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A convoy of the Malian armed forces was attacked on Monday by Islamist insurgents. According to Wassim Nasr, specialist in jihadist movements at France 24, this incident reveals the presence in Mali of Russian operations alongside the Malian soldiers attacked. Explanations and analysis.
France 24 was able to confirm, according to several local and international testimonies, the first altercation in Mali, Monday January 3, between Russian operatives and jihadists of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM or Jnim), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, in the center of the country. According to these testimonies, Malian military movements took place in the center of the country, accompanied by Russian elements.
It turns out that a group of the Malian armed forces was attacked Monday in Mandoli by the jihadists and that at least one Russian operative was wounded then transferred to the locality of Sévaré. Deaths are to be deplored on the Malian side and on the side of the jihadists.
Nevertheless, a vagueness persists on the nature of the Russian presence in Mali. It might very well be mercenaries of the Wagner company or Russian soldiers deployed within the framework of bilateral relations between the two countries, or both. Moscow, through the Wagner group, secures its interests without assuming direct consequences or responsibility. This capability, which can be described as a hybrid, gives Russia the ability to maneuver in different theaters of operations for Western and / or UN forces, such as Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic or even Mozambique, where the Wagner’s intervention once morest the jihadists of the Islamic State group was unsuccessful.
Calling on Wagner: a risky bet
The commitment of the Wagner group in Mali is envisaged by the Western countries according to three scenarios, one not excluding the other: 1. a “praetorian guard” of the current power; 2. an activity on the outskirts of the action zones of the French forces of Barkhane; 3. an activity at the heart of Barkhane’s action areas.
At the moment, it is the second scenario that seems to prevail. The third would involve the departure of French, European and potentially UN forces, if the “red lines” drawn by Paris are not respected.
If the French forces are maintained, a process of ‘deconfliction’, like the Syrian process, will be inevitable and essential between the Russians and the other forces present. This will lead de facto to an official acceptance of the Russian presence and influence in Mali and to the recognition of this presence and its setting on the part of Moscow and Bamako.
However, the bet of the Malian authorities on the Wagner option is not without risk either. Hundreds of foreign operations, battle-hardened in Syria and Libya, and which operate independently, can prove to be more than restrictive for these same authorities. The Central African example, where the EU suspended its training mission for the armed forces due to Wagner’s presence, being on everyone’s mind.
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