance or coalition training. Military cooperation has also historically always been considered an important lever of influence. Culturally, the military hierarchy, mainly within the army, has, moreover, always been more attracted by paratrooper commandos or marine troops than by cavalary or artillery, which are rarely deployed in the Sahel. There are, finally, less admissible reasons, linked to the difficulty of giving up a rough training ground, but not necessarily too exposed, French-speaking, allowing the rotation of troops, bonuses, and command posts, all by contributing to recruitment. All in a context of a growing vocations crisis. The pressure on maintaining troops in Africa has also paradoxically increased since the start of the war in Ukraine. The possible shift of French forces towards Europe is complicated today by the fact that many countries on the eastern flank are already engaged in cooperation with other powers: Estonia with the United Kingdom, Lithuania with the Germany, Poland and Romania with the United States. But all these schemes are exploding.
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#hypothesis #partial #redeployment #Chad #scenarios