[The Epoch Times, August 27, 2024](Reported by Epoch Times reporters Ning Haizhong and Luo Ya) As the civil war in Myanmar continues to escalate, the Southern Theater Command of the Communist Party of China will conduct a three-day ceremony starting August 27 on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border. This event will include joint live-force and live-fire exercises. Experts interpret Beijing’s actions as having multiple objectives, suggesting that the CCP is attempting to maintain balance within Myanmar, subtly influencing the situation there while safeguarding its interests to prevent Myanmar from aligning with Western countries.
Experts discuss the multiple objectives of the Chinese Communist Army’s live-fire exercise on the China-Myanmar border
Information released by the WeChat public account of the “Southern Theater Command” indicates that the Chinese Communist Party’s military stated this exercise aimed to test the capabilities of the Army and Air Force units related to reconnaissance and early warning, three-dimensional sealing and control, and firepower strikes to prepare for various emergencies and maintain security and stability in border areas.
A military report from the day prior noted that the Southern Theater Command conducted border armed patrols and joint air-ground police patrols along the China-Myanmar border in Ruili and Zhenkang from August 27 to 29.
Since June and July, fighting has resumed in northern Myanmar. The military junta extended the state of emergency again at the end of July, while the anti-government alliance known as the “Three Brothers” has been launching attacks on the junta in the country’s northeast since last October. Earlier this year, five individuals were injured in Nanshan Town, Yunnan Province, when artillery shells from Myanmar landed on Chinese territory.
As the civil war in Myanmar intensifies, the risk of China becoming involved is gradually increasing.
Sun Guoxiang, full-time associate professor at the Department of International Affairs and Entrepreneurship, University of Nanhua, Taiwan (provided by Sun Guoxiang)
Sun Guoxiang, a professor in the Department of International Affairs and Entrepreneurship at the University of South China who specializes in Asia-Pacific security and international relations, informed The Epoch Times that the Chinese Communist Party’s increase in troops along the China-Myanmar border is primarily due to border security concerns, particularly as the conflict has spilled over into Chinese territory. Additionally, the CCP is motivated by the protection of economic interests, considering its substantial investments in Myanmar, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project, which encompasses energy pipelines and infrastructure development. These projects hold significant strategic value for China, and troop enhancements and exercises serve to demonstrate military deterrence.
However, Sun believes the likelihood of the CCP directly deploying troops to intervene in Myanmar’s civil war is low, as such an action would attract international scrutiny and is not aligned with Beijing’s strategic interests. He suggests that the CCP is more likely to influence developments in Myanmar and protect its own interests through intelligence sharing, logistical support, and even covert military assistance, with the CCP aiming to act as a “stabilizer” to ensure that Myanmar does not move toward Western influence.
Zhong Zhidong, an assistant researcher at Taiwan’s Institute of National Defense and Security, mentioned to The Epoch Times that the CCP’s exercises along the China-Myanmar border indicate the current domestic instability in Myanmar. He noted that through military exercises and troop deployments, the CCP demonstrates its capability and willingness to intervene militarily if necessary, while seizing the opportunity to train troops with geopolitical implications. However, he stated that unless Myanmar becomes completely uncontrollable and Western nations intervene, Beijing would refrain from sending troops.
The CCP is “playing balance” within Myanmar, and the military junta may harbor suspicions toward Beijing
Under Beijing’s “mediation,” a ceasefire agreement was reached in January between the Myanmar military and three local ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar: Kokang, Ta’ang, and Arakan. Nevertheless, the recent escalation of fighting suggests that Beijing’s mediation efforts have been ineffective.
In April, fighting persisted between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. The following month, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, part of the “Three Brothers Alliance,” launched further attacks on government-controlled strongholds in the northeastern Shan State and Mandalay regions. On August 3, the Kokang Alliance Army captured Lashio, a vital town in northern Shan State.
Sun Guoxiang noted that the CCP engages in a balancing act within Myanmar. “It maintains a long-term cooperative relationship with the Myanmar military government while simultaneously keeping lines of communication with northern ethnic armed groups such as the Ruokang Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. The CCP utilizes these groups to retain some degree of influence in the situation in Myanmar, treating them as bargaining chips.”
Zhong Zhidong stated that while Beijing essentially supports the Myanmar military government, it still needs to maintain internal balance. “If both the rebels and the military government become overly reliant on Beijing’s support, it would showcase Beijing’s dominance in Myanmar.”
Assistant researcher at the Institute of National Defense Strategy and Resources, Taiwan National Defense Security Research Institute (provided by Zhong Zhidong)
Myanmar’s military junta appears to harbor suspicions toward Beijing.
On August 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyitaw, Myanmar’s capital, and met with the junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Wang Yi expressed opposition to any actions that might “damage China-Myanmar relations.” According to reports from Myanmar media, Wang Yi told Min Aung Hlaing that Beijing opposed attacks in Shan State.
Before Wang Yi’s visit, Min Aung Hlaing accused foreign nations of supplying weapons, technology, and other forms of assistance to Myanmar’s militias. Although he did not specify any country, many interpreted this as a veiled reference to Beijing.
Analysis: The CCP’s monopolistic influence over Myanmar hampers the country’s democratization process
Myanmar ended military rule in 2010, leading to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest for over 15 years. Her National League for Democracy was also allowed to register as a legal political party and participated in subsequent parliamentary by-elections.
In early December 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar, marking the first visit by a senior US official in half a century. By the end of 2013, the Myanmar government had released all political prisoners. However, on the morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar National Defense Forces, under Min Aung Hlaing, executed a military coup, toppling the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
Sun Guoxiang mentioned that Western nations have implemented various measures to counter the CCP’s influence in Myanmar and support the country’s democratic development, although results have been limited. These efforts are hindered by the CCP’s pervasive influence and the region’s complex political realities.
He pointed out that the United States and the European Union have imposed several rounds of economic and financial sanctions on the Myanmar military junta, aiming to weaken its funding sources to promote the restoration of democracy. However, China and Russia have consistently opposed such sanctions in international forums like the United Nations Security Council, blocking more severe measures. Consequently, the Myanmar military junta continues to rely on the economic and diplomatic backing of the Chinese Communist Party to sustain its regime.
Zhong Zhidong concluded that the West’s influence over Myanmar is limited, with the CCP holding exclusive sway, and that democratization in Myanmar is not conducive to the CCP’s control over the nation.
Editor in charge: Li Renhe#
The CCP’s Military Exercises on the China-Myanmar Border: Implications and Analysis
The civil war in Myanmar shows no signs of abating, with escalating violence and instability. Amid this turmoil, the Southern Theater Command of the Communist Party of China (CCP) initiated a series of joint live-force and live-fire exercises along the China-Myanmar border from August 27 to August 29, 2024. This military display is perceived as a multifaceted strategy by Beijing, aiming to safeguard its interests and exert influence over Myanmar, particularly in the face of increasing Western engagement in the region.
Multiple Objectives of the CCP’s Military Exercises
According to reports from the Southern Theater Command’s WeChat public account, the live-fire exercises involved various units from the Army and Air Force. The stated objectives include:
- Enhancing the capabilities of reconnaissance and early warning systems.
- Practicing firepower strikes and three-dimensional sealing and control.
- Preparing for various emergencies that could threaten security and stability along the border.
These military maneuvers come against a backdrop of escalating violence in northern Myanmar, where fighting has surged in recent months. The Myanmar military government extended its state of emergency in July, while anti-government forces have intensified their attacks. China has expressed concern over stray artillery fire landing in its territory, further stressing the importance of border security.
Risk of Increased Involvement
As the civil war escalates, the potential for China’s direct involvement grows. Experts like Sun Guoxiang, an associate professor at the University of Nanhua, suggest that the CCP is primarily motivated by economic interests, particularly its substantial investments in Myanmar, such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. This corridor includes vital energy pipelines and infrastructure projects.
Geopolitical Considerations
Beijing’s military exercises signal both deterrence and a readiness to intervene if necessary, although direct military engagement is deemed unlikely by analysts. More probable is a strategy of influence through intelligence sharing, logistical support, and covert military assistance to align with its interests while preventing Western encroachment.
The Balance of Power in Myanmar
The CCP’s approach reflects a delicate balancing act within Myanmar. Despite fostering a long-standing relationship with the military government, Beijing also engages with various ethnic armed groups, utilizing them as leverage in negotiations.
Ceasefire Agreements and Their Fragility
In January, Beijing facilitated a ceasefire between the Myanmar military and several ethnic armed factions, but ongoing hostilities suggest a deterioration in this temporary peace. Clashes have erupted between the Myanmar Armed Forces and various ethnic groups, complicating Beijing’s mediation efforts.
Suspicion Towards Beijing from the Junta
Despite Beijing’s influence, the Myanmar military has exhibited signs of distrust. As illustrated by recent diplomatic exchanges, the junta has accused external forces of providing assistance to opposition groups, implicitly alluding to Beijing’s involvement. The CCP, concerned about maintaining its status as an influential ally, seeks to reaffirm its role while tempering the junta’s suspicions.
Impacts on Myanmar’s Democratization Process
Myanmar transitioned from military rule to an emerging democracy in the early 2010s. However, the coup in February 2021 marked a regression, raising concerns over the country’s path toward democratization.
Western Influence and Challenges
Despite efforts from Western nations to counteract Chinese influence and support democratic processes in Myanmar, these initiatives have met limited success due to the entrenched CCP presence. Economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and EU have aimed at crippling military funding, yet China continues to shield the junta from severe repercussions in international forums.
The West’s Limited Reach
According to Zhong Zhidong from Taiwan’s Institute of National Defense and Security, the West’s ability to affect change in Myanmar is often eclipsed by China’s overwhelming influence. The CCP’s monopoly on relationships with the military government obstructs any genuine move towards democratization.
Final Thoughts: The Road Ahead for Myanmar
As China’s military presence along the border increases, and the geopolitical landscape continues shifting, the situation in Myanmar remains complex. The CCP’s efforts to play both sides may yield some short-term stability but could ultimately stifle genuine political progress in Myanmar. The intertwining of military exercises, economic interests, and diplomatic maneuvering indicates that the future of Myanmar’s governance will remain closely linked to the perceptions and strategies of China.
Key Takeaways
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Exercises Duration | August 27-29, 2024 |
| Key Focus Areas | Reconnaissance, firepower strikes, early warning systems |
| Major Risks | |
| Beijing’s Strategy | Balance between military support and engagement with armed groups |
| Impact on Democracy | Stifling of democratic reforms amid external influences |
