Middle East, how air defense changes war. Tricarico’s analysis –

Leonardo Tricarico

August 16, 2024

It is hard to die the belief that the furious salvo of missiles launched on April 13 against Israel by Iran was a set-up, a bluff because it was “telephoned in”, as even the most popular commentators say, but in this case they lack the technical tools necessary to delve into a subject that is not theirs. Knowing in advance that you will be the object of an air attack does not help you to face it more effectively, this is the point that must be taken into account, otherwise you will misinform or – worse – mislead those who have to make decisions. Let’s see why.

Missiles, drones, aircraft or any other aircraft penetrating with hostile intent must be detected, identified as enemies and only then shot down. The first phase, that of detection, occurs through the use of radar systems arranged to cover all possible sources; if the incursion occurs at low altitude, flying radars are used to supplement the ground ones. Israel has the best flying radars currently in circulation, capable of detecting anything that moves, at any altitude and starting from a speed of about 40 km/h.

The next phase, that of identification, is perhaps the most complex, the one that requires the most peremptory and lightning-fast treatment and decision. It is a matter of understanding whether the luminous dots appearing on the screens, the so-called radar traces, can be associated with friendly or enemy aircraft, an awareness that must be acquired quickly and with certainty, under penalty of shooting down a friendly aircraft.

Generally, friendly aircraft, both civil and military, are preliminarily assigned an identification code, a sort of temporary password that they are required to display and which is visually and unequivocally recognized on the radar screen.

For all other radar tracks that do not display the code, a quick investigation must be started to understand their nature. Generally, a consultation is started with the civil traffic control agencies, exchanging the characteristic data of the tracks – direction, distance, altitude, speed – to find out if they are aircraft under their control and therefore friendly. The same coordination is done, for example, if there is an aircraft carrier in the area with aircraft in flight.

Only when certain of the unknown nature of the radar trace does one, in wartime, proceed to order the shoot-down. With missiles, interceptor aircraft or other systems.
In the case of Israel, coordination activities multiply because the radar coverage with which to discover hostile traces is not only that provided by its own sensors but by the contribution of other actors, such as US naval units in the area, the radars of other friendly or collaborative countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and perhaps Egypt. All of these automatically “pass” to Israel and its control centers all the traffic observed and identified by their radars, so that the overall air situation can be as integrated and complete as possible.

It should be noted that even the next phase, that of neutralizing the threat, can likely count on the contribution of friendly countries and their anti-aircraft missiles or fighter aircraft, often already in flight when the attack is certain or is already underway. It is easy to imagine even for non-experts what situation can be created in such a complex machine, what a frenetic congestion of coordination and decisions, when the attacks come simultaneously from multiple directions, with the most disparate means from ballistic missiles to cruise missiles, from rockets to drones or – although unlikely – bomber aircraft, at the most diverse altitudes and in such numbers as to cause a saturation of the response.

All the defense operations described here are the bare minimum to face an air attack and none of them, absolutely none, can take advantage of the fact that the attack was announced with a large or limited advance notice. And if someone claims the opposite, invite him, if he feels like it, to demonstrate it by applying the reasons in the scenario just – albeit in broad terms – described.