2023-08-05 06:27:35
From April 8 to 30, 1982. On April 7, General Mario Benjamín Menéndez took office as governor of the islands. For Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez, the appointment of a soldier was not convenient, since he abandoned the idea of occupying to negotiate. The following day, the United Kingdom (UK) notified, through the Swiss embassy in our country, the unilateral establishment of a maritime exclusion zone in a circle of 200 nautical miles, centered on the Malvinas, which was going to enter effective in three days.
The intention of the depressed management of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, was more than obvious: to escalate the crisis. On April 9, Alexander Haig, a renowned Europeanist, arrived in Buenos Aires for the first time and the fruitless negotiations began. In the government there was no definite idea regarding the British procedure.
The following day there was a massive concentration in the Plaza de Mayo. President Galtieri –a braggart–, from a balcony of the Government House, affirmed: “The dignity and honor of the Nation are not negotiated. If they want to come, let them come. We will present battle to them.” In doing so he needlessly injured the pride of the British people and limited the government’s bargaining power.
On April 19, the last conversations with Haig in Buenos Aires were held, without success, who acknowledged that Mrs. Thatcher had asked him, “from the beginning, the withdrawal of all forces from the Malvinas, and the reestablishment of the British presence as prerequisites and conditions to start negotiations.
The British fleet, from Ascension Island, ceded by the US, had headed towards the South Atlantic. Simultaneously, the UK extended the exclusion zone to any ship or aircraft approaching the British Task Force, establishing the air and sea siege on our forces on the islands. At the same time, they attacked the South Georgia Islands and obtained the surrender of the small garrison under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz.
On April 26, in Washington, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez, at the XX meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), expressed: “The Argentine flag will not be lowered while a drop of blood runs through the veins of the last Argentine soldier who defends the Malvinas Islands”. Undoubtedly it was a stupid war harangue, which compromised our position. The month of April continued without any progress in the negotiations with the UK, and the incomprehensible Argentine political, diplomatic and military inaction.
In addition to the Military Junta, Galtieri, Anaya and Lami Dozo, the main high command on the continent were, among others: Generals Osvaldo J. García, José A. Vaquero, Cristino Nicolaides, Juan C. Trimarco and Edgardo Calvi; and Vice Admirals Juan J. Lombardo and Leopoldo Suárez del Cerro.
They were responsible for the national and military strategy, which implies, among other aspects, arranging the use of the national potential and of the Armed Forces to materialize the achievement of a national or political objective, freely in a broad domain of space and time factors. , with a view to a defined future purpose or not.
The tactic is the conduct that is carried out in the lower levels of the conduct and is synthesized in rules to which the combat operations must adjust in a defined situation in space-time, and in the terrain where the clash takes place.
San Martín, when he conceived his brilliant Continental Plan, was a strategist; but when he led the Battle of Chacabuco, he was a tactician. In this area, the infantry regiments, including a marine infantry battalion, the field artillery groups and the anti-aircraft artillery of the three armed forces, operated on the islands, among other units.
Carl von Clausewitz would have described the clumsy decisions of the Military Junta as “an insult to the principles of strategy.” The aforementioned high commands –and in the islands the generals Mario B. Menéndez, Oscar Jofre and Omar Parada– showed a pathological and paralyzing obedience, and never dared to express opinions contrary to the directives and orders received despite the fact that the circumstances demanded it. .
I do not doubt that they were convinced that it would not come to a war, at most a “duel at first blood”, and then it would be negotiated. The combat power available on the mainland was not anticipated or applied. The concrete fact is that they did not reach the islands, among other materials: neither armored vehicles (tanks), heavy cannons (155 mm and 20 km range), anti-aircraft artillery, radars, different types of vehicles, material to extend the airport runway , enough helicopters, and logistical support commensurate with the troops.
The principle of “unity of command” – in force since Alexander the Great – was conspicuous by its absence, instead, a curious, disconcerting and useless operational engineering was implemented. Experience shows that things that depend on many never happen well, and obviously threaten the fulfillment of the mission.
One of them was Schematic Plan No. 1/82, issued on April 12 by the commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations, Vice Admiral Juan José Lombardo, which, among other things, provided: “Dismantle and/or reject any attack form. Execute coastal defense artillery shot. Maintain a strong reserve. Build coastal defense works and beach fortifications”. Assigned resources? None.
It is unfortunate that Lombardo was unaware of Operation Overlord, carried out by the Allies on June 6, 1944 on the coast of Normandy, France, which successfully confronted the German Atlantic Wall, whose construction had taken two years.
On April 21, Nicolaides visited Puerto Argentino, stayed for a few hours, and on his return to the mainland, expressed: “I have seen an impregnable fortress.” In truth, the defensive position was an “onion cloth”. The next day, Galtieri did, who also did not meet with the heads of the tactical units and ordered the dispatch of other units that did not respond to any planning and aggravated the difficult logistical situation.
On April 30, the maritime and air siege was consolidated. We were almost alone before the world. NATO sanctions in the economic and military field materialized. The crisis was over. The inability and incompetence of the high command on the continent and on the islands was evident. They continued to believe that there would be no confrontation and unrecoverable time had been lost throughout the month of April.
The high command in the conflict. Until April 30, the high command of the Armed Forces were still convinced of a negotiated solution. His inaction was evident. The heads of tactical units were witnesses of all kinds of improvisations and of having completely ceded the initiative to the British. As a consequence of what has been said, and of the sea and air siege, the logistical situation seriously worsened.
It is not a minor fact to remember that British Admiral Sir Timothy McClement assured that four nuclear submarines had operated in the conflict since mid-April. The presence of nuclear weapons on Task Force ships has been proven, although these weapons were not used. Since the beginning of the crisis (March 20) there were evident shortcomings on the part of the Military Committee.
Thirteen operational commands were set up on the continent. Most of them only increased lawlessness and overlapping efforts. I will limit myself to pointing out some of them: Joint Staff of the Armed Forces (Vice Admiral Leopoldo Suárez del Cerro); South Atlantic Theater of Operations (Vice Admiral Juan J. Lombardo); South Theater of Operations, (Major General Osvaldo J. García); South Air Force, (Brig. Ernesto Crespo); Sea Fleet (Rear Admiral Walter Allara); Joint Operations Center in Comodoro Rivadavia (General García, Vice Admiral Lombardo and Brigadier Helmut Walter).
Two current principles throughout the history of wars, among others, are: “unity of command and economy of forces.” Both were conspicuous by their absence. Instead, an ineffective operational engineering was implemented that, instead of solutions and fluidity, negatively affected the cited principles.
I remember that Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) said: “One at least of the Military Committee, which is currently to replace the strategist, must have received a little holy oil from Saul.” It was not our case. In addition, the Minister of Defense, Amadeo Frugoli, the Secretary of State Intelligence, General Carlos A. Martínez, and the Secretary of Public Information, Rodolfo Baltiérrez, were marginalized from the advice that during the conflict acquired relevant importance.
Galtieri badly selected the high commands of the Army and several regiments sent to the islands; some staffed soldiers who had not completed elementary instruction. He imposed an inadequate deployment, invaded jurisdictions with unconsulted and erroneous decisions, incomprehensibly accepted by the high command. The Army participated with less than 10% of its operational and logistical capacity.
Anaya removed the surface fleet from operations, fully ceding control of the sea to the enemy. His Force participated, with great efficiency, with a marine infantry battalion and naval aviation.
Lami Dozo, for many, did not arbitrate the measures for the lengthening of the Puerto Argentino runway, which might have tried to dispute the local air superiority to the enemy, which was very difficult. However, he assumed the responsibility of involving the Air Force throughout the conflict, and was the moderator within the Military Committee.
Each Force waged its own war: “joint military action” was ignored. The tactical level, which the French General Antoine H. Jominí defined “as the art of fighting on the ground where the clash takes place”, endured the incompetence and limited professionalism of “desk generals” who -I repeat- never believed that they were would come to confrontation and privileged a diplomatic success.
The Military Committee clung to static conceptions outdated since the time of Julius Caesar and, during the crisis, forgot an old regulatory prescription. “The energies of the troops must be kept fresh for decisive circumstances (…) Whoever subjects a troop to unnecessary efforts conspires once morest the success sought” (Army Conduct Regulations, 1955).
On the islands, the high commands were: General Mario B. Menéndez, head of the Military Garrison and governor; General Oscar Jofre, head of the Army Group; Brigadier Luis Castellanos, head of the Air Group; and Rear Admiral Edgardo Otero, head of the Naval Group.
A reflection of John Paul II, a priori, of all that has been said: “Stupidity is also a gift from God, but we must not misuse it.” Malpractice must have, in all professions and activities, its legal and social condemnation, but sometimes I think that, in Malvinas, in some cases, it was rewarded. Galtieri passed away on January 12, 2003, during a constitutional government. The Army, with her political endorsement, gave him the highest military honors and at her funeral he was described as “an exemplary soldier.”
On May 1, 1982, the war began. Up to 48 hours before, some high command from the continent visited the Malvinas and did not forget to take pictures. When the noise of combat began, none of them set foot on the islands. They earned the old military aphorism that says, “Keep away from bombs and shrapnel makes generals grow old.” There were thousands of cases, in other hierarchies –soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers– who fought with a courage that recalls the nobility of the warriors of our independence.
*Lieutenant General (R). Former Army Chief (1992-1999). Malvinas Veteran.
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