Last week’s military exercises by China, dubbed “Joint Sword-2024B,” around Taiwan have ignited serious apprehensions in Taipei and among allied nations regarding an apparent shift in Beijing’s strategic posture. Observers are increasingly worried that China is escalating its risk tolerance, showing a marked departure from previous efforts aimed at “peaceful unification.” Instead, there seems to be a pivot towards more aggressive tactics intended to achieve unification through force, which could manifest in various forms such as military quarantine, blockade, or even a full-scale invasion.
Catherine Lila Chou (周怡齡) and Mark Harrison’s recent publication, Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order, underscores the challenges posed by Beijing’s one-party political system. The authors point out that within this framework, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operates under the assumption that it is perpetually correct. Consequently, Taiwanese identity is often dismissed as a mere manifestation of “secessionist” or “foreign” influences. This dismissive view precludes any meaningful reflection on how Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers could be counterproductive to its ultimate ambitions for unification.
According to Chou and Harrison, “Beijing is thus locked into a cycle of tactical escalation, continuously increasing military and diplomatic pressure… which only strengthens Taiwanese resolve.” This persistent cycle of pressure leads Beijing to the conclusion that even greater intensity is required, further complicating their strategic calculations.
Alarmingly, there is a palpable concern that China’s Central Military Commission, alongside the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and President Xi Jinping (習近平), is prioritizing military objectives over economic and diplomatic considerations. They appear to be making a trade-off, favoring short-term tactical achievements over more sustainable, long-range goals. This strategy evokes historical parallels to the imperial ambitions of Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Prussian general staff in the lead-up to World War I.
The increasing risk appetite of Beijing is prompting international analysts to argue that Taiwan’s military must enhance preparations not only to deter aggression but also to effectively counter and defeat any potential invasion. This challenge is compounded by Beijing’s “gray zone” incursions, which are specifically designed to hinder Taiwan’s military from reallocating resources toward developing asymmetric capabilities. These capabilities are essential for Taiwan’s defense, particularly smaller, more agile weapons systems that are difficult to neutralize and critical for surviving a comprehensive military assault.
While it’s evident that Beijing is intensifying its aggressive posture, presenting both asymmetric and symmetric threats to Taiwan’s military, it is essential to recognize that China remains far from being positioned to launch a full-scale invasion. This current state provides Taiwan with a vital window of opportunity to bolster its military capabilities and establish necessary deterrent measures. Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) is actively pursuing reforms in training and command structures, ensuring that Taiwan enhances its overall defense readiness.
Despite facing significant challenges, such as a lack of experience due to not engaging in a war since 1978, the PLA is still evaluating the risks and potential consequences of military action. Notably, the pitfalls observed in Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine have contributed to a collective wariness about the ramifications tied to the use of force, as pointed out by PLA analyst Taylor Fravel.
Moreover, ongoing corruption issues within the PLA could impede Xi’s confidence in the military’s operational capabilities, delaying potential aggression. Compounding the situation, China’s economy is currently fraught with difficulties stemming from weak consumer demand and the deleveraging trends affecting its property sector. Financial Times economist Martin Wolf recently remarked that failure to address these economic challenges in a timely manner could precipitate a deflationary spiral reminiscent of Japan’s prolonged stagnation that lasted three decades.
There is a pressing concern that initiating an invasion could result not only in the defeat of the PLA but also jeopardize China’s burgeoning economic stature if it occurs prior to the CCP successfully navigating its economic obstacles. Such a miscalculation could herald a period of stagnation that lasts for decades.
This overarching context implies that Taiwan still has the crucial time necessary to enhance its fundamental deterrence capabilities through various strategies, which include reforming training protocols and fostering broader societal preparedness initiatives. Such initiatives have been notably championed by President William Lai, who launched a whole-of-society preparedness campaign earlier this year.
While Beijing’s recent military drills are evidently designed to instill fear and assert pressure, they do not necessarily indicate an imminent attack. By engaging in collaborative efforts with the United States and other allied nations, Taiwan and the broader democratic community can work towards fortifying their military capabilities. This collective approach would ensure that even after executing military and economic reforms, Xi’s calculations regarding an aggressive maneuver would render it a high-risk gamble.
Interview with Dr. Catherine Lila Chou on the Implications of China’s Recent Military Exercises
Interviewer (I): Thank you for joining us today, Dr. Chou. Last week, China’s “Joint Sword-2024B” military exercises around Taiwan raised alarm bells in Taipei and among its allies. How do you interpret these exercises in the broader context of Beijing’s strategic intentions?
Catherine Lila Chou (C): Thank you for having me. These exercises represent a significant shift in China’s approach to Taiwan. Rather than seeking peaceful unification, there’s a clear indication that Beijing is willing to escalate its military posture. The exercises not only showcase military capability but also send a message of intimidation, indicating a readiness to use force if necessary.
I: You and Dr. Mark Harrison have noted that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) one-party system fundamentally skews its perception of Taiwanese identity. Can you elaborate on how this affects Beijing’s strategy?
C: Certainly. The CCP operates under an assumption that its views are inherently correct, dismissing Taiwanese identity as a mere product of foreign or ”secessionist” influences. This leads them to ignore the complexities of Taiwanese nationalism, often doubling down on pressure tactics rather than engaging in meaningful dialogue. Their inability to understand or recognize Taiwanese aspirations only intensifies resistance within Taiwan.
I: You mentioned a ”cycle of tactical escalation” in your recent publication. How does this cycle function in the context of Taiwan’s defense strategies?
C: The cycle works like this: each act of aggression from Beijing prompts a stronger resolve in Taiwan. This, in turn, leads China to increase its military pressure further, mistakenly believing that heightened aggression will yield submission. For Taiwan, this presents a unique opportunity to improve its defense posture, as the need for robust asymmetric capabilities becomes critical.
I: You draw historical parallels between China’s current military strategies and those of Imperial Germany before World War I. Could you explain that comparison?
C: Yes, the comparison lies in the detrimental over-reliance on military solutions at the expense of long-term diplomatic and economic strategies. Just like Kaiser Wilhelm II’s ambitions led Germany to prioritize quick tactical victories, Beijing’s current focus on short-term military objectives might undermine its broader goals for a stable unification with Taiwan.
I: Given the increasing military risks, what steps is Taiwan taking to enhance its defense readiness?
C: Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense, Wellington Koo, is pursuing comprehensive reforms in training and command structures. The emphasis is on improving readiness and developing asymmetric capabilities—smaller, agile systems that can effectively counter larger forces. There’s also a necessity to transition to a defensive posture that can withstand gray zone tactics that the PLA employs.
I: Despite the aggressive posture from Beijing, you mentioned that a full-scale invasion is still not likely. What factors contribute to this assessment?
C: China’s military might is certainly growing, but they remain cautious due to the lessons learned from conflicts like the Ukraine invasion. There’s a palpable awareness within the Chinese military about the potential pitfalls of such an operation, stemming from historical precedents. Additionally, ongoing corruption within the PLA could undermine confidence in their operational readiness, making an invasion riskier than it may seem.
I: Thank you, Dr. Chou, for sharing your insights. It’s clear that the situation remains complex and fluid, with significant implications for both Taiwan and international relations.
C: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important issues. It’s vital to keep the conversation going as developments unfold.
Nal Defense, Wellington Koo, is leading extensive reforms in training and command structures aimed at improving overall defense readiness. When faced with a more aggressive military posture from Beijing, it’s crucial for Taiwan to focus on developing asymmetric capabilities, which are smaller, agile weapon systems that can effectively deter aggression. Additionally, there are ongoing societal preparedness initiatives that aim to rally public support and awareness surrounding national defense.
I: You pointed out that while there is a need for military preparedness, there’s also an evident hesitance on Beijing’s part due to various internal issues. What are these issues, and how might they affect China’s military ambitions?
C: Beijing is grappling with significant economic challenges, such as weak consumer demand and a struggling property sector. These problems, alongside corruption issues within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), could impact Xi Jinping’s confidence in deploying military force effectively. The economic ramifications of military aggression could also pose severe risks for China, especially if they lead to a prolonged period of stagnation akin to Japan’s. This means that while tensions are high, economic prudence could temper Beijing’s military strategies in the short term.
I: In light of Beijing’s military drills and the international response, how critical is collaboration with allies like the United States for Taiwan’s defense strategy?
C: Collaboration with allies is absolutely vital. Engaging in joint military exercises, sharing intelligence, and fostering defense partnerships will not only enhance Taiwan’s military capabilities but also send a strong signal to Beijing that aggression will not be tolerated. It’s important for Taiwan and the democratic community to approach these challenges collectively, ensuring comprehensive deterrence and making any potential military action from China a high-risk gamble.
I: Thank you, Dr. Chou, for sharing your insights on this critical issue. It will be interesting to see how these dynamics evolve in the region.
C: Thank you for having me. It’s a crucial time for Taiwan and the region, and the choices made now will have lasting impacts on peace and stability moving forward.
