This article is “The Glocal Global Political and Economic Weekly Report”, which selects and analyzes weekly international events in three dimensions: point, line, and surface. The Glocal offers members-only subscription content:〈Reader Subscription〉。
This week’s The Glocal Global Political and Economic Weekly, focuses on the Burmese Civil War, which has entered its third year. Although the situation of the Burmese military government has begun to decline, and the anti-military government has seen a glimmer of hope, international intervention still needs to resolve fundamental interests. Like many Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar’s peaceful era relies on the dividends that roam between China and the United States. However, to end the civil war, China must also let go.
【Point】——The Burmese military government is in decline:
It has been two years since the military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021. The current situation of the military government in Myanmar has begun to decline, which may be an opportunity for international mediation. After the Burmese people were forced to take the road of armed resistance by the military government, the resistance force composed of the ethnic militia and the People’s Defense Forces continued to exert pressure on the Burmese military government. On the other hand, the military government has been struggling due to various factors such as low morale, disobedience, ineffective institutional governance, and endemic corruption. Coupled with the heavy losses caused by two years, divisions have emerged within the military and it has completely separated from political power. The junta has shifted from a fight to consolidate power to a fight for survival.
As a result, the decline of the military government gradually took shape, while the prospect of the anti-military government’s democratic resistance war gradually became clear. At this juncture of changing situations, the actions taken by Myanmar, including ASEAN, the democratic camp headed by the United States, and a country pro-Myanmar military government, will affect the development of the situation in Myanmar. Even, unilateral sanctions by the United States alone are enough to defeat the military government to a certain extent. However, the downfall of the military government does not necessarily mean peace. To completely get rid of the civil war, Myanmar must rediscover its position in the Indo-Pacific region.
Myanmar, which has little contact with the West, but has established close economic and trade relations with authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, how can it stand up again from the multi-party forces when ASEAN is doing nothing?
【Line】—ASEAN differences, limited US sanctions:
In 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the National League for Democracy government that won the election in the 2020 Myanmar parliamentary elections, and it ended with the Myanmar military taking power. The reason for overthrowing the democratically elected government at that time was that the National League for Democracy won the majority of seats in the 2020 Myanmar parliamentary elections, while the losing military questioned the election results, believing that there were frauds and election frauds, and then decided to use Article 40 of the Myanmar Constitution Section C, to take over and exercise state power.
Two months after the military coup in Myanmar (April 2021), ASEAN held a special meeting to put the Myanmar issue on the agenda and reached a five-point consensus. The purpose was to use the ASEAN mechanism to resolve the crisis in Myanmar, but the Myanmar regime refused to change Its tough stance, coupled with ASEAN’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, made the result “unsatisfactory”.
As the five-point consensus has no effect on the Myanmar crisis, cracks in the unity of ASEAN have emerged. For example, at the summit held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November 2022, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei did not attend. The member states are worried and will attend the summit It is tantamount to “acquiescence” to the Burmese military regime and weakens the pressure exerted by the international community on the military regime. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Summit in February 2023, the foreign minister appointed by the Burmese military was barred from attending the meeting, while member states showed “unity” on the Burmese issue. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Masudi’s repeated use of the word “unity” appears to be a cover-up, showing that she is trying to cover up divisions within the organization over the military’s seizure of power in Myanmar.
The United States also has certain measures to support the Burmese opposition, but with little success. In 2022, the United States passed the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2022, which reads: authorize the president to impose sanctions on those who he believes are involved in the destruction of democracy and human rights violations in Myanmar, and report to Congress these actions and related matters. At the same time, this bill is also aimed at strengthening related sanctions on the Myanmar military and its allies, and invisibly exerting pressure on China and Russia, allies of the military government. In December of the same year, the U.S. Congress added the Myanmar Act to the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation adds more specific policies that can help the democratic movement on the basis of the Myanmar Act. In addition to expanding targeted sanctions, the new bill promises to provide assistance to pro-democracy groups, including technical support and non-lethal assistance to resistance groups, and to provide humanitarian aid so that Burmese opposition operatives can receive funding for pro-democracy operations.
Although the policy of the above bill is ideally conducive to the democratization of Myanmar, in fact there are still many obstacles to the implementation of the bill. For example, in terms of political considerations, the United States still avoids putting too much pressure on the National League for Democracy, fearing that Myanmar will move closer to China because of this.
[Face]——Why can the Burmese military government stabilize the situation?
There are four reasons why the Burmese military government is still able to stabilize the situation:
(1) The disparity in military power between the Burmese military and the anti-junta faction is due to the fact that former President Thein Sein amended the constitution in 2008 to benefit the military, so as to ensure that the military will always legally dominate the Burmese political situation.
(2) There is a huge profit network within the Burmese military, and its military profit network has even penetrated into democratic countries. According to the information disclosed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the U.S. Department of the Treasury approved the Japanese company Yokogawa Bridge Corp. (MEC), a U.S.-sanctioned military company controlled by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, will ultimately help fund the regime’s operations and atrocities.
(3) The support for Myanmar’s democracy from all walks of life is only superficial, and most of the support is given at the diplomatic level without much material support. In addition, the role of sanctions is very limited, and it is difficult to shake the Burmese military regime.
(4) In 2021 and 2022, Brunei and Cambodia will serve as the chairman of ASEAN. The political influence and leadership of the two countries are weak, and they cannot handle the Myanmar issue in ASEAN.
In view of the current situation, if the United States and other democratic allies adopt reasonable sanctions, it may accelerate the fall of the Burmese military government and realize the democratization of Burma. But the Biden administration has shown hesitation in tightening sanctions on Myanmar, and its Congress has flagrantly ignored the priorities of isolating the military junta proposed by Congress through the Burma Act, failing to implement legislation and impose new sanctions since the U.S. Congress passed Burma in 2003 The Freedom and Democracy Act imposed a series of sanctions on Myanmar, but the economic sanctions did not achieve the expected effect of improving human rights in Myanmar, but instead made life worse at the grassroots level in Myanmar.
On the other hand, if the Burmese military government steps down, pro-Myanmar countries seem to be in more trouble. The reason is that such countries will have stable interest transfers and political transactions with Myanmar, and they should take actions to protect their interests in the post-military government era. . Among them, China, Thailand and India are the most influential, and the three countries together account for more than half of Myanmar’s total trade. In comparison, the US, UK and EU accounted for only 14%. As far as China and Thailand are concerned, the two sides have a large number of commercial transactions with Myanmar, such as important tin and copper imports, oil and gas pipelines and railway lines that have been completed, etc. Once the democratic camp in Myanmar takes power, China and Thailand need to renegotiate with Myanmar profit distribution.
As for India, although India and Myanmar have no obvious interest exchanges, there are rebels in the northeastern Nagaland state of India, which is connected to the border between the two places. India needs to establish a long-term friendly relationship with Myanmar to combat these anti-India forces. Therefore, India is in a more embarrassing situation. Is it going to draw a clear line with the Burmese army? Or continue to maintain friendly relations with Myanmar to fight against the rebels in the northeastern Nagaland State? It will be a difficult decision for India.