Attention is shifting to the Druze arena with developments and indications that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is facing an actual threat and is running the most difficult elections in his life, which will be decisive in determining his political and “leadership” size, according to the electronic “news”.
If Saad Hariri faced the policy and pressures of “embarrassment to get out” and came out with a voluntary decision, but in a coercive manner, then Jumblatt faces the policy of “siege and provocation,” but he cannot leave the elections or political life. Nor can he accept defeat and live with it, and he has no choice but to review the accounts, improve the conditions as possible, and save what can be salvaged.
Jumblatt faced such a bad situation before that in 2008 (the events of May 7), and he succeeded in circumventing it and limiting its negative effects, but in return for concessions and his disengagement from the “March 14” alliance.
Today, Jumblatt faces a danger that can be said to be an “existential danger” as well, but of another kind, in politics and not on the ground. Jumblatt feels that there is a plan that is being tightly prepared to surround him in the elections and push for the reduction of his parliamentary bloc as a prelude to his political curtailment and marginalization of his role, which was the likely role And the “egg” and lost it a long time ago.
Jumblatt, during the 15-year period between the Taif Agreement and 2005, reached its “peak” and took on a parliamentary and political size that exceeded its “realistic size” with the arrival of his bloc to 18 deputies, to begin to decline in the 15 years between 2005 and 2020. In the last elections in 2018, there were 9 representatives, and in the 2022 elections, this number might be reduced to half or a little more.
What worries Jumblatt and provokes him the most is moving the battle inside the “Druze House” and entering the stage of cutting out established Druze seats for him, following many Christian seats were gradually cut off in previous stages. So how regarding if Jumblatt no longer holds only half of the Druze seats, and perhaps On less?!
In the 128-seat assembly, Druze representation is limited to 8 seats distributed between: Chouf (2) and Aley (2), and one seat each in Beirut, Baabda, Hasbaya and the Western Bekaa. In the upcoming elections, Jumblatt is fighting battles on all fronts, facing challenges in almost all constituencies:
In the Chouf, the challenge lies in retaining the second Druze seat occupied by (resigned) MP Marwan Hamadeh, whom Wiam Wahhab looks up to following he almost got it in 2018 had it not been for the Shiite duo to go along with Jumblatt at the request of Berri.
In Beirut, it will be difficult for Jumblatt to retain the seat occupied by MP Faisal Al-Sayegh, and following it has become certain that the former minister, Saleh Al-Gharib, will run in this constituency and on the list of the Shiite duo. And if Jumblatt decided to respond to that by closing his list in Aley and not leaving the second Druze seat vacant for Arslan, then his victory in this seat is not definite and certain.
* In Hasbaya, the seat “confiscated” by President Berri over a period of 30 years and occupied by Representative Anwar Al-Khalil, will be transferred to Marwan Khair El-Din, who will be part of Berri’s bloc, even if he is overshadowed by the status of an independent representative, and Arslan would have a “share and shares” in it.
* In the western Bekaa, Wael Abu Faour faces a serious threat, and there is a possibility of regaining this seat by the Daoud family, which has good relations with Damascus and Hezbollah (the seat was previously occupied by Faisal Al-Daoud, and will go to his brother Tariq Al-Daoud).
Undoubtedly, the new election law (proportional representation and preferential vote) had a severe negative impact on Jumblatt’s electoral status, but the political reasons and factors remain the most important: First, Saad Hariri’s retirement to become the “sad lonely” mukhtara, and secondly, Berri’s influence declined With Hezbollah, which no longer “keeps up” with it as in the past, except in specific cases and circles (such as the Jezzine district). Thirdly, Hezbollah’s desire to “reduce” Jumblatt politically and pay the price of his recent positions, and fourthly, Damascus’s position on the “Mukhtara.”
In the face of the “war” waged by “Hezbollah” to intimidate the opponents and silence the sovereign voice in the electoral battlefield, according to “The Nation’s Call”, it was noticed yesterday that the “Progressive Socialist Party” issued a high-pitched and high-pitched statement emphasizing that it is moving forward in confronting the “enemies of sovereignty and reform” and aborting “The programmed campaign targeting our relations with the Arab depth, our affiliation with the sovereign line, and the planting of discrimination in our internal home.” These accusations were mostly aimed at targeting “Hezbollah” tireless efforts to surround Walid Jumblatt electorally and break his Druze leadership, by trying to extract “half the Druze seats” in The upcoming elections were handed to Jumblatt, which put the leader of Mukhtara before a “fatal electoral battle” to prevent Hezbollah from achieving its goal in splitting the Druze ranks.
In this context, the information revealed that “Hezbollah” informed the “Socialist” leadership through the official channels of communication between the two sides that it intends to fight the electoral battle alongside Tariq Al-Daoud in Rashaya and Wiam Wahhab in the Chouf, noting that the main goal of the electoral agenda of the “Party of God” God” in the Druze arena is to reach a result that makes him a “speculative partner” for Jumblatt by sharing Druze seats with him, by supporting the candidacy of Daoud and Wahhab, in addition to his reliance on the moral aspect that necessitates Jumblatt to leave a vacant seat for Talal Arslan, and considers that the Hasbaya seat is guaranteed. Beirut’s Druze seat is now within reach, following the “Future Movement” withdrew.
While the Socialist’s sources preferred not to delve into Hezbollah’s electoral calculations, they contented themselves with emphasizing that “it became clear through the party’s performance that it decided to open the electoral fire on us in Beirut, the mountain and the regions, believing that the moment was ripe to attack Walid Jumblatt.” The political and sovereign dimensions it represents.” The collapsed living reality and their electoral re-awakening remained, and the second challenge lies in fortifying ways of steadfastness and confronting the weight of the lack of a balanced and compact sovereign alliance in the current internal confrontation, as was the case during the era of the March 14 alliance, in parallel with the total Arab withdrawal from the Lebanese arena, in contrast to the third challenge. Represented by the presence of a fierce push for the other axis in an effort to capture Lebanon in light of the availability of internal and external conditions that help it achieve its goal.”
