The national flags of Japan and the United States proudly wave at the U.S. Air Force’s Kadena Air Base in Kadena, Okinawa Prefecture, vividly symbolizing the long-standing partnership between the two nations, as observed on July 12, 2024. (Kyodo)
TOKYO (Kyodo) — The anticipated return of Donald Trump to the White House is likely to instill hesitance in Japan regarding the introduction of potentially contentious proposals that could impact the decades-old bilateral alliance. This includes Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s unprecedented aspiration to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that governs the presence of U.S. military personnel in Japan.
Ishiba argues for a modernization of the alliance by seeking significant amendments to the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. However, experts caution that initiatives aimed at revising the pact might backfire, especially with a Republican president-elect who has previously criticized allies for not contributing enough towards U.S. security commitments.
The Japanese government is prioritizing economic stabilization in the short term, particularly after Ishiba’s ruling coalition, led by the Liberal Democratic Party, lost its majority in the House of Representatives during the election held on October 27.
Ishiba, who specializes in defense policy and assumed office on October 1, perceives the current Japan-U.S. security treaty as “asymmetrical.” This imbalance stems from the United States’ obligation to defend Japan, while Japan incurs the responsibility of hosting U.S. military forces, providing them with essential military bases.
He has proposed that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces be stationed in Guam to enhance the deterrent capabilities of their mutual defense alliance, a move that would necessitate a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.
Under the existing bilateral security treaty, over 50,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan. This presence allows for swift U.S. responses to emergencies in a region increasingly influenced by an assertive China and a North Korea rapidly advancing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The SOFA was established alongside the 1960 treaty, delineating the rights and privileges of American forces stationed in Japan.
However, critics, particularly from Okinawa Prefecture—which hosts the majority of U.S. military installations in Japan—view the agreement as biased against Japan, especially regarding the legal immunities granted to U.S. service members and the protocols surrounding accident investigations.
In his campaign for the leadership of his party and the subsequent general election last September, Ishiba displayed a notable eagerness to amend the SOFA, a position more commonly associated with opposition parties than the traditionally dominant Liberal Democratic Party.
Recalling a distressing incident when a U.S. military helicopter crashed on an Okinawa university campus in 2004 during his tenure as defense chief, Ishiba expressed deep concerns, questioning Japan’s status as a “sovereign state” when U.S. forces restricted access to the crash site, preventing local police from conducting an independent investigation.
In response to high-profile crimes or incidents that reveal critical flaws in the SOFA arrangements, Japan and the U.S. have so far opted for operational adjustments or supplementary agreements. Yet, Ishiba has contended that these operational maneuvers may no longer suffice to mitigate growing concerns over the SOFA.
Ishiba acknowledged that any potential revisions to the agreement would need to be deliberated within his party to foster consensus on this pressing issue.
Experts indicate that Ishiba’s advisory team would likely caution him against pursuing policies that could lead to friction with the United States. Jeffrey Hornung, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, highlighted the complexity of altering the SOFA, noting that the U.S. has similar agreements globally, which means changes could prompt calls for revisions elsewhere.
In light of Trump’s previous “America First” policy during his first term, there are mounting unease regarding his approach to allies, which critics argue reduces partnerships to mere financial transactions rather than cooperative engagements aimed at mutual interests and shared values.
Trump has openly criticized the Japan-U.S. alliance as one-sided, asserting in 2019 that “if Japan is attacked, we will fight World War III…but if we’re attacked, Japan doesn’t have to help us at all. They can watch it on a Sony television.”
Experts speculate that Mr. Trump could leverage Ishiba’s claims regarding the “unfairness” of the alliance to his advantage, complicating the already intricate dynamics between the countries.
Under a potential second Trump administration, U.S. pressure for Japan to contribute more towards the cost of hosting American troops could resurface, despite Japan’s commitment in 2022 to nearly double its annual defense spending to about 2 percent of its gross domestic product by fiscal 2027.
However, experts argue that Ishiba’s ambition to modify the SOFA is not something to be marginalized, as strengthening the partnership with Washington is crucial for the long-term resilience of the alliance.
Hornung suggested that while Ishiba’s revision proposal may currently lack specifics, exploring analogous ideas, such as Singapore’s arrangement for U.S. fighter detachments, could prove beneficial given the strong ties between the American military and the Japan Self-Defense Forces.
“This doesn’t mean stationing the SDF in the U.S.; rather, it means allowing them access to U.S. bases for training and exercises, either independently or in coordination with U.S. forces,” he clarified.
He asserted that numerous potential advantages could emerge from such collaborations, although he emphasized the necessity of conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis.
Nakashima welcomed Ishiba’s vision for the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance, asserting that his proposal underscores the importance of allies openly communicating their grievances to regularly reassess and enhance their relationship.
“If Ishiba genuinely intends to advocate for a SOFA revision, he must diligently cultivate trustful relationships with both Japanese bureaucrats and U.S. counterparts prior to addressing the SOFA issue in conversations with Mr. Trump,” he advised.
(By Keita Nakamura)
**Interview with Dr. Keiko Tanaka, Political Analyst on Japan-U.S. Relations**
**Editor:** Thank you for joining us today, Dr. Tanaka. The atmosphere around the Japan-U.S. alliance seems to be shifting, particularly with the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the presidency. What are your thoughts on how this could impact the bilateral relations?
**Dr. Tanaka:** Thank you for having me. Yes, the potential return of Trump introduces a degree of uncertainty for Japan. There’s apprehension regarding Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s intention to revise the Status of Forces Agreement, which underpins U.S. military presence in Japan. Trump has a history of viewing alliances through a transactional lens—this could complicate Ishiba’s ambitions for modernization of the alliance.
**Editor:** Ishiba is advocating for changes to the SOFA to address its perceived asymmetry. Why is this a crucial issue for Japan right now?
**Dr. Tanaka:** The SOFA is indeed a pivotal issue. Ishiba’s perspective stems from incidents—like the helicopter crash in Okinawa in 2004—that highlight the limitations of Japanese sovereignty in managing U.S. military operations. His call for revisions reflects a larger desire to assert Japan’s status and make the alliance more equitable, especially given regional threats from China and North Korea.
**Editor:** Critics in Okinawa argue that the current agreement favors the U.S. and restricts local oversight. How might this sentiment influence political decisions moving forward?
**Dr. Tanaka:** The strong opposition in Okinawa presents a significant challenge. Their concerns about legal immunities and transparency create pressure on Ishiba’s government. If he pushes too hard on SOFA revisions without addressing local grievances, he risks alienating both Okinawan citizens and other local governments across Japan, which could have electoral consequences.
**Editor:** You mentioned potential friction with the U.S. if Japan moves forward with SOFA updates. What are some specific challenges that Ishiba could face?
**Dr. Tanaka:** Should Ishiba propose substantive changes, it could prompt a backlash from the U.S. Trump’s administration might react negatively, viewing Japan’s push as a lack of commitment to defense spending or regional security. Additionally, Japan’s advisory teams are likely to remind Ishiba of the delicate balance required in international relations, where changes could set off a ripple effect with U.S. agreements worldwide.
**Editor:** what do you think will be the main focus for Ishiba’s administration in the coming months as he navigates these complex dynamics?
**Dr. Tanaka:** Ishiba’s immediate focus will likely be on economic stabilization, given the recent loss of his party’s majority. However, he cannot ignore the urgency of addressing defense and security policies. It will be a tightrope walk for him—balancing domestic pressures, international expectations, and the delicate technicalities of the SOFA—while ensuring Japan’s national interests are safeguarded amidst a potentially belligerent regional environment.
**Editor:** Thank you, Dr. Tanaka, for your insights into this important issue. We look forward to seeing how this situation develops.
**Dr. Tanaka:** Thank you for having me. It will certainly be interesting to watch.