Page last updated 2024-07-22 1820 UTC
Updated 2024-07-22 1528 UTC
As stated in our social media post at 2024-07-21 2106 UTCtogether with customers, CrowdStrike tested a new technique to accelerate impacted system remediation. We’re in the process of operationalizing an opt-in to this technique. Customers are encouraged to follow the Tech Alerts for latest updates as they happen and they will be notified when action is needed.
We have published a video outlining the steps required to self-remediate impacted remote Windows laptops.
We will continue to provide updates here as information becomes available and new fixes are deployed.
CrowdStrike is actively assisting customers affected by a defect in a recent content update for Windows hosts. Mac and Linux hosts were not impacted. The issue has been identified and isolated, and a fix has been deployed. This was not a cyberattack.
We assure our customers that CrowdStrike is operating normally and this issue does not affect our Falcon platform systems. If your systems are operating normally, there is no impact to their protection if the Falcon sensor is installed.
We understand the gravity of this situation and are deeply sorry for the inconvenience and disruption. Our team is fully mobilized to ensure the security and stability of CrowdStrike customers.
Overview
Statement from our CEO
Sent 2024-07-19 1930 UTC
Valued Customers and Partners,
I want to sincerely apologize directly to all of you for the outage. All of CrowdStrike understands the gravity and impact of the situation. We quickly identified the issue and deployed a fix, allowing us to focus diligently on restoring customer systems as our highest priority.
The outage was caused by a defect found in a Falcon content update for Windows hosts. Mac and Linux hosts are not impacted. This was not a cyberattack.
We are working closely with impacted customers and partners to ensure that all systems are restored, so you can deliver the services your customers rely on.
CrowdStrike is operating normally, and this issue does not affect our Falcon platform systems. There is no impact to any protection if the Falcon sensor is installed. Falcon Complete and Falcon OverWatch services are not disrupted.
We will provide continuous updates through our Support Portal at https://supportportal.crowdstrike.com/s/login/.
We have mobilized all of CrowdStrike to help you and your teams. If you have questions or need additional support, please reach out to your CrowdStrike representative or Technical Support.
We know that adversaries and bad actors will try to exploit events like this. I encourage everyone to remain vigilant and ensure that you’re engaging with official CrowdStrike representatives. Our blog and technical support will continue to be the official channels for the latest updates.
Nothing is more important to me than the trust and confidence that our customers and partners have put into CrowdStrike. As we resolve this incident, you have my commitment to provide full transparency on how this occurred and steps we’re taking to prevent anything like this from happening again.
George Kurtz
CrowdStrike Founder and CEO
Technical Details
- Technical Details on the outage can be found here: Read the blog Published 2024-07-19 0100 UTC
- We assure our customers that CrowdStrike is operating normally and this issue does not affect our Falcon platform systems. If your systems are operating normally, there is no impact to their protection if the Falcon Sensor is installed. Falcon Complete and OverWatch services are not disrupted by this incident.
- CrowdStrike has identified the trigger for this issue as a Windows sensor related content deployment and we have reverted those changes. The content is a channel file located in the %WINDIR%System32driversCrowdStrike directory.
- Channel file “C-00000291*.sys” with timestamp of 2024-07-19 0527 UTC or later is the reverted (good) version.
- Channel file “C-00000291*.sys” with timestamp of 2024-07-19 0409 UTC is the problematic version.
- Note: It is normal for multiple “C-00000291*.sys files to be present in the CrowdStrike directory – as long as one of the files in the folder has a timestamp of 05:27 UTC or later, that will be the active content.
- Symptoms include hosts experiencing a bugcheckblue screen error related to the Falcon Sensor.
- Windows hosts which have not been impacted do not require any action as the problematic channel file has been reverted.
Non-Impacted Hosts
- Windows hosts which are brought online after 2024-07-19 0527 UTC will not be impacted
- Windows hosts installed and provisioned after 2024-07-19 0527 UTC are not impacted Updated 2024-07-21 1435 UTC
- This issue is not impacting Mac- or Linux-based hosts
How do I Identify Impacted Hosts?
How do I Identify Impacted Hosts via Advanced Event Search Query?
Updated 2024-07-22 0139 UTC
The queries utilized by the dashboards are listed at the bottom of the appropriate dashboard manuals.
How do I Identify Impacted Hosts via Dashboard?
Updated 2024-07-22 0139 UTC
An updated granular dashboard is available that displays the Windows hosts impacted by the content update defect described in this Tech Alert. See Granular status dashboards to identify Windows hosts impacted by content issue (v8.6) (pdf) or log in to view in the support portal. Note that the queries utilized by the dashboards are listed at the bottom of the appropriate dashboard manuals.
If hosts are still crashing and unable to stay online to receive the Channel File update, the remediation steps below can be used.
How do I Remediate Individual Hosts?
Updated 2024-07-21 0932 UTC
- Reboot the host to give it an opportunity to download the reverted channel file. We strongly recommend putting the host on a wired network (as opposed to WiFi) prior to rebooting as the host will acquire internet connectivity considerably faster via ethernet.
- If the host crashes again on reboot:
- Option 1 – Build automated recovery ISOs with drivers
- Option 2 – Manual process
Updated 2024-07-22 1758 UTC
How do I Recover Bitlocker Keys?
Updated 2024-07-21 1810 UTC
How to Recover Cloud-Based Environment Resources
Cloud Environment
Guidance
AWS
Azure
GCP
Updated 2024-07-22 1758 UTC
Public Cloud/Virtual Environments
Option 1:
- Detach the operating system disk volume from the impacted virtual server
- Create a snapshot or backup of the disk volume before proceeding further as a precaution against unintended changes
- Attach/mount the volume to to a new virtual server
- Navigate to the %WINDIR%System32driversCrowdStrike directory
- Locate the files matching “C-00000291*.sys”, and delete them
- Detach the volume from the new virtual server
- Reattach the fixed volume to the impacted virtual server
Option 2:
- Roll back to a snapshot before 2024-07-19 0409 UTC
Third Party Vendor Information
Updated 2024-07-20 2259 UTC
This video outlines the steps required to self-remediate impacted remote Windows laptops. Follow these instructions if directed to do so by your organization’s IT department.
