Although the attack did not directly target Iran’s nuclear facilities, earlier reports suggested that Israel was considering such attacks. The Iranian leadership, in turn, has threatened to review its nuclear policy and advance its program in the event of an attack on nuclear facilities. These events underscore the threat posed by the regional escalation dynamic posed by Iran’s near-bomb threshold nuclear capability, which gives it the perception of a certain degree of deterrence (at least against direct US retaliation) while also serving as a understandably a tempting target for Israeli attack.
As tensions between Israel and Iran have moved away from the traditional proxy character and manifested as direct attacks on the other side’s territories, the urgency of finding an early and non-military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue has grown significantly.
While the current assessment is that Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic maintains a very advanced nuclear program, allowing it to develop a nuclear weapons capability relatively quickly (if it so chooses). Iran’s “close-to-doorstep” capability has not deterred Israel from undertaking its latest attack. But Iran’s nuclear program is a tempting target for an attack that could have potentially destabilizing consequences.
Iran sees its nuclear program as a deterrent against any direct US strikes or invasion on its soil, acting as an… insurance policy against it. This means that during an attempted invasion, Iran could quickly produce nuclear weapons. This capability allows Iran’s leadership to engage in destabilizing activities in the region with limited (perceived) likelihood of retaliation against its soil. Concerns about escalation and a possible Iranian push toward weaponizing its nuclear program may have been one of multiple issues that contributed to the U.S. refusal to engage in Israeli retaliation following Iran’s April 13 strikes on Israel.
Israel views Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and has long sought its elimination. Israel’s attack on military facilities near Iranian nuclear facilities—and against Iran’s air defense system for its nuclear facilities—appears to have been precisely calibrated to demonstrate that Israel has the ability to directly attack heavily protected nuclear facilities deep within of Iran.
Tempting goal
On April 19, Israel carried out a strike on the 8th Shekari Air Base, near the city of Isfahan. The airbase is just 22 kilometers north of the Isfahan nuclear complex and about 105 kilometers south of the Natanz uranium enrichment plant.
In this context, Iran’s nuclear facilities will continue to be a tempting target for Israel in any further escalation of the conflict between the two. In addition, Israel may also conclude that its own undeclared nuclear capability at Dimona in the Negev desert has failed to act as a deterrent against two major attacks on its soil. The attacks by Hamas on October 7 and Iran on April 13 likely heightened Israel’s sense of strategic vulnerability, although this perception may have been partially mitigated by the largely successful defense against attempted drone and missile attacks.
Israel has historically targeted Iran’s nuclear program through relatively limited sabotage in the form of cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists, and bombs placed on Iranian nuclear facilities. This strategy has allowed Tel Aviv to repeatedly turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear progress, thus remaining largely within the “rules” that Iran and Israel have established in conducting their shadow war.
Now, with both countries openly bashing each other, the tide is turning.
Bad choices
The possibility of Iranian weaponization and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities could lead to a serious escalation and possibly a wider military conflict in the region. If Iran anticipates that Israel is preparing to strike its nuclear facilities, it may decide to rush toward producing a nuclear weapon before Israel can do any significant damage to its ability to do so quickly. In turn, anticipating a preemptive nudge from Tehran, Jerusalem may be motivated to strike to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
First: The difference in timelines here favors Israel and creates a risk for Iran. The former could attempt a strike on short notice—perhaps days or weeks—while Iran would likely need several months to a year from the point of decision to acquire a viable weapon, though estimates remain uncertain.
Secondly: Tehran may make the decision to build nuclear weapons in response to a limited Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. Iran’s nuclear complex is too dispersed, the core facilities too hardened, and the nuclear know-how too entrenched to eliminate through limited military strikes. Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, where Iran produces the fissile material needed to produce nuclear weapons, are either fully (in the case of the Fordow enrichment facility) or partially (at Natanz) underground and protected in to a great extent. Any Israeli strike that would damage other Iranian nuclear sites—such as centrifuge production or uranium conversion facilities, or even the still-defunct Khonab heavy water research reactor—would prevent the program but ultimately leave Iran with the ability to continue to accelerate uranium enrichment, possibly moving toward the production of weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90% uranium 235).
Third: Any work Iran might currently be doing to equip its nuclear technology would likely be done in scattered and unknown locations, making military targeting very difficult.
Quarter: If Iran judges that its regional proxies and its missile and drone capabilities were insufficient to prevent Israel from launching direct strikes against its strategically important nuclear program, Tehran may see the actual weaponization of its nuclear program as the only remaining option that can guarantee the security of the Iranian regime.
Thursday: Without developing a full nuclear weapons capability, Iran may first respond by enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels. While weapons-grade uranium alone is not sufficient to produce a nuclear weapon, it would be a decisive step in that direction. Iran may also retaliate against further Israeli attacks by withdrawing from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Withdrawal would be followed by the exclusion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from the country.
Ecto: This uncertainty—and a formal denial of Iran’s commitment under the NPT to give up its nuclear weapons capability—risks seriously exacerbating regional instability. An Iranian withdrawal from the NPT may also incentivize nuclear proliferation in the region, with Saudi Arabia having previously threatened to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does so.
CONCLUSIONS
Direct involvement of the Americans
* The counterproductive effect of a limited blow to Iran’s nuclear program could lead Israel to consider a large-scale military operation to halt the program as decisively as possible. This option, however, will almost certainly result in an all-out, highly destructive war between Iran and Israel, possibly drawing other regional countries, the United States, and possibly others into the conflict.
* To effectively defeat Iran’s nuclear program with a military operation, strikes would have to be carried out on facilities that span across Iranian territory and would require the suppression of Iranian (and possibly Syrian) air defenses. The operation would also require strikes on ballistic missiles and other military sites, as they could otherwise be used in any immediate Iranian response.
* Attacks on underground facilities at Fordow and Natanz would require the use of weapons capable of penetrating several tens of meters of rock and reinforced concrete before exploding within the facilities. The only conventional weapon that could reasonably achieve this is the US GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which – at over 12 metric tons and 6m long – can only be carried by large US bombers such as B-2 Spirit based in Missouri.
* This tactical reality and the scale of force required to strike so many targets almost simultaneously suggest that a successful strike against most of Iran’s nuclear program would require extensive US support, if not direct involvement.
* However, US political dynamics remain in the background. With US backing, Israel may feel it has the military and political support it needs to deliver a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program and deal with the consequences before Iran decides to weaponize.
* Washington should also continue to make clear that it will not directly engage in any aggressive Israeli military operations and that it will condition any future military support to Israel in its conflict with Iran before we reach a dead end.
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#Myths #truths #Irans #nukes
