First-hand Observation of the Myanmar Military Conflict: The Death of a Chinese Undercover Policeman, the Burning of a Truck, and the Poison Gas Attack

2023-12-20 16:00:00

First-hand observation 2/The death of a Chinese undercover policeman, the burning of a truck, and the poison gas attack have expanded the military conflict in Myanmar

Foreword:
The internal war in Myanmar lasted for more than a month. Government troops and allied forces fought fiercely in various places. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. The local people were even more miserable. This attracted international attention. However, due to the local closure of the border and the prohibition of foreigners from entering, the outside world might not know regarding Myanmar. To learn regarding the real internal situation, Ling Media has contacted a Taiwanese businessman in Southeast Asia who is familiar with the current situation there. Through this Taiwanese businessman’s first-hand observation, it leads readers to have an in-depth understanding of the latest developments in the war in northern Myanmar.

Author: Taiwanese businessman from Southeast Asia

This military conflict initiated by the Kokang Allied Forces started on October 27, 2023, so the outside world called it “Operation 1027”, and the initiator called it “Operation Hurricane”.

The trigger for this military conflict, as well as the reasons for its subsequent expansion, are generally believed to be explained by three iconic events. However, like all wars, the information or propaganda in these battles is not only false but true, false and true, it is not only difficult to verify, but if the truth is actually found, the matter will be over.

1020 The murder of an undercover police officer in China

The time is October 20, 2023, and the location is Crouching Villa, a famous electronic fraud park (formerly a gaming park) in Kokang Old Street. It is rumored that the Ming Xuechang family, the actual managers of the park, were under pressure from China to hand over the fraudsters. During the transfer of relevant personnel, people fled collectively, so they shot and killed some people.

Who exactly were killed and how many people were killed? One said it was 70 Chinese electronic fraudsters, another said it was four Chinese undercover policemen who revealed their identities, another said it was two Chinese undercover policemen, and another said it was 70 electronic fraudsters plus four undercover policemen.

This move caused the Chinese local government (Lincang City, Yunnan Province) to issue a document demanding explanations. However, following the media checked with the Lincang Municipal People’s Government, it was actually not reported online that the organizer of the document was posted, nor was there any fact that the document was issued. Since no body was found, it was rumored that the two corpses excavated at a nearby construction site were the victims that day. However, it was later confirmed that these two corpses had nothing to do with the 1020 incident.

Whether this incident is true or false, it has already stirred up public opinion. It is generally believed that the Hurricane Operation, also known as the 1027 military operation, a week later, was the “first seven” of the 1020 incident. It was obviously to seek justice for the murdered Chinese undercover police officers. Therefore, quite a few people regarded the 1020 incident as 1027. The trigger for military action.

The problem is that the so-called “email scammers take advantage of the opportunity to flee” implies a premise that these people do not stay in northern Myanmar voluntarily. But is it really so?

It can be seen from many signs that at least a large part of these fraudsters voluntarily go to these fraud parks to hunt for gold. The rumored organ trafficking (cutting of kidneys), human trafficking, forced fraud, and kidnapping are most likely propaganda techniques used to combat electronic fraud, maintain China’s national dignity, or deter new fraudsters who will voluntarily go there in the future.

In addition, if the law enforcement agencies instigate important individuals or key witnesses within the group, the official may “extraordinarily confirm” that these people were deceived and forced to go to the local area, or even ordered to be undercover, so that they can reduce or escape from criminal responsibility and exchange for The “rebels” cooperate with the government to provide inside information regarding the organization of the fraud group, or to help publicize negative information regarding the fraud park as a person who has experienced it on the stage. Otherwise, the Kokang area belongs to Myanmar’s territory, and Chinese police cross the border to enforce the law. Even if this happens, it will not be publicly acknowledged.

We can observe and analyze the reality of this “voluntary or not” from several points. First of all, if these “cheated and abducted” stories are true, these people are in northern Myanmar unwillingly or even without knowledge, and they are forced to commit fraud under the violent control of the group. , then these people should be regarded as “victims.” However, we saw that when large numbers of “victims” were handed over to China, police officers were on guard and put on suspects’ hoods and yellow vests. The doorsteps of these suspects’ hometowns were probably painted with the words “personnel of fraud dens in northern Myanmar” “Home”, this is not the treatment that a “victim” deserves at all, but the treatment that a “criminal suspect” deserves.

Secondly, the public statements we hear in the media often come from those who are rebels. Firstly, these people will conceal the fact that they voluntarily went to the fraud park. Secondly, they also tend to conceal that in fact, they have already You know that the fraud group does not provide them with cross-border fees for free, but only temporarily helps them advance the money, and they have to return the money.

Although there are differences between companies, when signing a contract, the “employees” of the fraud park can basically choose to receive a monthly salary plus a small performance commission, or not receive a monthly salary but receive a commission of regarding 10% of the profit. But before they start making money, they always have to cross the border and enter the park. Those Chinese citizens who need to smuggle into northern Myanmar for various reasons owe huge sums of money in the early stages of their fraud because the smuggling fees are very high.

Some companies stipulate that new employees can be exempted from this initial fee following serving for a certain period of time (assisting smuggling is also part of the industry), and some companies allow employees to advance their salaries and commissions. But in any case, it was voluntary at the beginning, but because you mightn’t or didn’t want to pay back the money, you later became unwilling and wanted to escape. This is different from “forced fraud” which is involuntary from beginning to end.

On May 2 this year, following the then Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Myanmar, he initiated joint law enforcement among China, Myanmar, and Thailand (later adding Laos to become the four countries) to combat telecommunications fraud. After that, it became even more difficult for foreigners to enter the Kokang fraud park in Myanmar. not easy.

Sources pointed out that the cost for foreigners to sneak into Lao Cai from Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city, in early September (excluding air tickets) was as high as 20,000 yuan (regarding NT$100,000) per person. This means that for a commission-taking scammer, he must achieve a “performance” of approximately NT$1 million, just enough to repay the smuggling fee he advanced to the group.

If we think regarding it from the perspective of a fraud group, under the pressure of China’s increasing crackdown on e-mail fraud, those e-mail fraudsters who cannot afford to pay back the money, do not want to repay the money, and have poor performance are likely to be handed over first. personnel; and those main personnel who create profits for the group should be transferred to other regions to start a new business, which is a reasonable strategy. In fact, this is indeed the case. The main force of local fraud is moving to other places through various channels.

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Of course, if the group is really determined to cut off from the fraud and take the initiative to hand over the main fraudsters, it is reasonable for these fraud “elites” to plan to escape or resist; however, if the group is determined Cut off from fraud, then there is no need to use armed actions to combat electronic fraud.

According to data provided by Chinese officials on November 21 this year, since September of the same year, the total number of electronic fraud suspects handed over to China by relevant units in northern Myanmar has reached 31,000, an average of regarding 380 people a day. Of course, this is still far behind the rumored hundreds of thousands of Chinese e-fraud practitioners in northern Myanmar. However, we reviewed followingwards and found that within a week following the 1020 incident, all the Kokang leaders including the Ming Xuechang family were still there. A meeting was held to discuss strengthening the fight once morest telecom fraud; on the day of the war, Kokang Autonomy also issued a statement to eradicate telecom fraud.

Therefore, the actual situation is more like that as more and more electronic fraudsters are handed over to China, or if the electronic fraud industry delays time to transfer more fraud main force to areas outside Kokang, “combat electronic fraud ” This flag of justice that started the war in northern Myanmar will gradually lose its legitimacy.

The previous killing of a Chinese undercover police officer was the beginning of the 1027 military operation widely rumored in the media. It is also widely rumored in the media that the continuation and expansion of the war in northern Myanmar is related to another incident, which is the issue of the use of poison gas.

Tracing back to the source, the earliest accusation once morest the Burmese army for using poison gas came from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, one of the “Three Brothers”, on November 19. According to them, this poison gas incident occurred twice. One was on November 4, when the Ta’ang National Liberation Army attacked the Burmese army stronghold near Lashio, the most important trade center in northern Myanmar. Another incident occurred on November 17 in Namkan near the important town of Muse on the China-Myanmar border. At that time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) were fighting with the Myanmar Army. A short section was shot on the battlefield. The video shows soldiers vomiting and running as smoke filled the air.

Regarding the above-mentioned accusations, the Myanmar military government publicly and sternly denied it on November 23, saying that this was a pretentious statement for the opponent to be repelled.

According to a medical officer of the De’ang National Liberation Army in an interview, a total of 8 soldiers showed symptoms of poisoning during the 1117 incident, but in fact they did not know whether it was a poison gas bomb. The only thing that was certain was that the patient’s symptoms Same reaction as inhaling toxic gas. By the time the medical officer was interviewed, all eight soldiers had recovered, and the incident itself did not cause anyone to die.

While the Myanmar military junta sternly denied the use of poison gas, the Kokang Allied Forces (MNDAA) also made similar accusations. The MNDAA accused Myanmar’s military junta of using poison gas to attack them during a conflict on November 23. The relevant accusations are very severe, and they even accuse the military government of using poison gas to attack anti-government armed forces and civilians indiscriminately. These accusations have been circulating in anti-Myanmar military government media for a long time. Related analyzes and comments mostly concluded from the use of poison gas that the Myanmar military government may be in danger and that the anti-government armed alliance is in sight of victory. But in any case, the 1123 poison gas incident has not been reported by any important foreign media so far, nor has there been any official response from the Myanmar military government.

1123 truck burning incident

It also happened on November 23, near Muse, an important trade town on the China-Myanmar border. A truck parked at the freight station near the China-Myanmar Golden Triangle port suddenly caught fire on a large scale. The scene was filled with thick smoke. It took 6 hours for the fire to be extinguished. . How many trucks were burned? The media has different opinions. Some say 5 vehicles, some say 80 vehicles, and some say hundreds. Judging from the video taken at the scene, there should be no fewer than dozens of vehicles. When interviewed, a spokesman for the Myanmar military said that there were 258 trucks on site, of which regarding 120 were burned. He also accused the Kokang Alliance Army of being responsible. This accusation was later refuted by the Kokang Allied Forces.

Why did these trucks catch fire? It is still an unsolved case. Some say it was a bomb explosion, some say it was a drone attack, and some interviews with cargo owners at the scene revealed that only a few vehicles caught fire at the beginning, but the fire spread too quickly, causing more than a hundred trucks to be burned down.

A Alex Reed on a domestic talk show on November 28 said that the truck burning incident was the result of the “fleeing vested interests” and “original forces” returning to blow up everything because they were unwilling to give up the huge benefits of border trade. Give it to the rebels who occupied this place. But this statement is inconsistent with the facts. When the actual truck was burned down, the Golden Triangle Port was still under the control of the Myanmar military government and had not yet changed hands. The fire brigade was also dispatched by the Myanmar military government.

The Golden Triangle Port was occupied by the Kokang Allied Forces on November 25, two days following the incident. After the Kokang Allied Forces captured Bangsai on November 19, they continued to advance southwest toward the Golden Triangle Port. When the incident occurred on the 23rd, the Kokang Allied Forces were regarding to compete for the Golden Triangle Port. Therefore, it seems that both warring parties are suspected of the truck burning incident, whether it was a deliberate attack or an accidental attack.

The situation on the day of the truck burning incident on November 23, 2023

Why are more than two hundred trucks stranded here? This is because, starting from October 6 this year, China began to issue temporary passes at the Golden Triangle Port, allowing drivers and co-drivers of Myanmar trucks to drive directly to Wanding Town in Ruili, Yunnan without changing to Chinese drivers. In consideration of reducing transportation costs, owners flocked to it, but it didn’t take long before they encountered the 1027 military operation. As soon as the war started, the roads connecting the local area with the big cities of Lashio and Mandalay were cut off by anti-government forces, and the Golden Triangle ports were subsequently surrounded by anti-government forces.

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News Eye/Myanmar’s local armed forces stormed!A severe blow to the morale of the Burmese army, Aung Hlaing’s regime is crumbling

Ling Media original website:First-hand observation 2/The death of a Chinese undercover policeman, the burning of a truck, and the poison gas attack have expanded the military conflict in Myanmar

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