To be more precise, we might say that a significant part of the “summit” meeting between Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad really took place. As usual, the preparatory steps for a meeting of this kind are of equal importance to the meeting itself. Rather, sometimes the meeting between the two “presidents” is a protocol culmination of the understandings completed before it is held, and within this type falls Erdogan’s meeting with Assad, following the former declared “twice within a few weeks” his willingness to meet Assad when their intelligence achieves the necessary understandings and arrangements.
The second statement, made in Prague two days ago, is important because of the emphasis on the first, which caused an uproar at the time, and had it not been for an encouraging atmosphere in the negotiations conducted by intelligence officials, Erdogan would have ruled out the meeting, even if to put some kind of pressure on his counterpart. It is noticeable that Erdogan and his foreign minister have long since assumed the media infusion that spreads a positive atmosphere regarding the relationship with Assad, and even if the positive was conditional on concessions from the latter, it preceded his concessions by implementing the first conditions, and perhaps the most important of all, which is the recognition of Assad’s legitimacy, and consequently recognition of the right of His sovereignty over all Syrian lands, including those currently under Turkish control or influence.
Prevarication does not help in refuting this frank recognition according to diplomatic standards, nor does it negate the developments by saying that Ankara has persisted over the past years in stressing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria. In the past, the reference to Assad was either negative or non-existent, and the context indicated the absence of Turkish ambitions in Syrian territory, and Ankara’s willingness to return the lands it controls in the event of an appropriate change in Damascus, or if an internationally agreed settlement is reached.
Now the desired change has become Turkey. Steps by Assad reassure Erdogan on two issues. The Kurdish issue, and the refugee issue. In the Kurdish issue, and following despairing of obtaining a double US-Russian approval for a new Turkish operation once morest the SDF, Erdogan wants Assad to control the SDF positions that are not covered by the American umbrella, as long as the two sides have nothing to do with those supported by the United States. In a related context, Erdogan’s deflection in the direction of Bashar does not bother Washington if it is preparing to leave, and if it remains indifferent to the fate of the SDF, it is outside the precisely drawn line of influence with Moscow.
On the issue of refugees, where Erdogan and his Minister of Interior continue to promote the quick return of one million Syrian refugees in Turkey, Ankara needs the approval of Assad, and behind him the approval of Moscow, otherwise talk regarding their return will become a subject for ridicule and to undermine Erdogan in his upcoming election season. It suffices for a squadron of Russian planes to raid once in a while the shelters of these refugees, ready, inhabited or under preparation, to undermine the notion promoted as safe voluntary return. Rather, it is sufficient, with the approval of Moscow, for Assad’s artillery to target the dwellings within its range to achieve the same goal, even if the Turkish army responded forcefully and effectively to the sources of fire. It is not insignificant that Assad’s forces and their Russian ally did not bomb the houses that Ankara built and built in its areas of control; Logic necessitates an understanding between the two sides that puts it outside the targeting circle.
It would be naive to think that Assad, behind him and in front of him Tehran and Moscow, will be satisfied with a Turkish recognition of his legitimacy and the crossings opened between his areas of control and those under Turkish control, to be a second lung for his dilapidated economy, similar to his trade with the SDF areas east of the Euphrates. The funny thing is that what appear to be Turkish demands now are at the heart of Assad’s goals, though not among his top priorities. After the end of blackmailing Ankara with the Kurdish forces “and vice versa” no less than Ankara’s eagerness to subdue its Kurdish opponent, and his demands in negotiations with SDF is the best evidence of that.
The rewarding return that Assad is waiting for in meeting the SDF are the Ankara-backed factions, and if the grand and complete deal is now impossible, due to the presence of the American player, this does not prevent Assad from demanding smaller interim swaps like the ones we witnessed within the Russian-Turkish understandings and ended with the step-by-step completion of the deal. The so-called de-escalation zones. The difference from the past, as if it belongs to the absurd, is that Ankara demands Assad’s effective control over the SDF areas outside the American umbrella, and the price he demands in return is that Ankara cedes to him the lands it controls.
To appeal to the reasonable, Ankara may, “if Erdogan stays,” absorb a limited number of the leaders of its affiliated factions, and the scenario being circulated is the integration of the rest of the fighters into Assad’s army, regardless of the fact that those who put forward this perception do not explicitly mention Assad. The latter, in its negotiations with the SDF, also demands that it become part of its forces, following it in terms of receiving orders and determining the location of its deployment and combat missions, not as the SDF leadership demands that it be part of a wide area of independence, while remaining in the current locations.
The amalgamation between the two former parts is not originally a Assadist dream. Rather, it is among the current perceptions that reintegrate all militias into the so-called regular forces. Outside the crippled international track, this is Moscow’s perception that it presents in conjunction with its demand to return the areas outside Assad’s control.
Of course, this conclusion will not be reached soon, even if Erdogan is speeding up for internal electoral reasons, and for the same reasons he may not be stingy with many surprises before the elections in the summer. However, regardless of the speed with which the negotiations between Erdogan and Bashar’s intelligence are progressing, the possibility that the SDF fighters and the fighters of the Ankara-affiliated factions will meet in the future as comrades-in-arms within Assad’s forces, but that this is the only possibility of meeting following they fought fiercely in the war of the losers.
