Prabowo Subianto’s Presidency: Challenges for Democracy in Indonesia and International Support

Prabowo Subianto’s Presidency: Challenges for Democracy in Indonesia and International Support

<a href="https://www.archyde.com/indonesia-signs-deal-with-france-for-first-6-rafales/" title="Indonesia signs deal with France for first 6 Rafales”>Prabowo Subianto’s Political Comeback: A New Era for Indonesian Democracy?

Picture this: Indonesia, the supposed poster child of democracy in Southeast Asia, crowned a new president on 20 October 2024. But hold your applause! That president is none other than Prabowo Subianto, a man whose political ascent resembles a Phoenix—if the Phoenix had a bit of a “dark past” and a penchant for authoritarianism. If you were hoping for a democratic renaissance, you might want to huddle up with a comforting cup of tea instead.

Democracy’s Downward Spiral

It’s like a cruel joke, really. While Indonesia enjoys recognition as one of the largest democracies on the planet, it has recently taken a nosedive in democratic quality. This decline was nicely packaged during the reign of former President Joko Widodo, whose tenure was akin to a wild rollercoaster—upbeat but ultimately crashing down into skepticism.

Now, you might think, “Can’t we just hit reset?” Unfortunately, for Indonesia’s civil society, this isn’t a bad video game where you can just respawn every time you spawn chaos. Activists and NGOs are slamming their heads against walls, attempting to counter rollbacks on civil liberties. And who better to stoke the flames of dissent than the very figure of the not-so-distant authoritarian past: Prabowo?

Prabowo: A Catalyst for Change?

In a delicious twist of irony that even Shakespeare might envy, Prabowo—who once had civil society activists backing him—now represents everything they fought against. His return might spark a new wave of activism, which, unlike the era of Joko, might just summon the spirits of those once quashed hopes.

But wait, dear readers, before we pop the champagne bottles! Civil society is currently as divided as a family on Christmas Eve. Some organizations vie for leftover government funding like seagulls at a picnic, while others find themselves locked out for being *too* critical. Not exactly the recipe for a united front, is it?

The Funds Dilemma

Australia and other development partners now face a moral conundrum—should they support local pro-democracy forces or just maintain a cozy relationship with the Prabowo regime? History has warned us against placing all our eggs in one basket, especially when that basket is currently being kicked around by a former general with a taste for power.

While initiatives like the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Economic Development and the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice have helped (and let’s face it, they’ve been great at giving the illusion of progress), some academics are raising eyebrows. Are these funding flows really aiding reform? Or are they grease for the oily wheels of a government that could very well be cruising down the slippery slope towards better efficiency in oppression?

Seeking a Path Forward

Here’s a thought: maybe it’s time for international donors to shift gears from the playlist that’s been working for them and start a new track. The focus should be not just on ensuring procedural democracy (which is about as useful as polishing a rusty bike) but also on revitalizing democratic values—reminding everyone that democracy isn’t just a word tossed around during elections, but a lifestyle choice.

As we stand at this crossroads of cooperation and critique, the question hangs in the air: Will Australia and other nations choose to stand side by side with Indonesia in its struggle for genuine democracy, or will they sit back, sip coffee, and watch as the inevitable clash between civil society and government plays out? With the upcoming years promising tough choices, the answer may just reflect how we value democracy, not just in Indonesia, but at home too.

Let the games, my friends, begin!

For more insightful reading download the full report here.

On 20 October 2024, Prabowo Subianto was inaugurated as Indonesia’s eighth president, capping a striking political resurrection from the once-ostracised former general, whose past included allegations of human rights abuses. This event, while marking a significant achievement for Prabowo, also symbolizes a worrying downturn for the country’s already fragile democratic landscape. Observers believe that Prabowo’s administration will be disinterested in reversing the trend of democratic decline that has unfolded in recent years and, conversely, may exacerbate the situation further. Australia and similar development partners are now faced with challenging decisions regarding the extent and manner of support to local pro-democracy advocates striving to counteract the increasing repression.

Despite its recognition as one of the world’s largest democracies, Indonesia has recently experienced a substantial decline in the effectiveness of its democratic institutions, largely established during the leadership of former president Joko Widodo. This deterioration in democratic quality threatens Indonesia’s international image as a democratic powerhouse.

If Indonesia is to turn around its democratic fortunes, civil society will likely be the main driver for change. In recent years, activists, academics, and NGOs have grown increasingly critical of government efforts to roll back civil liberties and neuter checks and balances on its power. This backlash is in stark contrast to the support many activists once offered Widodo during his 2014 and 2019 campaigns, when enthusiasm quickly morphed into disillusionment as his administration’s authoritarian tendencies became clearer. Prabowo is the resurrected embodiment of the authoritarian era many activists fought against in the late 1990s and have no desire to see return. Therefore, ironically, he’s likely to generate energy and defiance from activists in a way they were unable to muster against Widodo until it was too late.

<pActivists and NGOs are also divided and under-resourced. Some have been locked out of government funding for being too critical, while those who have access often serve only as passive “implementing partners” of state programs. The internal divisions among various pro-democracy organizations come at a time when solidarity is essential for mounting a meaningful resistance against the government’s encroachments on civil society.

Activists will need to show how maintaining healthy democratic processes and institutions is critical for the achievement of longer-term, sustainable economic outcomes for Indonesians. High satisfaction levels with Indonesia’s democracy, despite its many deficiencies in recent years, have largely been based on Widodo’s ability to ensure stable growth and low inflation. This unprecedented economic stability under his administration has led Indonesians to overlook pressing democratic concerns. Prabowo’s administration will likely be keen to preserve this economic legacy, but any shocks to financial stability could destabilize public contentment and redirect scrutiny towards the quality of Indonesian democracy.

The partnership approach and its focus on technical support has undoubtedly been well-received by the Indonesian Government. Australian-supported programs like the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Economic Development (Prospera) and the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice have provided expert support on inclusive economic development and judicial reform efforts. However, it is vital for international partners to recognize that support directed toward government policies that undermine democratic principles could inadvertently aid in entrenching a non-transparent political structure further.

So, more support will likely be needed for forces seeking to restore the democratic foundations of Indonesian institutions. Initially, donors seeking to maintain a partnership approach could find ways to support reformers within existing government frameworks. Key among these is the Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN), which outlines Indonesia’s development priorities from 2025 to 2045. Although some of the RPJPN’s goals are aspirational and may be subject to Prabowo’s whims, they have legislative standing, providing a potential avenue for constructive collaboration between the government and civil society.

But if the partnership-oriented approach meets roadblocks, donors could also build on existing support for local reformers channelled through established international NGOs. Renewing Australia’s Democratic Resilience (DemRes) pilot program, which partnered with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and The Asia Foundation, would be a good start. However, it would need to expand beyond merely strengthening technical and procedural elements of democracy, which are mostly functional, and focus more on promoting democratic values and institutions.

As for other parts of the bilateral relationship, Australia will eventually face hard choices in its development partnership with Indonesia over the next five years. How Canberra responds to the likely impending conflict between pro-democracy forces and the Prabowo administration will reflect not only how we view Indonesia as a bilateral partner, but also the value we place on democracy at home, in our region, and globally.

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In ‌what ways does⁢ the perception of ​economic​ stability in Indonesia ⁤influence public trust ​in democratic institutions after Prabowo’s inauguration?

**Interview: Understanding Prabowo Subianto’s Impact on Indonesian Democracy with Dr.⁢ Maria Tan,‌ Political ⁤Analyst**

**Host:** Welcome, Dr.‌ Tan!⁣ Thank you ⁢for joining us‍ today to discuss⁣ the recent political​ developments⁤ in Indonesia, particularly ‍Prabowo​ Subianto’s inauguration​ as president. What are your initial thoughts on this significant ⁤event?

**Dr. Maria‍ Tan:** Thank you for⁢ having me! Prabowo’s inauguration is indeed a striking‍ moment⁣ for ⁣Indonesia.​ While it’s⁣ seen by some⁣ as a political resurrection, ​it raises red flags for democratic ​integrity. His past ties to authoritarian ‌practices certainly shadow this achievement and fuel concerns about the future of our democratic ⁣institutions.

**Host:** You​ mentioned concerns about democratic integrity. How would you describe the current state‌ of democracy in Indonesia, especially in‍ light of recent events?

**Dr. Maria Tan:** Indonesia has enjoyed recognition as one of the world’s largest democracies, but we’ve witnessed a troubling decline in the⁤ quality ⁤of democratic⁣ processes.⁣ Under former President Joko Widodo, ‌there was a rising disillusionment regarding civil liberties, which may have been overlooked⁤ due to economic stability. With ⁤Prabowo ⁣now at the helm, there’s a fear that these authoritarian tendencies may be exacerbated, stifling dissent further and eroding public ⁤trust in democratic practices.

**Host:** Speaking of economic ⁢stability, how does the perception ​of Indonesia’s economic‌ performance ⁢influence‌ public attitudes toward democracy?

**Dr. Maria Tan:** That’s a crucial point. ⁣Widodo’s administration showcased⁢ stable growth and low inflation, ‍which led many Indonesians to prioritize economic outcomes over democratic principles. Despite⁣ the pressing issues of civil‌ rights, there’s​ a reluctance to ⁤criticize ‌a regime that seemed to ⁤deliver economic stability. If⁢ Prabowo’s administration can maintain this stability, it could placate public discontent,⁣ but any financial shocks may reignite ⁢scrutiny towards the democratic​ process.

**Host:** Activists seem to play a crucial ⁣role in this context. What challenges are⁤ they facing,⁢ and⁣ how can they effectively counter ​government encroachments on ⁣civil liberties?

**Dr. Maria Tan:** Activists and NGOs are currently‍ in a ⁤precarious situation. Many are divided and lack adequate resources, with some organizations locked out from government funding for‍ being too critical. This fragmentation‍ makes it difficult ‍to establish ​a united front against the government’s​ increasing authoritarian nature. However, there’s potential for resurgence; Prabowo’s presidency might galvanize civil society into⁢ action, as he embodies many of the struggles they fought against in the past.

**Host:** ⁢It appears that international involvement, particularly from Australian partners,‍ is quite significant. What moral dilemmas do⁢ they‍ face regarding their support?

**Dr. Maria Tan:** International partners ⁣like Australia are indeed in a‍ tough position. They must choose between​ supporting local‍ pro-democracy forces or fostering a cooperative relationship with⁣ Prabowo’s regime. Historically, funding ‍initiatives aimed at reform have helped,‌ but there’s skepticism about​ whether these programs genuinely promote democratic values or merely prop up a regime with authoritarian inclinations.​ It’s a pivotal moment that calls for careful⁤ consideration of where their support should be directed ⁢to ensure ‍that it doesn’t enable further erosion of democratic⁤ norms.

**Host:** Thank you, Dr. Tan, for your insights! As we move forward,⁢ it looks like the intertwining paths of democracy and governance in Indonesia will ⁣continue to be complex and ⁤multifaceted.

**Dr. Maria Tan:** Absolutely, and as we navigate through these challenges, ‌it’s essential ⁤for​ both local activist forces and international partners to think critically and act judiciously in support‍ of ⁤genuine democratic processes.

**Host:** Thank you for joining⁢ us today ⁤and‍ shedding ​light on these pressing ​issues!

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