If the German media Handelsblatt suggests that the German government is preparing to authorize a shipment of the kindthe official position of Berlin remains for the moment not to authorize this export as long as the United States does not also transport this type of armament to Ukraine.
Liana Fix, researcher on European issues at the Council on Foreign Relationsfrom Washington, explains why the whole debate around tanks represents a significant political damage
for Berlin.
What should be understood from Berlin’s initial decision not to allow the export of tanks until the United States also takes this decision?
This is the continuity of German policy since the beginning of this war. The Chancellor has always indicated that he would not deliver arms to Ukraine alone, but that this would be done in coordination with the allies. That said, what is new is the fact that coordinating with allies means acting alongside the United States. So it’s not just about European allies anymore, but it’s also about getting cover from Washington. This contradicts the role that many wanted Germany to play in Europe.
Do the internal political dynamics in Germany make it possible to better understand these hesitations?
In fact, it makes the whole thing even harder to understand. We have a coalition formed by three parties for the first time in Germany. In this coalition, two of the three partners are in favor of the delivery of arms. Only one party, Chancellor Scholz’s Social Democratic Party, opposed it. So the Chancellor was not only under pressure from international partners, but also from his allies in Germany. It was really the fear of reprisals from Russia that had dictated the Chancellor’s conduct since the beginning of the war, but this position became increasingly difficult to defend.
Why is the Chancellor so fearful of these reprisals, which does not seem to be the case with other European partners, including some that are geographically closer to Russia?
I think this is because unlike other European allies, such as France and the UK, Germany does not have a long tradition of military and strategic culture. The delivery of arms to Ukraine is a completely new stage, at least since the end of the Cold War. This subject is also the subject of more heated debates in Germany than in other European countries, where there is little discussion on this topic.
The other reason is related to this idea that the nuclear umbrella of the United States is the main security guarantee of the Germans and that acting only with European allies is not sufficiently safe. It’s complicated because it comes at a time when there are discussions about the desire of Europeans to take their destiny into their own hands by developing greater autonomy. But if the continent’s most important country, Germany, continues to look to the United States and wait for a green light from Washington, all those hopes of a strong Europe will not materialize.
Germany has come under a lot of criticism for its dithering on tanks. What impact can this have on the country’s reputation on a continental scale?
Germany has had a reputation problem since the start of the war. Berlin announced a transformation of its foreign policy in response to the attack on Ukraine, but since then the country has moved only in small steps. German credibility had already been questioned, but it’s even worse with the tank file because Germany’s initial refusal to send these vehicles does not only have an impact on its own decisions. . Without Berlin’s approval, other European countries that have purchased these tanks from Germany in the past cannot export them to Ukraine.
In addition to questions about Germany’s credibility, this dossier raises questions for other European countries. Do they want to be dependent on Berlin for their basic military needs, if Germany can block a decision like sending the tanks to Ukraine?
Germany had however announced a change of strategy at the start of the war, in terms of energy and defence. What has happened since?
It was both in terms of energy and defense. The Chancellor, for example, announced that Germany would spend more than 2% of its GDP on defense each year. This is the objective of NATO, but Germany had never respected it. According to estimates, Berlin may not reach this goal until 2025. So there have been a lot of announcements about fundamental changes, but in the areas where these changes must come from Germany itself, for example in defense, it is slower than anticipated.
In terms of energy, Berlin simply had no choice but to act, because at a certain point Russia simply decided not to supply any more gas to Germany.