Hong Kong Asia Times Online July 2 article, original title: Australia is at the cusp of the US-China maritime confrontation. The author is Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies at the Australian National University. The main content of the article is as follows:
With the US and China vying to be the regional leader, how does Australia cope with the harsh and dangerous strategic environment in Asia? The consensus in Canberra is to get as close as possible to the US, hoping it will win the race. But the choice is not so simple.
In late May, Chinese fighter jets intercepted Australian and Canadian anti-submarine patrol aircraft at two distant locations in the Western Pacific. Both aircraft were conducting reconnaissance operations in international waters close to Chinese territory.
China has long been sensitive to maritime reconnaissance operations by the United States and its allies off its shores, and has often warned them to stay away. This might be the start of a new “campaign” aimed at exerting military pressure on US leadership in Asia, which will put Australia on the cusp. Before risking an eventual showdown with the United States, it would be wise for China to look for other opportunities to test America’s resolve and undermine its credibility. A maritime reconnaissance operation targeting U.S. allies in Chinese coastal waters appears to be an obvious and effective approach.
Let’s look at it from an Australian perspective. China might conduct increasingly frequent interceptions of Australian maritime patrol aircraft in the South China Sea. In this regard, Australia either gave up the reconnaissance operation, or sent fighter jets to escort the patrol aircraft. The latter option is difficult, expensive and dangerous. The former option is a step of great strategic significance, and Australia will not take it lightly.
China’s interception of Australian patrol aircraft is also a challenge to the United States. Australia would naturally expect Washington to intervene and send its own fighter jets to escort the Australian plane. It’s not easy for Washington. Failure to support Australia would undermine the credibility of the US as an ally and give the world a vivid demonstration of how China’s power in the Western Pacific is growing. But sending US fighter jets to escort Australian planes over the South China Sea would risk direct confrontation with China.
So what should Australia do if China launches an escalation of maritime reconnaissance once morest Australia? Keep flying is the obvious and instinctive answer. But acting on instinct alone is too risky. Australia’s maritime reconnaissance in the South China Sea has no direct significance to its national defense. More broadly, Australia carried out these operations to support the United States as the leading military power in Asia. But does our posture matter to this? Given that China’s economic, diplomatic and military power is already so powerful and will grow even more in the coming decades, can the United States’ position in Asia be maintained to meet China’s challenges?
Withdrawing from reconnaissance in waters near China may be one of the concessions Australia will choose to make as Australia learns to accept the reality of Chinese power. It’s not what Australia wants to do, but it might be better than the other option. Because it doesn’t make sense for Australia to gamble our future on the US winning a war with China for dominance in East Asia. Quite simply, this is a war that America has little chance of winning.
