Iran’s missile and drone attack on Israel had become, by the end of this week, one of the most widely interpreted events in recent modern history.
Then, in the early hours of Friday morning, came reports of Israel’s counterattack. As in June 1914, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in a moment that ultimately led to the first world war, those gunshots were heard around the world, even if few can convincingly agree on what they foreshadowed. the Guardian estimates in its lengthy analysis.
Ambiguous analyzes of Iran’s target
By a minimal reckoning, Tehran merely sent a warning shot with its attack last Saturday. The maximalist version is that this was a state-on-state attack designed to change the rules of engagement. By flooding Israel with so many missiles, says such (the truth is far-fetched) assessment, Iran was ready to risk turning Israel into a mini… Dresden of 1945 and was thwarted only by Israeli strategic defenses and, above all , from the extraordinary cooperation between the US, Israel and the Sunni Gulf allies.
Whatever Iran’s ultimate intention was, its attack and now Israel’s reported counter-attack have left the Gulf states with dilemmas and difficult choices, according to Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations. How they react may determine the outcome of the crisis.
The key question is: do the Sunni monarchies led by Saudi Arabia fear Iran and its proxies more than they loathe Israel and its damage to the Palestinians and regional stability?
Over the past six months, that option has been suppressed as Iran and the Sunni states have forged a fragile united front. In January, Saudi Arabia ensured Iran had a seat at the table through a joint meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (GCC-IOC).
Still, the two sides have critical disagreements — over the two-state solution, the future role of Hamas, and whether state boycotts or divestments, once a common tool of Arab states once morest Tel Aviv, will they must be used in this crisis to put pressure on Israel, which Joe Biden has been unwilling to deploy.
Moreover, Iran has made no secret of its desire to see the US expelled from the region, a vision that the Gulf states do not share.
Cooperation with Israel
The question is whether the cooperation of the Arab states with Israel in repelling the Iranian attack indicates something bigger and more permanent. One school of thought is articulated by Martyn Idynk, former US ambassador to Israel, who stated in a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) briefing on the Iranian attack:
“What happened … is that the Sunni Arabs, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia, came out of the closet and made it clear that the threat from Iran was much greater than anything else. What we discovered was that the strategic coordination between the US and Israel is far more advanced than most of us knew … and [τα αραβικά κράτη] which have been attacked by Iranian missiles and rockets in the past now have a reliable defense umbrella that is part of a US-Sunni-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement.”
He said that the Gulf states no longer care if the world knows regarding this alliance and that as long as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can show sensitivity to Arab concerns, the basis for the development of the Israeli-Sunni relationship is there.
It is certainly true that the role of the Gulf states in Israel’s defense has long been prepared, Guaridan believes. “We’ve been practicing our steps together over and over once more for years,” said a British official. This is based on the assumption that the Arab states and Israel are “enemies”.
Speaking regarding the defense operation launched once morest the coming barrage from Tehran, CFR Fellow Max Boot said: “This is a huge victory for this de facto Centcom alliance and this new air defense network. 99% interception rate exceeds expectations. The US played a huge role, but so did the Arabs.”
Some Gulf nations have been more coy regarding their role than others, fearing domestic backlash. Qatar had no involvement despite being home to the largest US base in the Middle East. Likewise, no US F-35s flew from Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait may have allowed US jets into the sky, not to attack Iranian missiles, but to carry out “intelligence-gathering” missions. Saudi Arabia’s aerial warning and control system was operational, potentially providing information.
Above all, Jordan made no effort to hide the fact that it was shooting down Iranian drones to defend its sovereign airspace, prompting angry exchanges between the two countries. In them, Jordan accused Iran of using the Muslim Brotherhood militant group and Iraqi militia proxies for months to stage operations to infiltrate its territory to rouse the region’s largest Palestinian population.
The US military has for years supported a comprehensive air defense alliance that would unite the Gulf countries and Israel.
The first stage was the 2020 accords, through which Bahrain and the UAE normalized their relations with Israel. The second stage occurred in September 2021 with the relocation of Israel to Centcom, the US-Middle East combatant command that includes the Arab states.
Anti-Iran alliance?
The question now is whether the latest events will lead to an anti-Iranian air defense alliance, and if so, on what terms.
Dana Stroul, who until December was the highest-ranking Pentagon official with responsibility for the Middle East, insisted: “Whatever the regional politicians, the military establishment, the security establishment and the intelligence services of both the Arab states and Israel’s are quite clear – that Iran is the center of gravity for its instability, export of terrorism, and illegal nuclear weapons program.”
The Saudi press has made little effort to disguise Riyadh’s irritation with Iran. In Arab News, Abdulaziz Sagar, president of the Gulf Research Centre, wrote: “The Iranian leadership has tried to position itself as the guardian of the rights of the Palestinian people and the protagonist of the Palestinian struggle once morest Israel. This policy turned into hijacking the Palestinian cause and using the plight of the Palestinians in a completely dark way to support Iran’s expansionist and interventionist regional policy and national interests.”
He added: “The inevitable result of the Iranian missile attack on Israel is the collapse of the myth … that Iranian leaders have transmitted to the imaginations of the Arab world: that supporting Iran, its revolution and its leaders is the only way to effectively confronting Israeli arrogance and aggression”.
In Israel, politicians hope the Saudis will see the week’s events as a turning point. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said: “We have an opportunity here to create a strategic alliance once morest this serious threat from Iran, which is threatening to put nukes in the warheads of these missiles.”
But Stroul urged caution. “If this integrated air defense is regarding our partners’ dominant airspace, there is room for cooperation, but if we try to push it into an anti-Iran and pro-Israel coalition, our partners will get nervous.”
Moreover, some consider the idea that the Gulf states are going to significantly intensify their relations with Israel to be too much triumphalism. Lovatt said the Arab states’ cooperation in responding to Iran’s attack might be seen simply as an effort to limit the damage done by Tehran and thus prevent an escalating Israeli response.
He said Riyadh’s foreign policy was on a new path that put its own economy first and that was the purpose of the Saudi-Iranian deal reached in 2013 with the help of Iraq and China.
Palestinian future
Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, had in recent months invested significantly in their own Palestinian peace plan, he pointed out. This included proposals for a ceasefire, followed by an Arab international protection force that would operate in both Gaza and, significantly, the West Bank. Under the plan, the protection force would be formed at the request of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and would not be externally imposed. This would be the harbinger of peace talks that would last at most two years and lead to the creation of a Palestinian state.
All parties would have to agree on this final point, which is an obstacle for Netanyahu. The plan promised Israeli regional recognition and integration at the final stage. Lovatt said Arab states had hoped to release the plan in March, but that was delayed by the US. A key element would include giving Hamas a role within a renewed Palestinian leadership.
Lovatt said it was possible that Iran might join it, despite its long-standing opposition to the two-state solution. Noting that Iran signed a GCC-IOC statement in January supporting a two-state solution, he said that if a concrete plan for it emerged, the Palestinians, including Hamas, accepted that it might be possible to convince Tehran.
Although there is widespread cynicism regarding Saudi Arabia’s intentions towards the Palestinians, many British officials insisted that Riyadh was talking enthusiastically regarding the possibility of holding a peace conference. Saudi diplomats themselves denied they would abandon the Palestinians if Biden met Riyadh’s demands for his own security in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel.
Tobias Borck, head of the Middle East at the defense institute RUSI, said: “The Palestinian issue is next to Riyadh’s domestic national interests, but I think the Saudis know very well that the kind of stability they want in the region is really only possible when this instability from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is somewhat tamed.”
On that basis, he noted, Saudi Arabia will resist further escalation with Iran for now, seeing it as a distraction, and will instead insist that the world’s gaze should not be diverted from Gaza.
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