Russia’s ground forces in Ukraine have become a mix of regular units, supplemented by mobilized soldiers and those who signed military service contracts to pay off their family debts. The remainder consists of convicts and irregular volunteer formations under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.
Five options
“Based on available data and the history of modern warfare, I estimate that Russian-occupied Ukraine has 150,000-200,000 men, including support units.
However, if the level of losses remains at last year’s level, the Kremlin leadership will have to decide how to get more manpower. Each of the five options involves practical problems or a political cost,” the analyst notes.
- in 2024 to recruit 20,000-30,000 soldiers per month, despite the inevitable shortage of convicts (now mostly dead or wounded), who in 2023 made up the most important part of the newcomers;
- reduce losses through negotiations;
- apply the “escalation for de-escalation” method in the Baltic region in order to force negotiations;
- to send conscripted soldiers who are currently not included in the war to the front; and
- start another wave of mobilization.
The latter option is also the last – in 2022. mobilization has been very unpopular with Russian society and will be avoided unless the Kremlin believes that other efforts are not yielding results, the expert says. By the summer, it will be clear whether the Russian leadership was forced to go down this path. The fourth alternative – sending young conscripts – would violate Putin’s promise not to do so, although it remains possible.
Why are there so few soldiers? After all, in December the personnel limit of the Russian Armed Forces was increased to 1,320,000 from 1,150,628 at the beginning of the year.
According to the latest official statements, in 2023 regarding 490,000 contract workers and volunteers and 244,000 mobilized soldiers were recruited into military service.
Although Vladimir Putin has said that there are “more than 600,000 people” in the combat zone, it is very likely that “people” includes the Russian civilian population, including civil servants and so on.
“First of all, it is necessary to find out what the total officially declared current number of Russian soldiers can be compared with. For example, the peak number of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was regarding 109,000 troops, of which 106,000 were Soviet servicemen. Of this number, regarding 74,000 military personnel belonged to combat units (regarding 70%). Next, the current composition of the army needs to be assessed.
The number of contract troops is estimated at 490,000 men, including regarding 50,000 warrant officers serving two years or more. However, there are many unknowns, such as whether this figure includes 40,000-50,000 cadets, how many soldiers the government forced to extend their contracts, and how many were killed or injured,” says the expert.
It is known that the number of contract soldiers includes prisoners. They in 2023 were recruited into Storm Z and Storm V units, probably totaling more than 100,000. By comparison, the Wagner group in 2022 June-December recruited 50,000 prisoners (many of whom have died and the rest have been incorporated into official units).
in 2021 month of January. There were a total of 466,000 prisoners in Russia, of which 40,000-45,000 were women. October month. this number dropped sharply to 266,000. A large but unknown number of them agreed to military service. In addition, there were 20,000 or more military volunteers in units controlled by the Ministry of Defense.
There are also double-counted contract servicemen. Both inmates and volunteers were required to sign further contracts following six months or were automatically re-signed following a few months, meaning some of them would be out of contract in 2023. were counted twice as contractors.
Actually, not 490 thousand, but only 300-350 thousand. actually serving
“In total, I estimate that there are 200,000 conscripts, sergeants and warrant officers who were already in the military, as well as at least several tens of thousands of prisoners and tens of thousands of volunteers. In total, we get 300,000-350,000 of the declared 490,000 contract soldiers who are actually serving,” says expert Pavel Luzin.
What regarding losses? US and British intelligence conservatively estimates that by 2023 at the end of the war there were 315,000-320,000 dead and wounded soldiers and mercenaries, and in 2022 at the end – more than 100,000.
The total number of personnel of the Russian Armed Forces in 2022 eve only reached regarding 750,000, down regarding 20,000 from 770,000 in 2016-17, due to negative demographic trends.
“Therefore, all 2023 recruitment efforts and partial mobilization in 2022 in the fall allowed Russia to restore the quantity, but not the quality, of the armed forces. The losses mean that the organizational integrity and training of the Russian ground forces have been severely degraded.
More troops are needed to fight the war and quell the ongoing insurgency in Ukraine, but Russia’s armed forces are clearly “overstretched,” an expert observes.
According to him, in 2023 in June, during the Wagner Group mutiny, it was clear that there are no large concentrations of reserve troops in the Russian regions near the Ukrainian borders, except for some combat support units and, of course, air bases and other military branches. Almost all Russian combat capability and combat support units are deployed in occupied Ukraine.
So what’s next? he asks.
If they use a bloody method like in Avdijivka, 30 thousand will be needed. new troops per month
Russia’s political leadership must find new human resources. This decision will depend on many factors.
First, if average losses remain the same as in 2023, Russia will need to recruit at least 20,000 new troops/volunteers per month. However, if it seeks to carry out more offensive operations using the same bloody method as in Avdijivka, that number will increase to around 30,000 per month.
“It won’t be easy. There are quite a few factories in Russian prisons, and they need labor. This means that the military will not be able to recruit the same number of people as in 2023. As this source diminishes, the ability to recruit sufficient “cannon fodder” appears more difficult.
Second, Russia would welcome a temporary respite from the war, or at least a negotiated reduction in its intensity. In February, Putin twice discussed the terms of his negotiations, all using nuclear blackmail once once more. Any pause would allow restructuring and restoring the vitality of the army and reducing the recruitment crisis,” says the analyst.
Third, there is the seemingly simple possibility of sending conscripts who are not officially participating.
The prospect of a direct confrontation with NATO should not be underestimated
Last year, 277,000 Russian men were drafted for one year. Some of them have signed contracts, and new spring and autumn recruiting campaigns will take place this year. They remain in Russia only at the discretion of the Kremlin. Conscripts can legally be sent to the battlefield following four months of military service, an expert notes.
“In addition, from March 1 The expansion of the Southern Military District into the occupied territories of Ukraine means that conscripts can be easily moved to any part of the district without public attention. The same applies to the restoration of the Leningrad Military District, which would become the starting point for any military action in the Baltic region. Considering Russia’s paradoxical belief in “escalation for de-escalation”, the prospect of a direct confrontation with NATO should not be underestimated,” P. Luzinas warns.
“Such aggression might be carried out even without mass mobilization, at least initially. It is true that conscripts are poorly trained, but so are mobilized soldiers and prisoners; also, the conscripts are younger, which is a big plus.
However, this would not be the method favored by the Russian military leadership. She prefers to pressure conscripts to become mercenaries. It is expected that in 2024 such pressure will increase,” says the expert.
Ultimately, however, this may not be enough to provide the required workforce. If the numbers are not made up by the summer and/or combat losses are higher than expected, the Kremlin will have few options, even though it lacks junior officers and sergeants to train and guide the recruits.
“All this should not surprise or change the calculations of Ukraine’s supporters from the West.” Russia cannot be negotiated with or made concessions to. The Russian threat to Ukraine and the West can only be eliminated by military force,” the analyst concludes.
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2024-04-04 01:14:37
