Israel – An investigation by Israel’s Channel 12 revealed that an intelligence officer in the Southern Command warned of dangerous movements in Gaza, hours before the start of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack on October 7.
The investigation indicated that an electronic tracking and information-receiving program from the Gaza Strip was disabled hours before the attack.
Channel 12 quoted a military source as saying that on October 7, the Israeli army did not have a sufficient plan to respond to the Palestinian factions’ plans, and “this is where the failure began.”
The investigation says that the Israeli intelligence officer tried to contact the assistant to the head of the National Security Agency, Aharon Haliva, to inform him that the situation was not good in Gaza, but the latter did not care and did not cut short his vacation in Eilat despite the information he received.
Subsequently, Major General Yaron Finkelman, the commander of the Southern Command, after receiving an update from the intelligence officer, informed Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi of the information.
After 3:00 a.m., Unit 8200 commander Yossi Shariel sent a message via WhatsApp saying: “There is a very unusual event here, there is a high alert on the other side (in the Gaza Strip).”
The report indicates that Shariel relies on receiving intelligence information from a special technological system (an electronic tracking system) that has provided important information about the movement of Palestinian factions for several years, but that night he was surprised that this important system was not working and would not return to work for several hours, by which time it would be too late, because at 6:30 in the morning… it would be the moment of the launch of the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”
The information in the army’s Unit 8200 indicated unusual events in the sector that night, but they could not contact anyone, there is not even a single assessment of the situation, neither by Unit 8200 nor by intelligence.
At 5:00 a.m., the head of the research division of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate “Aman,” Amit Sa’ar, refused to assess the signals coming from the Gaza Strip at that moment as a warning, saying, “This does not indicate a warning.”
Although Aman received information in 2021 about Yahya Sinwar’s intention to attack Israeli settlements and Israeli army bases, and Unit 8200 received information that this was the case, according to Major General (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash, the former head of Aman, the security apparatus did not understand the nature of the information and the scale of the event, saying, “The tasks, the objectives, who will do what? And with what timetables?”
“Although this was a detailed plan by the Palestinian factions for a comprehensive invasion of Israel, Aman did not understand the extent of the incident. Therefore, I did not investigate it deeply,” Farkash continued.
Regarding the technological program for information coming from the Gaza Strip, the investigation says that Haliva and senior leaders of the National Security Agency are aware of its existence and are using it, as are the former commander of the Southern Command, Eliezer Toledano, the outgoing commander of the Gaza Division, Avi Rosenfeld, and the commander of Unit 8200, Yossi Shariel. But many in the army and the intelligence and security services do not know anything about it. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and his deputy Amir Baram, as well as the head of the Operations Division, Oded Basiuk, and the head of the Operations Division, Shlomi Bender, who were supposed to prepare the forces for the next war, do not know about the program. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also did not acknowledge his knowledge of the program, nor did Defense Minister Yoav Galant, and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Yuli Edelstein.
The head of the research department at Aman, Amit Sa’ar, and the head of the Third Operations Department categorically confirm that they have never heard of Hamas’s plan to attack army bases and settlements in the Gaza envelope, even though the role of the head of the research department is to analyze the plan and determine the danger of war based on it, and the head of the operations department is authorized to distribute it to the various units, meaning that the head of Aman, Aharon Haliva, did not inform them of this, and the commander of 8200 did not think to share the information with them.
“It seems very strange to me,” says Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of Aman’s research department. “I think it’s very dangerous. You receive information that you cannot ignore, with a high level of credibility. You have to act.”
Even senior air force officials, led by its commander Tomer Bar, did not accept the information about Hamas’s plan for the attack. “This is where the failure begins,” said Brigadier General (res.) Yaron Rosen, head of the Air Force and Helicopter Joint Task Force. “It stemmed from an intelligence assessment. We arrived on October 7 because there was no operational plan that responded to the other side’s plan.”
“We know how to move very well toward a cumulative state of war,” Rosen continues. “But to use force in the military, you have to have plans in advance. If there is no intelligence, you don’t know where to shoot and you are facing a situation for which you are not prepared.”
The investigation continues that the Air Force and intelligence felt that the intelligence picture they were receiving was incomplete.
“It has become a secret society of 8,200, keeping intelligence, analysis and ideas to itself,” said a senior Air Force official.
“The invasion of the Palestinian factions took the air force completely by surprise,” Rosen says. “The units were not prepared for such a scenario.”
Source: RT
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2024-08-18 20:07:23