© Benoit Tessier/Archyde.com
A French soldier from the Desert Tactical Group (GTD) “Belleface” carries out an area control operation in the Gourma region during Operation Barkhane in Ndaki, Mali, July 27, 2019.
In Somalia as in the central Sahel, the vacuum left by fragile states allows a whole series of non-state actors to occupy an uncontrolled space. Lessons are to be drawn from the similarities as well as the differences between the two areas.
Somalia has only recently started to establish a real state, since the fall of Syad Barré in 1990. In contrast, the central state exists in the Sahel, but seems to have abandoned its responsibilities in areas far from the capital or marginalized – like northern Mali or the Diffa region in southeastern Niger, as big as Tunisia.
In the Sahel as in Somalia, vast areas are under the cutting of armed Islamist groups. Despite the defeats inflicted on them by the African force of Amisom, the Shebabs control regarding a third of Somalia, including the capital, which is not secure. They tax each commodity that enters the port of Mogadishu, following the same system of mafia predation that prevails in the Sahel with the activities of smuggling, trafficking of migrants, hostages, drugs, weapons, etc.
« Crises overlap, both political and security », estimates Bakary Sambe, founder and director of think tank Senegalese Timbuktu Institute. Their comparison, however, comes up once morest the fact that ” the conflict is regional in the Sahel with a continuum cross-border socio-cultural while in Somalia, the crisis stops at the borders, despite the attacks perpetrated by the shebabs in Kenya ».
Clan and ethnicity as dividing lines
Another major difference between the two situations: in 2012, Somalia adopted a federal Constitution which remains provisional, but is authoritative. ” It emphasizes decentralized power, explains Richard Danziger, former Director of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for West and Central Africa, now Director of the IOM in Somalia. Budgets are also supposed to be decentralized, a good tool to help counter extremism, as local governments are closer to communities. The great challenge in Somalia remains the organization of society into clans, a logic that supersedes all ».
In the Sahel, the fault lines are both political and ethnic. “ the continuum strong language around pastoralism masks the Fulani question, according to Bakary Sambe. The grievances of certain sections of the population feed frustrations that have seen part of the Fulani youth join the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. »
Moreover, one of the mistakes made in the Sahel did not occur in Somalia: in northern Burkina, for example, the establishment of local militias was encouraged and financed by the authorities. ” This decision, risky and potentially counterproductive, gives access to weapons, opens the way to abuses and massacres », analysis Richard Danziger.
Clandestine migration to Libya and Europe represents a major asset for extremists in the Sahel, as a resource to capture, whereas in Somalia, it does not represent an issue. ” Most movements are west to east, with mostly Ethiopians traveling on foot to the coast, via relatively safer routes (Somaliland and Puntland) to reach the Gulf countries notes the senior IOM official.
External intervention forces
Both regions have regional security frameworks, the G5 Sahel on the one hand, institutional, and the Amisom force on the other, with a more aggressive mandate. Mali is distinguished by the dual presence of Minusma (14,500 soldiers and police), a UN stabilization force, and the French army (4,800 soldiers), whose operation Barkhane is the subject of a acute crisis of confidence.
In Somalia, Amisom, created fifteen years ago by the African Union, is not giving satisfaction either. The presidents of the Federated Member States of Somalia criticize its 21,500 men for remaining in a defensive position in the areas reconquered from the Shebabs. In addition, the European Union (EU) and the UN show a certain weariness in financing this force made up of Kenyans, Ethiopians, Djiboutians, Burundians and Ugandans. In particular, the EU cut its support for the salaries of Kenyan force troops in Somalia by 66% in July 2021.
Can a true sub-regional partnership represent a stabilizing factor? The question arises all the more strongly in the Sahel, where Algeria remains in the background despite its central role, since the army has seized power in Mali and Burkina Faso, once morest the backdrop of negotiations with mercenaries. from Russian group Wagner. In Somalia, the response remains mixed as the Ugandan and Burundian contingents in Amisom do not necessarily have the greatest incentive to act. The Horn of Africa is, in fact, quite far from the concerns of these Great Lakes countries.
Finally, an alternative to placing entire countries under international trusteeship remains to be invented. Especially since the security response is not enough in the face of political problems whose roots go deep into history and societies. In 2021, the climate has become tense between the president and the opposition in Somalia. The military split in Mogadishu, leading to fears of civil war. Clearly, a possible return to square one of yet another crisis, as in Mali.
