The leadership’s capacity to demand unwavering loyalty from all party members, compelling them to accept its evolving interpretations of reality, has been, and continues to be, a critical pillar of its governance. Command of the party’s ideology serves as a formidable tool for the top leader, allowing him to legitimize fluctuating agendas while simultaneously quashing dissent and fostering a semblance of unity among the ranks. The plight of the average Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member is palpable, as they have been conditioned over an extended period to unconditionally embrace the so-called “scientific” imperatives that have dictated wildly divergent policies—ranging from the rigid Soviet-style command economy to the disastrous Great Leap Forward, through the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, onto the era of “reform and opening,” and presently, culminating in the New Era characterized by heightened economic statism and intensified political control.
In a Leninist framework, no concept of limited governance constrains the party’s reach. Much like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the official doctrine of the CCP overtly champions the concentration of power within its leadership, eschewing any forms of external limitations. The party’s pervasive integration into the mechanisms of state, society, and the economy enables it to mobilize a diverse array of powers to further its objectives. Its core ruling institutions are remarkably resilient: The Central Committee boasts a legacy of over a century, while the CCP has maintained a grip on governance across all of China for more than 75 years. Central Party officials operate under established administrative norms, leveraging tried-and-true doctrines, and enjoy the privilege of long-term strategic planning.
The CCP’s decision-making process is unrestrained by legal or normative boundaries concerning its engagement with society or the global stage; the expedience in service of party interests serves as the guiding principle at every level. Political vulnerabilities and interests are foregrounded in internal discussions, truly reflective of the CCP’s inception—it is acutely aware of the threats of subversion—and remains ever mindful of the daily reminders posed by its internal surveillance apparatus regarding possible risks.
A ruling Leninist entity like China’s maintains a perpetual state of alertness, ever wary of threats to its power. It is intentionally paranoid. This characteristic derives partly from ideological foundations, notably the perceived animosity of “counterrevolutionary” factions domestically and capitalist nations abroad, but is fundamentally a byproduct of a governance system that does not tolerate challenges. In alignment with other Leninist regimes, the CCP strives to eliminate independent civil society and seeks dominance over all institutions. It does not merely aim for survival; it demands an uninterrupted monopoly on power.
Leninist systems have the capacity to adapt to evolving conditions while preserving their fundamental characteristics. For instance, during a period of existential crisis, Yugoslavia managed to implement substantial economic and social liberalization. An analysis of the inherent tensions and trends within the Leninist model elucidates why China has experienced a significant conservative turn over the past two decades, marked by reinforced centralization, widespread internal discipline initiatives, adherence to ideological rigidity, and the suppression of civil society.
Observers often consider these policies in stark contrast to the preceding “reform and opening” era initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Deng himself was unfalteringly committed to the principles of Leninist governance, as illustrated by his brutal crackdown on protests on June 4, 1989. Following the devastation of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, however, the urgency to salvage the party-state compelled Deng and his contemporaries to embrace radical experimentation, which included agricultural decollectivization, the gradual introduction of market mechanisms, and a measured retreat by the party from everyday life. While democratic reforms were never on the table, the changes embraced at that time were extraordinary and displayed an unexpected willingness to take risks concerning Leninist authority.
The reform and opening policies yielded significant gains in terms of growth and revitalization; however, they concurrently undermined the system’s controls, reduced disciplinary measures, and unleashed pressures advocating for liberalization. The Tiananmen Square massacre effectively curtailed any official discussions around political change, yet economic reforms and resulting societal transformations throughout the 1990s and 2000s increasingly eroded the foundations of the Leninist regime.
Once reform and opening propelled China to a certain threshold of wealth and power, the rationale for persisting with high-risk strategies concerning party equities began to meet mounting opposition. This counter-reformist momentum largely stemmed from internal forces within the CCP, reflecting a deep-rooted discomfort with the political ramifications of reform and an evolving perception of the cost-benefit equation. Notably, this resistance began to crystallize well in advance of Xi Jinping’s ascension to leadership in 2012. As highlighted by Professor Susan Shirk in her consequential work, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, this process had likely commenced in earnest no later than the mid-2000s.
Even as they portray themselves as inherently progressive, communist regimes exhibit notable conservatism and intolerance in practice. The CPSU’s Leninist perception of threats transcended conventional political landscapes, logically prompting the Kremlin to reject not only overt opposition but also unsanctioned expressions of ethnic identity, religious practices, women’s and human rights, sexual orientation, artistic endeavors, intellectual exploration, and independent economic activities.
The reform and opening period in China demonstrated that some degree of liberalization across these various spheres was possible within a Leninist framework. Nonetheless, constraints were persistently evident, as the control apparatus never fully vanished, and the party elite ultimately united in defense of the system’s very existence as perceived threats grew. The conservatism and intolerance characterizing contemporary China are not merely a reflection of Xi Jinping’s personal inclinations, but rather stem from the same structural logic that guided Soviet governance.
Recognizing the political structure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provides valuable insights into Xi Jinping’s identity as a leader. Xi epitomizes the consummate company man; despite the influence of his tumultuous youth, his professional trajectory has been defined by a sustained ascent through a complex and deeply entrenched institutional framework. Xi stands as both the product and beneficiary of a distinctive bureaucratic culture. He draws comparisons not with revolutionary figures like Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Deng Xiaoping, but with leaders whose emergence occurred within established Leninist frameworks—such as Leonid Brezhnev or Jiang Zemin. Unlike their revolutionary predecessors, these figures were shaped by bureaucratic structures that prioritized institutional integrity and continuity over fundamental challenges to the governing system.
National strength, economic prosperity, and societal well-being are undoubtedly important to Leninist leaders; however, internal dominance—not mere survival—ultimately takes precedence. Unlike liberal democracies or most authoritarian regimes, few governments evaluate policy with such an expansive lens focused on regime control. The CCP’s recent affirmation of a statist economy at the July 2024 Third Central Committee Plenary underscores this dynamic, and it is unlikely that Beijing’s subsequent stimulus initiatives will indicate a fundamental departure from this trajectory.
Indeed, the current CCP appears content to forgo the potentially higher growth rates that authentic market reforms could deliver, prudently recognizing such outcomes as politically precarious. Proposals for a systemic rebalancing of the economy towards enhanced consumption are off the table for analogous reasons. If Beijing reasserts its commitment to state control, technological innovation, and officially sanctioned economic drivers, it largely reflects the regime’s political priorities, which preclude structural alternatives.
Meanwhile, the leftward shift manifest in Beijing has heightened the conformity that is typical within Leninist systems. The reform and opening era from 1978 gradually cultivated a greater willingness among leaders at all levels to embrace risk for the sake of growth, their previously singular objective. In stark contrast, party operatives today navigate an environment characterized by diminished risk tolerance, where the political implications of decisions loom larger than ever.
Xi’s relentless anti-corruption crusade has escalated the stakes for party leaders, imposing penalties not only for malfeasance but also for failing to accurately interpret and implement the Center’s mandate—an imperceptible task now, as security considerations have been prioritized alongside economic development. As subordinate officials face ongoing pressures to comply and appease, economic stagnation strips them of the tools needed to satisfy their superiors and raises the probability of harsh repercussions for poor local performance.
Striking the ideal balance between consolidating power and managing the complexities of governing a vast, diverse, and relatively open society remains an ongoing challenge for the CCP. Over ten years into Xi’s leadership, the average Han citizen (albeit not their Tibetan or Uyghur counterparts) experiences a level of freedom and affluence far exceeding that of the early reform and opening days, and even more so when compared to the zenith of Mao’s era. Thus far, Beijing appears to recognize that applying direct mobilization and control tactics against its ethnic majority is less likely to fulfill its overarching objectives.
However, Beijing seems prepared to tolerate a balance that incurs substantial economic and social ramifications: A buoyant national economy for its own sake is viewed with suspicion, while dissatisfied elites seek to relocate themselves and their wealth internationally. The treatment of the Uyghurs serves as an alarming testament to the party’s readiness to revert to totalitarian measures when deemed necessary.
A return to the reform and opening framework appears improbable. Unless there is a rare successful leadership challenge or his health deteriorates, Xi Jinping is likely to remain at the helm indefinitely—and the trajectory of his views may further trend towards illiberalism as he ages. Additionally, despite facing significant challenges, Beijing is unlikely to encounter crises of the magnitude that prompted and facilitated Deng Xiaoping’s bold reforms. Absent extraordinary developments, the present-day CCP will likely remain in a defensive posture for the foreseeable future, responding conservatively to any challenges in order to protect its Leninist order.
**How does the heightened sense of conformity within the CCP under Xi Jinping impact the party’s decision-making processes and governance style?**
**Interview with Dr. Emily Zhang, China Political Analyst**
**Interviewer:** Thank you for joining us today, Dr. Zhang. The current trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to diverge significantly from the more open economic reforms of the past. Can you elaborate on the political implications of this shift?
**Dr. Zhang:** Thank you for having me. Yes, the CCP is increasingly prioritizing state control over economic growth and market reforms. This shift is rooted in a broader political strategy to maintain the party’s dominance and cohesion. Beijing seems to recognize that authentic market reforms, while potentially beneficial for economic growth, could introduce risks to the regime’s stability. Thus, proposals for greater economic rebalancing toward consumption are largely sidelined.
**Interviewer:** You mentioned the CCP’s heightened conformity under Xi Jinping. How does this affect the decision-making process within the party?
**Dr. Zhang:** The current environment within the CCP has indeed fostered a higher degree of conformity. Leaders now face significant pressure to present decisions that align with the party’s evolving interpretations of ideology, coupled with a fear of losing their positions due to misinterpretations or failures in executing the Central Committee’s directives. This increased risk aversion limits the willingness among officials to take the kinds of economic risks that were more prevalent during the reformist era initiated by Deng Xiaoping.
**Interviewer:** You spoke about Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts. How do these impact party leaders at various levels of the CCP?
**Dr. Zhang:** Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has raised the stakes considerably. Not only are party leaders accountable for their actions, but they must also navigate the complex landscape of interpreting and executing party mandates. This creates an environment where economic stagnation can pose serious problems. Leaders may find themselves caught between their obligations to comply with the party’s expectations and the realities on the ground, leading to potentially severe repercussions for any failures.
**Interviewer:** There seems to be a palpable fear within the party ranks. How does this correlate with the CCP’s historical context and governance style?
**Dr. Zhang:** This fear is deeply entrenched in the CCP’s Leninist framework, which emphasizes a monopoly on power and intolerance for dissent. The party’s history, from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, illustrates how governance and ideological control have evolved but always with an eye toward centralization and domination. The current conservatism is not merely a reflection of Xi’s personal style; it’s an outcome of structural pressures that prioritize the party’s internal stability over broader economic experimentation or reform.
**Interviewer:** Lastly, what does this all mean for the future of the CCP and China’s position globally?
**Dr. Zhang:** The CCP’s decision to value internal dominance over economic flexibility suggests a more isolated and cautious approach in both domestic and foreign policy. The party may focus on consolidating power and maintaining control rather than pursuing aggressive economic advances. While this might provide temporary stability, it could eventually limit China’s growth potential and innovation, posing challenges in its global standing. Without the willingness to adapt or reform, we may see both internal and external pressures mount, ultimately questioning the long-term viability of the current party structure.
**Interviewer:** Thank you, Dr. Zhang, for sharing your insights on such a complex topic. It will be interesting to see how these dynamics develop moving forward.
