China’s Influence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Belt and Road Initiative’s Impact on Infrastructure and Trade

Executive Summary:

  • China, leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is integral to developing strategic transit networks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the explicit goal of harmonizing regional road infrastructure and enhancing the efficiency of Chinese exports across borders.
  • The economic footprint of Chinese involvement in these nations is undeniable; however, it concurrently strengthens China’s influence and amplifies its soft power within Central Asia. Chinese firms dominate the construction landscape, typically relying on financial resources, workforce, and materials sourced from China.
  • Despite the foundational benefits of these infrastructure projects for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they cultivate a growing dependency on China. Moreover, frequent instances of cost overruns, project delays, and onerous loan commitments primarily serve Chinese interests rather than enhancing local economies.

Kyrgyzstan marked a significant milestone on September 4 with the inauguration of the Bedel border checkpoint, necessitating the establishment of a new roadway linking Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul Region with China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Akylbek Zhaparov, the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, hailed the Bedel checkpoint and the construction of the Barskoon-Uchturpan-Aksu highway as pivotal not only for promoting economic collaboration but also for symbolizing “a bridge of friendship and mutual respect” between Kyrgyzstan and China (Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, September 4). The integration of transport networks remains a cornerstone of development prioritization for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with external financial and technical support proving essential for fulfilling these objectives, as both nations are classified among the world’s poorest economies (Tajikistan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, July 6, 2018). China’s substantial financial capabilities and advanced engineering expertise present significant opportunities to address these infrastructure needs. Both Dushanbe and Bishkek view the BRI as a strategic avenue to surmount logistical bottlenecks within their transport sectors, while Beijing sees the initiative as a pathway to elevate its export activities within Central Asia.

While both nations’ expectations are being met, data indicates that Beijing is reaping additional advantages. China’s primary engagement in Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s transportation sectors largely favors Chinese enterprises, providing Beijing with leverage over the local economies while concurrently facilitating increases in cultural influence and soft power. According to officials, since gaining independence in 1991, Tajikistan has constructed 2,407 kilometers (1,495 miles) of roadways (Asia-Plus Tajikistan, May 31). In the same timeframe, Kyrgyzstan has managed to develop 2,680 kilometers (1,665 miles) of road networks, largely attributed to significant Chinese investment which has established the nation as a key contractor and financier through loans and grants (Radio Azatlyk, January 26).

Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport maintains that the nation owes 26 percent of its expanding transport infrastructure, valued at approximately $570.2 million, to China’s financial contributions (Asia-Plus Tajikistan, August 20). A substantial portion of this funding consists of loans totaling $533.2 million, supplemented by $37 million in grants. In Kyrgyzstan, horse trading with Chinese financial institutions remains prevalent in the road construction sector, particularly in the funding dynamics involving the Export–Import Bank of China (Chexim), while the Asian Development Bank notably contributes capital for development as well (Akchabar.kg, February 16, 2023).

Chinese engagement in constructing and modernizing Kyrgyzstan’s road network enhances Beijing’s oversight over critical multimodal transport routes within the nation. The active trade relations cultivated between the two nations, particularly in road-based imports of Chinese goods, are reaping substantial dividends; trade volume between Kyrgyzstan and China soared 40.77 percent in the first half of 2024, reaching an impressive $3.17 billion (24.kg, August 16). The bulk of this figure is derived from Chinese exports, which account for $3.12 billion, while Kyrgyzstan’s exports palm out at a mere $48 million, predominantly comprising raw materials like metal ores and oil. This trade pattern illustrates a consistent trend since 2023, where Kyrgyz exports represented only about 1.5 percent of the overall bilateral exchanges (Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee, accessed October 30).

Improvements in Tajikistan’s road infrastructure have similarly stimulated trade, particularly with a rise to $1.5 billion in trade turnover towards the close of 2023, marking an increase of 24.2 percent from the preceding year. A staggering $1.2 billion of this represents Chinese exports, while merely $313.8 million can be attributed to Tajik exports. As with Kyrgyzstan, the primary focus of these exports to China consists of minerals and raw materials, but a noteworthy trend is observed wherein while Chinese exports surged by 42.8 percent between 2022 and 2023, Tajikistan’s exports diminished by 24.2 percent during the same window (Asia-Plus Tajikistan, February 3, 2023).

The reconstruction projects waged by Chinese companies in both countries are lucrative not just for the host nations but for China as well, as they yield significant financial returns for Chinese firms and the employment of Chinese workers. Unlike financing from international entities, which often allows for local sourcing of labor, Chinese funding is principally predicated upon having projects executed by Chinese contractors. This contractual stipulation is a recurrent theme across all Chinese-funded transport initiatives, regardless of whether they involve roads or rail (Radio Ozodi, June 17, 2021). Noteworthy examples include the Dushanbe-Dangara and Dushanbe-Chanak road reconstruction efforts that were financed through loans with 20-year terms at 2 percent interest and included a five-year grace period (Avesta.tj, August 25, 2009; Radio Ozodi, February 16, 2020). The China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) was selected as the primary contractor for these initiatives.

China’s dominance in the Kyrgyz and Tajik road construction sectors can be attributed not only to its financial heft but also to its ability to secure a plethora of contracts funded by state budgets or international financial partners. Data from the Asian Development Bank indicates that from 2017 to 2021, Chinese enterprises secured contracts worth approximately $154.3 million in Tajikistan and around $106.8 million in Kyrgyzstan (Asian Development Bank, accessed October 30).

A substantial road construction project by CRBC in Tajikistan in 2019, spanning 728 kilometers (452 miles), was executed for a total of $779 million, attributed largely to the unparalleled competitive pricing Chinese firms such as CRBC offer (Eurasianet, July 26, 2022). As noted by Nurali, an engineer overseeing various projects in Tajikistan, the competitive edge of Chinese firms is irrefutable: when “Chinese companies [come] in … no one can compete with them.” He expounded that Chinese bidders can reduce their costs by 20-25 percent, courtesy of support from the Chinese state, allowing these companies to win contracts and profit while still offering a lifeline to Chinese employment and taxation systems (Author’s interview, August 10–17).

The long-term viability of numerous Chinese-funded road projects stemming from the BRI remains ambiguous. Several undertakings have spiraled into protracted construction initiatives mired in missed deadlines. A notable instance is the North-South Road project, which commenced in 2015 but has yet to reach completion; it is projected to finally open its routes by the end of 2024, with costs escalating by an astounding $887 million beyond initial estimates (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, June 5, 2020; Akchabar.kg, March 8, 2023). Compounding this issue, it was recently revealed that the contractors inflated the original project costs by at least 30 percent. As the road nears completion, Kyrgyz officials are now tasked with securing funds for maintenance, repaying incurred debts, and ensuring the route operates profitably.

The extensive engagement of Chinese companies in the road construction projects of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has yielded significant soft power advantages for Beijing. In Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the bustling capital of Bishkek, China has provided financial support for developing interchanges aimed at alleviating persistent traffic congestion (Cin’khyla Novosti, February 20, 2022). Upon project completion, it is common for Chinese firms to leave visible reminders of their contributions, such as prominent banners across newly built roads, celebrating the role of the BRI in fostering connectivity and development (Thepeoplesmap.net, January 12, 2022).

Regardless of whether China provides financing, the substantial presence of Chinese corporations conjures a perception of generosity and commitment in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Residents along newly constructed roads in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region uniformly believe that their infrastructure advancements are funded by China, underscoring the perception of China’s dominance in local construction initiatives. In both nations, China emerges as not only the primary trading partner but also a crucial investor and the key to alleviating their landlocked economic challenges. Both countries gain enhanced roadway systems, yet the ultimate beneficiaries of this partnership remain firmly rooted in China’s growing influence over the people of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Ing ‌to manage the additional expenses ⁤incurred during construction.

In both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the significant reliance on Chinese funding for infrastructure projects has‌ led to a complex relationship where⁤ the financing often comes with stipulations that favor Chinese contractors and workers ‍over ‍local⁤ employment. This has raised concerns regarding the⁢ sustainability of such projects and the economic independence of these countries.

Despite⁣ the ⁣immediate benefits of ​improved infrastructure ‌and enhanced trade connectivity,⁢ the long-term implications of ⁣being heavily indebted to Chinese⁤ financial institutions remain a contentious issue⁣ in‍ both nations. Explaining these dynamics highlights‌ the broader context of how investments under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)‍ are reshaping the economic‍ landscape of Central Asia, bringing both opportunities and challenges⁣ to the ‌forefront of regional development.

### Summary

China’s engagement through infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is‍ substantial, comprising⁤ a mix of⁤ loans ​and grants.‌ Trade volumes are notably imbalanced, favoring Chinese exports, and concerns loom about the local workforce’s‍ exclusion from these projects. While the immediate benefits of improved roads are apparent, the sustainability of these projects and the countries’ increasing debt to China raises critical⁢ questions about economic sovereignty ‌and long-term viability. The ongoing ​North-South Road⁤ project exemplifies these challenges, facing significant cost overruns and ⁣delays.

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