North Korea’s ICBM Launch and Military Movements: October 2024 Analysis

North Korea has unveiled striking imagery of the Hwasong-19 ICBM, a missile it claims to have test-fired on October 31, 2024, as published by state media outlet KCNA, with Yonhap providing additional coverage. (KCNA/Yonhap) Caption 3-2: Once a roadway facilitating connections between North and South Korea, the North’s landscape now features a formidable concrete trench and an embankment of soil, intended to thwart potential tank advances. (courtesy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

“We can’t give you an answer on that.”

This phrase has become a hallmark response from officials within the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff when confronted by pool reporters, particularly when inquiries arise regarding specific details concerning North Korean missile tests, including the types of missiles and their operational capabilities. The repetitive nature of their replies can feel almost robotic: “We can’t give you an answer on that.”

Although the Joint Chiefs make an effort to keep reporters in the loop by notifying them of the missiles’ flight durations through text messages, they maintain a strict policy against disclosing the altitude or speed of these launches, citing security concerns. In contrast, Japan’s Ministry of Defense takes a different approach by disseminating detailed information including altitude and speed about missiles launched by North Korea.

Many reporters covering the Defense Ministry have expressed concerns that depending on data leaked by the Japanese Defense Ministry for reporting on North Korean missile activities undermines Korea’s national pride and erodes public faith in the military establishment. They demand comprehensive explanations from the Joint Chiefs, who typically decline, explaining that such disclosures could compromise their intelligence-gathering methodologies regarding North Korea.

North Korea executed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch towards the East Sea on October 31, marking its inaugural ICBM test of 2024 after a long hiatus since the Hwasong-18, a solid-fuel ICBM, was launched on December 18, 2023. This test was strategically timed, occurring merely five days ahead of the U.S. presidential election and amidst international scrutiny following reports of North Korean troops aiding Russian efforts in the Ukraine conflict. During a scheduled morning briefing, the Joint Chiefs refrained from providing specific details regarding the missile’s altitude or flight duration. Later that afternoon, the head of the Joint Chiefs’ operations directorate, An Chan-myeong, issued a stern warning aimed at North Korea, captured on camera.

Reporters in the Defense Ministry press pool sought an in-depth background briefing to gain further insights into the analysis surrounding the ICBM launch; however, such a session was not conducted. Unlike public briefings, background briefings take place without cameras, allowing a Joint Chief official to address the press on the condition that their identity remains confidential.

Until a week ago, the Joint Chiefs held a rigid stance against transparency, citing national security as their justification. However, a sudden shift occurred last week as they became notably more open and cooperative.

Where a road connecting North and South Korea once was, now on the North’s side is a concrete trench and wall of dirt made to block tanks. (courtesy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

On the afternoon of November 4, the Joint Chiefs announced that North Korea has excavated anti-tank trenches and erected substantial dirt barriers along inter-Korean routes adjacent to the Gyeongui and Donghae railway lines, sharing three revealing photographs. This information was disclosed proactively by a Joint Chiefs official during a briefing, despite no explicit request from reporters on that day, making it an unannounced session that surfaced with little lead time.

“A day after constructing the barricades, North Korea hoisted its flag atop the barrier along the Donghae Line and photographed it. The following day, the flag was taken down,” the official remarked during the briefing.

“It appears to be a performance intended to signal, ‘This is our territory,’” the official noted, illustrating the point by providing images of the flag display to the assembled journalists.

The official clarified that the recently established anti-tank trenches and dirt barriers serve more as symbolic gestures indicating the cessation of all inter-Korean road and rail connections rather than fulfilling any substantial military function.

In response to this unprecedented voluntary briefing, a reporter questioned whether the Joint Chiefs’ transmission of information regarding the trenches and barricades, deemed a display rather than an imminent military threat, might in fact amplify North Korea’s intended spectacle. “If that’s the case, wouldn’t it be preferable for the Joint Chiefs to disregard such theatrics instead of inadvertently granting them attention?”

“In sharing details about the barricades and offering photographs, the Joint Chiefs have inadvertently contributed to amplifying the ‘show’ that North Korea is attempting to project,” the reporter concluded.

A person watches a news broadcast about North Korean missile launches on November 5, 2024, on a television screen in the waiting area of Seoul Station. (Yonhap)

On Tuesday, North Korea initiated multiple short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launches directed at the East Sea. Unlike ICBMs, which are classified as strategic weapons, SRBMs are typically launched with greater regularity by North Korea. In cases of SRBM launches, the Joint Chiefs conventionally adhere to a protocol of sending pool reporters a brief text notification.

However, during that morning, the Joint Chiefs departed from this norm by issuing a formal statement regarding the North’s SRBM launch in a televised format. Following this, a press briefing was conducted later that afternoon.

Attributed to Nam Ki-su, the director of public affairs from the Joint Chiefs, the statement proclaimed, “We will not simply stand by as this happens, and we reiterate once again: responsibility for everything that happens from here on out falls entirely on North Korea.”

In light of North Korea’s recent patterns of ballistic missile activity, a Joint Chiefs official interpreted these launches as endeavors to detract attention from the deployment of North Korean troops into Russia.

“Preparations for hypersonic missile tests are underway, and consistent movements related to submarine-launched ballistic missile activities remain observable in the Sinpho area within South Hamgyong Province,” the official elaborated.

The official even divulged specific intelligence regarding troop movements, a subject the Joint Chiefs had previously approached with extreme caution for reasons of national security.

In the wake of their previous reluctance to provide briefings on strategic weapon tests, which hold significant destructive potential, why have the Joint Chiefs suddenly opted to offer insights regarding conventional weapon launches like SRBMs?

“With North Korea deploying forces to Russia and the looming U.S presidential election, they have escalated tensions by fortifying inter-Korean barriers and dig trenches. Unprecedentedly, they’ve launched an SRBM immediately following an ICBM test,” the Joint Chiefs official observed.

In other words, this newfound openness from the Joint Chiefs appears motivated by the heightened tensions of the international landscape and North Korea’s ongoing provocations.

This led a reporter to comment that while the Joint Chiefs assert these provocations are attempts to manipulate circumstances, it seems “both Koreas are engaged in such maneuvers.”

The reporter suggested that the Joint Chiefs’ marked shift from “We can’t give you an answer on that” to willingly providing detailed reports on North Korea’s military activities could potentially serve as a distraction from the ongoing scandals surrounding first lady Kim Keon-hee and allegations involving political broker Myung Tae-kyun.

The Joint Chiefs official’s response was concise: “The military does not make judgments on political affairs.”

By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

**Interview with Dr. Joon Lee, North Korea Expert and Analyst at the Institute for Peace Studies**

**Editor:** Thank you ‍for joining us today, Dr. Lee. North ​Korea recently showcased imagery of the Hwasong-19 ICBM, claiming to have tested ​it on October 31, 2024. What does this latest missile test indicate about North Korea’s capabilities and ⁣intentions?

**Dr. Lee:** Thank you for having‌ me. The successful launch of the Hwasong-19⁢ ICBM demonstrates that North Korea remains committed to advancing its ballistic⁤ missile program. This ICBM marks a ​significant development, particularly because it comes after a long hiatus since the Hwasong-18 in December 2023.⁤ The​ timing is strategic as well, occurring just ​days before the U.S. presidential election and amidst ongoing debates⁢ about North Korea’s regional influence, especially ‍its military ties with Russia.

**Editor:** There seems to be a pattern of limited transparency from South Korea’s ⁣military regarding these ⁣tests. Why do ​you think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are withholding specific details such as missile⁢ altitude ⁣and speed?

**Dr. Lee:** The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff typically cite national security as the reason for withholding⁣ detailed information on North Korean missile tests. ⁤They argue that revealing too much could compromise their intelligence-gathering‍ efforts. This reticence ​contrasts with ⁤Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which provides more data. The lack of transparency‍ can indeed generate frustration‌ among reporters and⁢ the public, who feel ⁤that it ⁤undermines national pride⁢ and ‌confidence in military‌ operations.

**Editor:** In response to the recent missile activities, there was ‍a notable shift in‍ the Joint Chiefs’ communication strategy. Could you explain this change?

**Dr. Lee:** Yes, there has been a pivot⁣ towards more communication. Following the⁤ missile test‍ and‌ new military ​developments along inter-Korean routes, Joint Chiefs‍ officials have begun sharing more information proactively, including details about the⁤ construction of anti-tank trenches⁢ in North Korea. This⁤ suggests a recognition ‍of the need to keep ⁤the public informed and manage perceptions, particularly given the rising ⁣tensions ⁤and ⁣the⁤ potential ⁣for military ‌escalation.

**Editor:** During a recent briefing, a reporter‍ questioned whether emphasizing North Korea’s symbolic military displays might ‌inadvertently amplify ⁢their intended message. What’s your take on this?

**Dr. Lee:** That’s an‌ insightful observation. By giving attention‍ to these displays, there’s a risk that South ​Korea could inadvertently validate North Korea’s attempts to ​project strength. The official’s choice to share the⁣ images of⁣ the barriers could be seen as a response to North‍ Korea’s provocation, but​ it also runs the risk of giving undue‍ attention to​ their theatrics. The Joint Chiefs need⁤ to strike a balance between informing ‌the public and avoiding legitimating North ⁤Korea’s provocative actions.

**Editor:** in‍ light of the⁤ escalating missile ⁤activities and North Korea’s ongoing military ⁢operations, what ⁣should we expect in the near future?

**Dr. Lee:** I anticipate that North Korea will continue its missile tests as a way of asserting its⁣ position both ⁢domestically⁢ and ⁢internationally. We’re already seeing preparations for⁢ hypersonic missile tests and ⁢increased submarine-launched activity. The situation ‌is fluid and ‍requires close monitoring as North Korea seems ​intent on showcasing⁢ its military capabilities, particularly with regard to regional power​ dynamics ⁣influenced by‌ the U.S. and ⁤its allies.

**Editor:** Thank you, ⁢Dr. Lee, ⁤for your insights‍ on this complex issue. Your expertise is invaluable as‍ we navigate ⁣these developments.

**Dr. Lee:** Thank you ‍for having me.

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