2024-11-18 09:00:00
JUntil the US elections, the countries that posed the most immediate dangers to European economic security were Russia and China. From now on, it is the future American government which poses the greatest threat to the new strategy of the European Union (EU) in this area.
In its fight against the Chinese giant, the United States showed Europe two seemingly opposite faces: one coercive, the other cooperative. First, under the first Trump administration [2017-2021]while the trade war between Washington and Beijing was escalating, the United States forced, not without some intimidation, the governments and companies of Europe to take part in their policy of decoupling vis-à-vis China. In particular, they pushed European governments to adopt restrictions against Huawei, the major Chinese supplier of 5G infrastructure. Then, under the Biden administration, the United States turned its back on these purely coercive methods. They preferred the diplomatic route, opting for cooperation with Europe, in the name of shared economic security and risk mitigation with China.
Among followers of the Biden method, some emphasize the effectiveness of his cooperation with the Netherlands and Japan to control semiconductor exports to China. That said, even this positive example of diplomatic collaboration is not free from turbulence. Whoever won the election, it was likely that the United States would not have narrowed down the ever-longer, ever-more political list of “security” items it considers to be of concern: crucial list for their approach to economic security. Moreover, even the countries most willing to collaborate with the United States have economic realities and visions of risks that are different from their own. The fact is that a gap often separates their interests from those of the Americans.
A heavy constraint
The example of the Netherlands gives a clear vision of the divergence of these economic realities. During Trump’s first term, the United States began restricting China’s access to advanced semiconductors and related technologies. They have drawn into their crusade not only chip-producing countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, but also countries that manufacture the equipment necessary for their production, such as the Netherlands. Thus, in 2018, the Trump administration opened discussions with the Dutch government with a view to limiting exports from the equipment manufacturer ASML, the world’s leading manufacturer of chip production machines. As a result, a year later, the Dutch government ended exports of ASML’s most advanced machines to China. Subsequently, under Biden, the United States maintained its pressure on the Netherlands and obtained new restrictions on ASML sales to China.
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What are the potential impacts of the 2024 U.S. elections on Europe’s economic security strategies?
**Interview with Dr. Emily Karsten, European Economic Policy Analyst**
**Editor**: Good morning, Dr. Karsten. Thank you for joining us today to discuss the evolving dynamics between the United States and Europe regarding economic security, especially in light of the upcoming U.S. elections.
**Dr. Karsten**: Good morning! It’s a pleasure to be here.
**Editor**: To start, could you elaborate on the assertion that the future American government poses the greatest threat to the EU’s new economic strategy?
**Dr. Karsten**: Certainly. As we approach the 2024 elections, there’s a growing concern in Europe about the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy. The divergent approaches between the Trump and Biden administrations highlight a critical issue. Trump’s coercive tactics, particularly towards European countries regarding China, could resurface depending on the election outcome. If a more isolationist or combative administration takes power, it may revert to pressuring Europe in ways that could undermine collective strategies on economic security and trade.
**Editor**: You mentioned the contrasting approaches of the Trump and Biden administrations concerning China. How have these strategies reshaped European policy?
**Dr. Karsten**: Under Trump, Europe was essentially forced to take a side in the U.S.-China trade war. This led to significant policy shifts, such as restrictions on Huawei. On the other hand, the Biden administration brought a cooperative approach, prioritizing diplomacy and collaboration, particularly seen in the semiconductors export controls. European nations have largely welcomed this shift, but there’s an underlying fear that without a consistent U.S. policy, Europe may have to navigate the complexities of dealing with China alone.
**Editor**: Given the complexities of the situation, what steps should the EU take to safeguard its interests moving forward?
**Dr. Karsten**: The EU must prioritize its own strategic autonomy in economic and technological sectors. Strengthening internal cohesion and developing independent supply chains, especially in critical areas like technology and energy, will be essential. Additionally, maintaining a strong, unified stance with the U.S.—regardless of the administration—will be crucial to ensuring that Europe is not caught off guard by sudden policy shifts.
**Editor**: Thank you, Dr. Karsten. Your insights into the geopolitical landscape as we approach the elections are invaluable.
**Dr. Karsten**: Thank you for having me!
