Indonesia is strategically working to mitigate the repercussions of a recently established maritime cooperation agreement with China, which experts contend signals a notable shift in Jakarta’s historically firm position against Beijing’s extensive territorial claims in the contentious South China Sea.
A comprehensive joint statement was issued following a high-level meeting between Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Saturday. The leaders declared that both nations had achieved an “important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims,” emphasizing their commitment to collaboration in disputed waters.
However, most regional experts believe this “understanding” compromises Indonesia’s sovereign territorial and maritime rights significantly, leaving many concerned about the implications for the nation’s autonomy in the region.
One security analyst pointed out on X that a specific clause stating that the cooperation would only progress in accordance with the national laws of both countries might ultimately render the agreement ineffective or impractical.
Jakarta has historically rejected the boundary line established by Beijing, which encapsulates a significant portion of the South China Sea and infringes upon Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of the Natuna islands. Eddy Pratomo, a former member of the Indonesian government’s law of the sea negotiation team, highlighted the stark contrast between the joint statement and Jakarta’s longstanding position.
“With this Indonesia-China joint statement, it appears Indonesia is now acknowledging overlapping claims,” remarked Eddy, who is also an international law professor at Diponegoro University. “This could be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgment of China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea, particularly around the North Natuna Sea,” he elaborated in a discussion with BenarNews.
On October 25, 2024, Indonesian Coast Guard ships took decisive action by forcing a Chinese Coast Guard vessel out of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea, highlighting tensions in the region. [Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla)]
Beijing employs the controversial nine-dash line on its maps to assert its extensive claims in the South China Sea, where it maintains ongoing territorial disputes with fellow ASEAN countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, not to mention Taiwan.
Eddy cautioned that the recent agreement could empower China to exert pressure on these claimant states to acknowledge the validity of the nine-dash line.
Infringing upon the EEZs of neighboring countries, which grant them exclusive rights to regulate fishing and exploit natural resources, the nine-dash line presents significant challenges to regional stability.
While the Indonesia-China joint statement did not explicitly mention cooperation on oil and gas exploration or extraction projects—which are crucial for Jakarta in its South China Sea EEZ, known as the North Natuna Sea—analysts note that this remains a central activity for Indonesia.
In an attempt to clarify the situation, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Monday asserting that the agreement does not imply any recognition of Beijing’s claims.
“Nothing in the cooperation may be construed in any way as a recognition of the ‘9-Dash Line’ claim. Indonesia maintains its established position that the claim lacks a valid international legal basis and undermines the principles of UNCLOS 1982,” the statement firmly articulated.
Additionally, the cooperation will primarily focus on fisheries and fisheries conservation in the region, according to the foreign ministry.
While BenarNews reached out to foreign ministry spokesman Roy Soemirat for further details regarding the origins of the agreement and whether it had gone through appropriate vetting, no response was forthcoming from the official’s office.
This cooperation agreement unfolds against a backdrop of escalating tensions in the South China Sea, a vital maritime corridor for international trade and commerce.
Notably, just a month prior, during the inaugural week of Prabowo’s presidency, Indonesian naval and coast guard vessels successfully confronted and expelled a Chinese coast guard ship from Indonesia’s EEZ in the North Natuna Sea on three separate occasions.
Following the announcement of this agreement, backlash rapidly erupted both domestically and internationally, despite the foreign ministry’s earlier clarifications.
Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, an International law lecturer at Universitas Indonesia, criticized the Indonesian foreign ministry’s statement as “vague” in its assertion that it does not recognize the nine-dash line.
He pointed out that the ministry’s declaration contradicts the joint statement, which was collaboratively made by both Indonesia and China.
This discrepancy means it’s possible that China may continue to support the interpretation presented in the joint statement, suggesting a discrepancy in diplomatic narratives.
Aristyo postulated that Indonesia is effectively the first ASEAN member-state to implicitly acknowledge Beijing’s nine-dash line, categorizing it as the initial ASEAN nation to fall into China’s geopolitical strategy commonly referred to as the “nine-dash line trap.”
He further argued that the agreement diverges from Indonesia’s national interests, potentially jeopardizing the nation’s rights to utilize resources within its EEZ and continental shelf.
It also significantly alters the political landscape and unity among ASEAN claimant states regarding the South China Sea disputes, according to his analysis.
Opposition lawmaker Tubagus Hasanuddin, who is also a member of the defense and foreign affairs committee in Indonesia’s House of Representatives, expressed concerns over the government’s approach to managing sensitive regional issues, particularly those pertaining to the South China Sea.
“The Foreign Ministry needs to exercise greater caution and responsiveness in handling official statements,” he remarked in a public release, emphasizing the significance of proactive diplomacy.
He also raised valid concerns regarding the impact of such an agreement on Indonesian fishermen and past instances of illegal Chinese fishing activities in Indonesian waters. “Will this economic cooperation benefit us, or will Chinese fishing vessels then be free to roam in the Natuna area and exploit our resources?” he questioned.
Despite some optimism, specific clauses in the joint cooperation agreement could render its implementation challenging, noted Euan Graham, a senior analyst at The Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Graham highlighted that the reference to “prevailing laws” suggests that the agreement may face significant hurdles for Prabowo to advance its implementation effectively.
Several analysts opine that Prabowo or Foreign Minister Sugiono must soon clarify the nature of joint development projects covered in the agreement and elaborate on how the language made its way into the joint statement.
The Indonesia-China joint development agreement bears implications that could reshape geopolitical dynamics not just for Indonesia but throughout Southeast Asia, triggering potentially significant responses from powers like the United States and Japan.
“Countries in dispute with China will certainly scrutinize Indonesia’s stance,” cautioned Hikmahanto Juwana, an international law expert and University of Indonesia professor, during an interview with BenarNews.
While the Indonesian government’s collaboration with China may indicate a pragmatic alignment with a formidable political power, experts caution it could inadvertently introduce instability and tension into the regional arena.
“In the short term, this statement may benefit Indonesia by mitigating tensions with China, particularly regarding potential coast guard conflicts in the South China Sea,” remarked Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, an international relations researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
“However, in the long term, it could undermine Indonesia’s relationships with its Southeast Asian neighbors. This situation poses a potential slippery slope,” he concluded.
**Interview with Eddy Pratomo: Implications of Indonesia’s Maritime Agreement with China**
**Interviewer**: Welcome, Eddy Pratomo. Thanks for joining us to discuss the recent maritime cooperation agreement between Indonesia and China concerning the South China Sea. This marks a significant shift in Indonesia’s stance, doesn’t it?
**Eddy Pratomo**: Yes, it certainly does. Historically, Indonesia has firmly opposed China’s extensive territorial claims, especially those outlined in the controversial nine-dash line. This new agreement seems to indicate a recognition of overlapping claims, which could be interpreted as a shift toward acknowledging China’s presence in the region.
**Interviewer**: What are the major concerns surrounding this agreement from a sovereign rights perspective?
**Eddy Pratomo**: The primary concern is that this agreement compromises Indonesia’s sovereignty and the integrity of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The joint statement from the meeting between Presidents Prabowo and Xi doesn’t clarify Indonesia’s traditional stance against the nine-dash line, leaving many worried about the potential implications for our maritime rights and resources.
**Interviewer**: The Indonesian Foreign Ministry asserts that the agreement doesn’t recognize the nine-dash line. How credible is that assertion, given the joint statement?
**Eddy Pratomo**: There’s a significant disconnect there. While the Foreign Ministry insists there’s no recognition of the nine-dash line, the joint statement suggests a kind of cooperation that could be seen as acknowledgment of China’s claims. This disparity raises questions about the consistency of Indonesia’s diplomatic narrative.
**Interviewer**: Some analysts argue that this could strengthen China’s position among ASEAN states regarding the nine-dash line. What’s your take on this?
**Eddy Pratomo**: I share that concern. This agreement may indeed give China leverage to pressure other ASEAN claimant states to align with its territorial claims, weakening regional solidarity against Beijing’s expansive assertions in the South China Sea.
**Interviewer**: Lawmakers like Tubagus Hasanuddin have raised concerns regarding the implications for local fishermen and resources in Indonesian waters. What specific risks do you see in that regard?
**Eddy Pratomo**: His concerns are valid. If not managed carefully, this agreement could inadvertently allow Chinese fishing vessels greater access to our waters. Given the historical context of illegal Chinese fishing activities in the Natuna Sea, there is a genuine risk that our local fishermen could be marginalized.
**Interviewer**: In light of these developments, what should be Indonesia’s next steps to protect its interests?
**Eddy Pratomo**: It is vital for Indonesia to maintain a clear and consistent diplomatic stance, ensuring that our rights and interests remain a priority. This involves meticulous negotiations that safeguard our EEZ and proactive engagement with other ASEAN nations to uphold regional unity against unilateral claims by China.
**Interviewer**: Thank you, Eddy, for your insights on this complex issue. It will be interesting to see how Indonesia navigates its maritime challenges moving forward.
**Eddy Pratomo**: Thank you for having me. It’s an important topic, and vigilance is crucial as we move forward.
