How Europe can save NATO
As President-elect Donald Trump prepares for his return to office, he is expected to approach NATO with skepticism regarding its significance and express concerns about the sufficiency of Europe’s contributions to its own security. Insights from officials who previously worked alongside Trump during his initial term suggest that he remains open to the prospect of diminishing or, in extreme cases, ending America’s longstanding commitment to the Alliance. Despite this, Trump is anticipated to act as a transactional leader, eager to assert strength. European allies, therefore, face a critical opportunity to bolster NATO’s future. They must proactively approach the upcoming NATO Summit scheduled for June 2025, set to take place in The Hague, emphasizing Europe’s strategic responsibilities and identifying concrete measures to alleviate some of the U.S. defense burdens.
Major European powers currently confront challenges including stagnant economic growth, diminished leadership, and a pervasive sense of war-weariness stemming from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, this leadership void is likely to be filled by NATO’s new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, who possesses the requisite experience and determination for the role. Rutte, a former center-right prime minister of the Netherlands, is recognized for his amicable rapport with Trump and shares a common preference for negotiation and deal-making.
When addressing the crisis in Ukraine, it will undoubtedly be the priority of the new administration. Trump is advocating for a rapid negotiation process that could lead to enduring Russian control over certain Ukrainian territories. In contrast, Rutte has already underscored that safeguarding U.S. interests hinges upon averting a Russian victory. Hence, Europe must actively shape Trump’s negotiation framework to ensure that a lasting peace is anchored in a steadfast Western commitment to the long-term security of Ukraine. This commitment should be Europe’s primary objective, ideally paving the way for Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. However, Trump may resist this development. If that occurs, the European Union (EU) should pivot and elevate Ukraine’s accession to EU membership as a priority, leveraging the comparatively weaker Article 42.7 defense commitment. Moreover, Europe should consider deploying troops to Ukraine in the post-conflict period to reinforce its commitment and dominate the narrative regarding the long-term military assistance to Kyiv.
At the global level, the June summit should establish a new division of responsibility among NATO, the EU, and the United States.
The June 2025 NATO Summit will also serve as a noteworthy occasion to recognize that twenty-three of NATO’s thirty-two member states are currently aligning with the defense spending target of 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). There is a pressing need for the Alliance to motivate the remaining nine nations to reach this benchmark in the near future. Meanwhile, in response to escalating Chinese military expenditures, which focus on naval capabilities, missile technology, and nuclear armament, the United States must act decisively to preserve its deterrence posture in East Asia. Concurrently, Europe should play an instrumental role in reinforcing its own defense initiatives to support this strategic shift.
To facilitate this process, NATO should consider augmenting the current 2 percent GDP defense spending target, proposing an increase to possibly 3 percent by the end of the decade. In the event that Trump retracts the U.S. commitment to NATO, this heightened spending goal could serve as the minimum threshold for European defense budgets moving forward. By publicly committing to this new target, European nations may play a strategic role in encouraging Trump to maintain U.S. involvement in the Alliance while concurrently strengthening NATO’s overall capacity.
Furthermore, the revised defense spending target should be meticulously aligned with specific military requirements. Notably, the establishment of adequate European forces capable of fulfilling the supreme allied commander Europe’s new defense plans for the continent is crucial. Another requirement involves acquiring sufficient assets known as enablers to counter significant deficiencies in European defense capabilities. These enablers, including strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, and advanced operational intelligence systems, are vital for maintaining modern deterrence frameworks and should host capabilities essential for military conflicts. Additionally, it will be imperative to enhance European naval forces, enabling the United States to reposition its naval assets towards Asia without undermining NATO’s defensive posture.
To achieve these ambitious defense objectives, Europe will need to foster enhanced collaboration and innovation within its defense industrial sectors. While these initiatives will primarily fall under the purview of the EU, it is essential that they incorporate U.S. defense firms and technologies in a way that ensures no exclusion occurs.
These budgetary adjustments should be complemented by an expansive forward deployment strategy for European troops. Presently, NATO’s enhanced forward deployments are positioned in eight frontline countries, but the scale of these forces is often limited to battalion-sized contingents of approximately one thousand personnel. A few deployments, like that in Lithuania, have already been upgraded to continuous brigade-sized formations, with around five thousand soldiers. All eight deployments should ideally be elevated to brigade-level makeups, supplemented with long-range artillery and air defense systems, alongside prepositioned stockpiles for rapid reinforcement. The U.S. military should also enhance its presence in Poland to complement these efforts.
At the global level, the June summit should seek to redefine roles amongst NATO, the EU, and the United States, effectively easing the burden on U.S. forces. NATO’s primary obligation would center on protecting its treaty territories, while the EU should assume the lead in conflict resolution to its south, notably in Africa. Joint national responsibilities, with a U.S. leadership role, will likely persist in the Middle East, mirroring the existent frameworks in Red Sea security.
This transatlantic distribution of strategic responsibilities ought to extend into the Asian theater during the discussions in The Hague. Previous summits have taken meaningful steps toward this direction, with North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict emphasizing the interconnectedness of security concerns across Europe and Asia. While the United States will remain the central figure in supporting its Asian allies, Europe is poised to enhance its contribution to deterrence efforts in that region. NATO will not broaden its Article 5 commitments to Asia, but by maintaining Asian participation in NATO summits, establishing liaison offices in Asia, warning China about the severe repercussions of invading Taiwan, and engaging in more joint freedom-of-navigation exercises with the U.S., European nations can significantly aid the American initiative against potential aggression in Asia.
Consequently, Europe may also be compelled to address the considerable ten-fold nuclear imbalance between Russia and itself. It was the robust U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent that sustained the peace during the Cold War. If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were withdrawn from Europe due to a shift in NATO policy, Britain and France would likely need to reassess their minimal-deterrent strategies, which could expose Europe to greater vulnerability against Russian nuclear coercion. Thus, discussions surrounding this nuclear dynamic are expected to take place behind closed doors at The Hague.
The agenda for the upcoming summit in The Hague is undeniably ambitious. These discussions will take on even greater complexity if U.S.-European relations are mired in a trade war instigated by Trump’s promised tariffs. Nevertheless, the stakes for security are alarmingly high. Europe must rise to the occasion, embracing its enhanced security role and ultimately working to ensure the survival of NATO.
Hans Binnendijk served as National Security Council senior director for defense policy in the Clinton administration and as director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Timo Koster served as director of defense policy and capabilities at NATO and was ambassador-at-large for security policy and cyber for the Netherlands. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center.
Further reading
Tue, Nov 5, 2024
How Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO affects the High North
Issue Brief
By
Anna Wieslander
This issue brief explores the impact of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership on the High North. Having Sweden and Finland in NATO strengthens the influence of the Alliance in the High North, as it responds to Russia’s military buildup and China’s regional interests. Deterring aggression while maintaining Arctic stability amidst rising geopolitical tensions will require new defense priorities and enhanced Nordic collaboration.
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