By Jorge Heine
In an astonishing twist, a seemingly obscure issue regarding Brazil’s deliberation on joining a significant Chinese international cooperation initiative has captured global headlines. “Brazil becomes the second country after India not to join China’s BRI,” proclaimed The Economic Times, India’s premier financial publication. In a less accurate account, The New Civil Engineer claimed, “Brazil third country to pull out of China’s multi-billion-dollar vision to construct ‘new Silk Road’” — a statement contradicted by the fact that only Italy has officially withdrawn from the BRI under Giorgia Meloni’s far-right administration.
Following Brazil’s reported rejection of Venezuela’s bid to join BRICS during their 16th summit in Kazan from October 22-24, speculation regarding a drastic shift towards right-leaning foreign policy in Brazil intensified.
Is this narrative grounded in reality? Have the longstanding principles of Brazilian foreign policy undergone a transformation?
Brazil’s recent decision certainly raised eyebrows and warrants deeper inquiry. To date, 22 Latin American and Caribbean nations have entered into Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with China regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Colombia potentially becoming the 23rd following President Gustavo Petro’s recent visit to Beijing. As China’s flagship foreign policy endeavor, the BRI has mobilized approximately one trillion dollars globally since its inception in 2013, fostering diverse infrastructure and connectivity projects, predominantly within the Global South. As China’s primary trading partner in Latin America, Brazil’s bilateral trade surged to $181 billion in 2023, with Brazil enjoying a notable trade surplus.
Remarkably, nearly half of Chinese investments in the region—approximately $73 billion—have flowed into Brazil. President Xi Jinping is set to attend the upcoming G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 19-20, and Brazil’s commitment to the BRI would have served as a crowning achievement for this visit, akin to the unveiling of the Chinese-built deep-water port in Chancay, Peru, during Xi’s participation in the APEC summit on November 15-16.
For an extended period, Brazil remained one of the last significant nations in the region refraining from endorsing the BRI (with Mexico as another notable exception). In recent weeks, there had been mounting speculation that Brazil might finally opt to join. Why jeopardize an anticipated agreement at such a critical juncture and provide additional fodder for China hawks worldwide? Are we genuinely observing a significant pivot away from China in Brazilian diplomatic circles?
Alternatively, could this be an unexpected and rather exceptional misstep in Itamaraty’s storied diplomatic history? To what extent did U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s warning—delivered at the Bloomberg New Economy meeting in São Paulo on October 23—play a role in Brazil’s reluctance to join the BRI? Her cautionary notes on the perils of aligning with China’s BRI may have resonated strongly within Brazilian leadership.
Nevertheless, I contend that the media may be exaggerating the implications of Brazil’s decision. Latin American countries began formalizing BRI MOUs as early as 2018, with Panama being the first to sign. However, larger economies, including Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, have largely opted to remain independent of this initiative. Their analyses suggest that their economic stature ensures that China would engage with them regardless of their participation in the BRI.
Historically, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico held their ground. Argentina’s struggle with foreign debt ultimately compelled it to join the BRI in 2022. Colombia has consistently lagged in its relations with China, prompting President Petro to believe that signing onto the BRI would give his nation a much-needed boost in connectivity. While Mexico’s situation precludes it from joining the BRI, Brazil finds itself in a uniquely powerful position that diminishes the necessity of committing to the BRI. As a rising power within the region, Brazil is likely to remain a preferred partner for China irrespective of its formal affiliations.
It is essential to recognize the historical restraint that has characterized Brazilian foreign policy. During his tenure from 2003 to 2011, President Lula stood as a prominent advocate for the Global South, with Brazil playing a foundational role in the India-Brazil-South Africa Initiative (IBSA)—a coalition of three significant democracies representing Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Brazil also jointly founded the BRICS group and was instrumental in establishing the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Curiously, throughout these years, Brazil never formally joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), instead holding only an observer status. Celso Amorim, the foreign minister then and now a key foreign policy advisor to Lula, perceived membership as potentially disruptive and unnecessarily provocative both domestically and internationally.
A similar rationale appears to underpin Brazil’s stance on the BRI. This decision aligns closely with the principles of Active Non-Alignment (ANA), which currently guide Brazilian diplomacy. ANA emphasizes prioritizing national interests while deftly navigating pressures from major global powers. As articulated in our upcoming publication, *The Non-Aligned World*, the intense competition among these powers can, paradoxically, yield opportunities for developing nations that maintain a neutral stance, allowing them to leverage relations with both sides effectively.
ANA promotes fostering positive relations with competing great powers—namely, the U.S. and China—while simultaneously diversifying international connections to mitigate various geopolitical risks. This approach, known as hedging, does not simply involve maintaining a neutral position; it also encourages conducting oneself in ways that may appear unexpected or even contradictory, keeping potential adversaries and partners uncertain about Brazil’s next diplomatic moves.
As Brazil prepares to chair the G20, COP30, and the BRICS group in the coming years, it occupies a pivotal position in global diplomacy. Consequently, Brazil must exercise heightened caution in managing its role within this intricate geopolitical landscape. President Lula is proud of his amicable ties with President Biden, yet his recent Ukraine peace initiative drew criticism from Washington. His state visit to Beijing in 2023 followed a prior engagement in Washington, underscoring the delicate diplomatic balancing act Brazil is undertaking. Joining the BRI could provoke needless complications within an already tense international climate; Brazil is acutely aware of this reality. The essence of its foreign policy remains steadfast, and this entire narrative will soon fade into the background.
Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. His book, co-authored with Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, *The Non-Aligned World: Striking Out in an Era of Great Power Competition*, is forthcoming from Polity Press in April 2025.
**Interview with Jorge Heine, Expert on Latin American Foreign Policy**
**Editor:** Welcome, Jorge! Thank you for joining us today. You’ve recently analyzed Brazil’s decision not to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What do you believe influenced this choice?
**Jorge Heine:** Thank you for having me! Brazil’s decision seems to stem from a calculated approach to foreign policy, rooted in its historical stance of Active Non-Alignment. The recent warning from U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, where she highlighted the potential risks of aligning with China’s BRI, likely played a role. Brazil is keen to maintain its independence and navigate pressures from both China and the U.S. without overtly committing to one side.
**Editor:** Interesting perspective. With 22 countries in the Latin American region engaging with the BRI, including Colombia potentially joining soon, why do you think Brazil opted out at this critical juncture?
**Jorge Heine:** Brazil is in a unique position – it has a significant trade surplus with China, amounting to $181 billion in 2023. As one of the largest economies in the region, Brazilian leadership may feel confident that they can engage with China on their own terms, without needing the BRI framework to facilitate that relationship. The decision also reflects a desire to assert its global standing independently.
**Editor:** There’s speculation that this shift indicates a broader pivot toward a right-leaning foreign policy in Brazil. Do you agree, or do you think this is more about Brazil’s historical diplomatic principles?
**Jorge Heine:** While there may be an inclination to view it through a political lens, I think it’s essential to consider Brazil’s longstanding restraint in foreign affairs. The country has historically sought to prioritize its national interests, balancing relations with major powers. This decision is likely more about adherence to its historical diplomatic principles than an outright political shift.
**Editor:** How do you think Brazil’s stance will impact its relationship with China, especially with President Xi Jinping attending the upcoming G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro?
**Jorge Heine:** It will be a delicate balancing act. Brazil’s non-participation in the BRI doesn’t mean a cooling of relations with China. Given Brazil’s established trade ties and significant investments from China, both countries are likely to continue engaging constructively. Xi Jinping’s visit will likely focus on solidifying these ties, even if they don’t formalize a BRI agreement.
**Editor:** could you elaborate on the implications of Brazil’s decision for the region as a whole?
**Jorge Heine:** Brazil’s choice not to join the BRI reinforces the critical importance of sovereignty and independent decision-making among Latin American countries. Other nations, like Argentina, have pursued different paths due to various pressures, including debt concerns. Brazil’s firm stance may encourage its neighbors to think critically about their relationships with global powers and what it means for their sovereignty.
**Editor:** Thank you, Jorge, for your insightful analysis on this complex issue. It’s clear that Brazil’s decision has far-reaching implications that transcend immediate diplomatic considerations.
**Jorge Heine:** Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important topic!
