The speech preceded the man’s visit hours to the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, where he chaired the meetings of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa – IGAD, aimed at “discussing issues of common interest in the region,” foremost of which is the escalating tension between Ethiopia and Sudan. Despite the efforts of the Executive Secretary of the Commission, Raqneh Gebeyehu, to pre-empt the meeting by visiting Khartoum and holding a calming meeting with Al-Burhan, and his call earlier “the two brotherly countries to actively search for diplomatic means to reach a permanent and sustainable solution”, Sudan saw that the summit comes at a critical and important time. Despite the fact that Al-Burhan’s speech did not refer to his foreign policies.
Therefore, the “sovereign” president benefited from choosing the date of his speech, to renew his positions in the face of the repeated Ethiopian attacks on the border areas with Sudan, amid his efforts to reduce Addis Ababa’s traditional influence among some sectors of the civil component, while it is expected that he will meet with the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed. , in Nairobi.
Civilian forces and their entitlements
A large part of the discourse of the “civil forces” in recent weeks, with the support of the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Volker Perthes, who was summoned by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry a few days ago, against the background of his statements regarding the “June 20” demonstrations and his demand that the Sudanese authorities “avoid the use of violence”, focused on the necessity of Excluding any role for the army in governance, or negotiating with it. But Al-Burhan’s speech, which declared the armed forces’ rejection of “political exclusion”, may prompt it to review its previous positions, in order to reach a more realistic agenda. However, setting such an agenda seems extremely difficult in light of several considerations. Most notably, the continued state of fragmentation among the opposition political forces; Its ability to mobilize nationally has declined behind its positions, especially in the parties; the absence of a clear mechanism by which the outcomes of the dialogue will be implemented, even after the completion of the negotiations of the tripartite mechanism between the civil forces; In addition, the mandate of the “government of national competencies” will be very limited and closer to conducting business, pending the arrangement for the final stage of the transitional phase by holding parliamentary elections.
The “Forces of Freedom and Change” rejected what it described as an open tactical maneuver
In any case, the civil forces showed confusion in dealing with the speech of Al-Burhan, while the currently active traditional political parties, such as the National Umma Party and the Federal Party, welcomed the speech, but reduced it to “the armed forces’ exit from power.” It can be assumed that there are two possibilities behind the turbulent response of the “forces of freedom and change”: first, its agreement to wait, and the preparation of a unified response that may also include specific clauses regarding its role in the transitional phase; Second, communicating with external actors, i.e. the sponsors of the tripartite mechanism, and a number of regional countries, to explore scenarios for dealing with the developments imposed by the hadith of Al-Burhan.
Regional Repercussions
Although the speech did not give any indication of the country’s foreign policies, it came in the context of the Sovereignty Council’s efforts to deal with the pressures facing the country, most notably the suspension of Sudan’s debt forgiveness process, border tension with Ethiopia, and attempts to marginalize Khartoum’s regional position.
It is expected that the speech, and the political process that may follow, lead to the suspension of punitive measures in the debt file or at least to postpone them until guarantees are provided for the formation of an “executive government,” and perhaps the Paris Club countries will freeze their decision to suspend Sudan’s debt relief process. Al-Burhan’s speech, in its part related to the rejection of political exclusion, also represents a contrast with the vision of regional countries, most notably the UAE, for the participation of the Islamic movement or “remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime” in any political processes, whether in the remainder of the transitional period or beyond. Although there are explanations that this trend is “tactical,” it appears to be a strategic one, taking into account this current’s support for all the policies of the military component, and its ability to mobilize and mobilize, in addition to being an added value to other nervous and tribal forces that support the policies of the military. This indicates the continued ability of the proof to evade direct external dictates in the aforementioned file.
While Sudanese opponents linked Al-Burhan’s speech to what they considered the “Egyptian scenario” or “Egyptian advice,” the link between the “sovereign” and Cairo goes beyond this symbolic analysis, given the seriousness of the common files facing the two countries, which in turn push Cairo to open up the movement’s horizons before the Council, Supporting any solutions that lead to the establishment of political stability in Sudan, and ensuring the strengthening of its negotiating capacity in the face of its multiple crises, as well as some Arab economic conditions to support it in exchange for sovereign draining it, similar to the Emirati pressure model to lease the lands of the Sudanese Al-Fashqa area in cooperation with Ethiopian investors, which Cairo considers, Unstated, it is a direct threat to its national security.
The “revolutionary” answer to the speech
Shortly after the speech, the “resistance committees” declared their lack of confidence in “the proof and his speeches,” and stressed their categorical rejection of his agenda “even under the (guarantees) of the international community,” while the “forces of freedom and change” announced its intention to issue a statement on its council. The Central Bank to clarify its position on the speech, especially since what was mentioned in it regarding the formation of an “executive government” constituted an active path in the tripartite mechanism, at least since mid-June. The statement was actually issued yesterday noon from the headquarters of the National Umma Party, rejecting the “open maneuvering” of the proof and its tactical retreat, and calling for the resignation of the “revolutionary authority” (dissolving the Sovereignty Council before the formation of the civil government) and a new constitutional declaration that “identifies the structures and issues of the transition,” declaring that the plan The current “forces of freedom and change” is to continue peaceful protest, leading to civil disobedience, and intensify communication with the “regional and international families,” considering that “the coup authority uses calls for dialogue as attempts to legitimize its coup and break its isolation, which it has not and will never succeed in.”
Scenarios of the “proof map”
Sudan appears to face several scenarios in the next few months, the most prominent of which are: moving forward according to the “proof map” and the completion of the political forces (after international and regional pressures) consultations regarding the formation of a caretaker government under the auspices of the United Nations, the African Union and “IGAD”, provided that preparations for elections will follow. general in the country; This is a possibility that does not seem unlikely, especially in light of the US-Saudi-Egyptian sponsorship of dialogue between the military and “freedom and change”.
The second possibility is the opposition’s adherence to its declared positions rejecting any role for the army in governance, or in implementing the outcomes of the national dialogue. However, for this scenario to produce results, it requires superior cohesion between the components of the opposition, and a greater ability to mobilize popular positions on a permanent basis rather than in an instant. In the event that the polarization between the Sovereignty Council and the opposition deepens, and what will result in mutual mobilization, the scenario of total chaos will also be on the table.