Tony Issa – Republic
Next September, Israel will face the right to start extraction from the Karish field, knowing that this challenge is very dangerous if it is not preceded by a demarcation and gas-sharing agreement with Lebanon. Therefore, its officials are talking seriously regarding “days of combat” on the borders by land, sea and air. Do they anticipate the repercussions of a possible military explosion on the gas extraction rigs, and on the Israeli interior?
It is believed in some circles that Israel’s introduction of the floating gas platform from Malaysia to Karish last spring would not have taken place if its officials had not taken a decision to start extracting gas, following a delay of several months.
This process came as a result of an agreement costing tens of millions of dollars between Israel and the Greek company “Energen.” Most likely, Israel would not risk this process if it did not guarantee that the extraction would start on the new specified date, or with a “reasonable” delay, that is, it might be calculated in a few days. Some believe that the company would not have taken the step if it had not been given guarantees that its platform would be in a safe position.
The translation of these words, in the political sense, is that the United States has, throughout the previous period, been conducting contacts far from the limelight between the two conflicting parties, and that the results of these contacts were positive, meaning that the Lebanese side obtained satisfactory answers, which allowed Washington to reassure the Israelis that they might Initiation of field procedures for the extraction process.
But this matter entails the following question: If the pillars of the authority, concerned with the demarcation file, gave the American mediator a green light, does this mean that they proceeded from an integrated vision of a demarcation agreement that would be approved by Israel and would obtain Lebanon’s rights at the same time? And if this is the case, why is this agreement not immediately announced and approved without delay, so that Lebanon begins to invest its gaseous wealth, as does Israel, at the same time? Is what is happening now is the final touches on this agreement before it is announced at a very soon date, as is rumored?
But if the talk regarding a prior tacit agreement is incorrect, then the question can be asked: So, why did Israel hasten to bring the drilling rig to Karish, and set September as the date for the start of work, following it repeatedly postponed this since last March? And if it is a matter of a rejection by Hezbollah, then this entails the question: Wasn’t the party involved in the preliminary consultations, directly or through the pillars of the authority? Did he agree to the proposed exits or not?
And if all the Lebanese forces did not agree to these proposals, why did Israel venture to bring in the floating platform? Is it ready for a military adventure in a highly sensitive border spot between gas and oil fields?
When the “party” sent its rallies in the direction of “Karesh”, it suggested that the agreement was not ripe yet, and that the Israelis “share”. Consequently, the game will be open to adventures if the Israelis do not concede.
In fact, the Israelis are aware that the “party” possesses a missile arsenal capable of entering this game when needed and strongly influencing its course. Two days ago, they admitted that failure to reach an agreement would lead everyone to what they called “fighting days.”
This expression carries with it a lot of connotations. He confirms that the Israelis are taking seriously the “party” of war, if they try to start extracting gas from “Karesh” without an agreement with Lebanon that gives it its rights and also allows it to invest its wealth. However, the Israeli expression also suggests that the limits of a possible military confrontation will be limited to “days”, and that it will not turn into an all-out war, as some fear.
Amid these mysteries, the picture of the coming weeks is not clear. But, most likely, no one wants to enter the war. On the contrary, the Israelis are currently obsessed with imposing their presence as a platform for gas from the Middle East to Europe, and exploiting the Europeans’ need to compensate for the shortfall in Russian gas supplies at the gates of winter. This ambition does not suit him at all to enter the war.
As for Lebanon, with all its political powers, it is more enthusiastic regarding gas than ever before, because it seems the only door to rise from the bottom of the abyss.
However, one possibility remains: In the balance of profit and loss, will the Israelis consider using the factor of intimidation to push Lebanon into submission, where diplomatic pressures have failed? Do they resort to “combat days” as a tool of pressure, as part of a well-thought-out plan to impose options on him?
Is it true what some Palestinian analysts say, that the war with the “Islamic Jihad” movement in Gaza is intended to anticipate a possible war on the Lebanese front?
In this case, the costs will be horrendous wherever he is, and no one guarantees the consequences.
