What the European judicial delegation might not say regarding the goals of its mission in Lebanon, was sponsored by the French Ambassador Anne Griot. On the eve of the delegation’s arrival, the ambassador broadcast her New Year’s message. A hint is read between its lines that France, in the year 2023, will not give the powers holding power in Lebanon an opportunity to repeat what it did in 2022.
Grio focused on the phrase “renewal,” and addressed the people in Lebanon, not the government and politicians, and said: “We want those who will take charge of your future to reject the generalized culture of impunity, and to seriously commit to reforms and laying the foundations for a state of law and justice.” And she stressed that France “will accompany these necessary steps.”
It is clear that France is in the process of adopting a new approach in Lebanon. It developed its “traditional” political discourse calling for “reforms”, and moved to extremism and “rejection of the policy of impunity”, and accompanied this with practical steps that are expressed politically by ignoring the authority and political forces, and judicially by its participation in the European investigation delegation currently working in Lebanon.
This means that the French tend to implement practical punitive steps once morest political and administrative officials whose involvement in corruption will be proven, and to demand their removal from their positions, especially if it turns out that they committed crimes on European soil. In this case, they will be pursued according to European laws as well, and held accountable. Otherwise, European sanctions will affect them, similar to those imposed by the Americans on Lebanese personalities.
Someone is asking: Have the French decided to completely abandon the policy of appeasement and rounding corners that they often adopt in Lebanon, and have they become closer to the United States in approaching the Lebanese file, or will they back down for various necessities, as they have done repeatedly?
It is not the first time that the level of French anger or frustration has risen towards the staff of power and administration in Lebanon. When the uprising of October 17, 2019 erupted, the French supported the slogan of change. However, they differed with the Americans in terms of method and goals. Then they returned with a more stringent position following the port explosion in August 2020, as they boycotted the Lebanese government and directed aid to the people directly, just as the Americans did.
In the summer of 2021, the European Union approved a legal framework to impose sanctions on Lebanese officials for their abuse of democracy and the rule of law. But the Europeans have always feared implementing the sanctions practically. The French bet on a “soft settlement” that the Lebanese themselves would reach, without external pressure, and preferred to adopt a policy of buying time, so that change might be achieved automatically and democratically in the 2022 elections. But the results were disappointing. Despite the partial victory of the changeists, the country has not taken any step towards the desired goal.
Those in power in Lebanon have been accustomed to practicing “indulgence” in their dealings with France, and they have always considered that Paris is keen on balances between all axes in the Middle East, and that it maintains balance with all parties in Lebanon, and will not venture into straining relations with anyone in order to impose solutions. Consequently, the limits of French anger are short.
This picture has a lot of truth. However, what must be taken into account is that preserving the state in Lebanon is a matter that the French consider to be among their supreme interests, and that France’s current mobilization is caused by its administration’s conviction that the state in Lebanon is really close to being classified as a failed state, with what this means of danger to the Lebanese entity as a whole.
The French intervened strongly every time a vacuum occurred in positions of power, whether by the failure to form governments or by the failure to elect a president for the republic, as is the case today, and they have always warned of the danger of Lebanon’s “demise.”
Today, the French consider that Lebanon, in light of the current political staff, which rejects any serious rescue step, is actually at risk of falling into the category of a failed state. The elements of this classification are complementary: the complete inability to manage public affairs and the most basic services, led by a corrupt class, amidst the inability to impose sovereignty over lands and fears of an explosion of violence, and the state’s inability to establish trusting relations with the international community. In fact, the acceptance of the political forces to make Lebanon an arena and mailbox for regional and international conflicts would increase the risks for the entity.
Therefore, the approach adopted by the French administration towards Lebanon comes at the current stage. The European judicial delegation, of which the French are the main nucleus, will be a “stick”, while promises to move the frozen “Cedre” conference aid are a “carrot”.
Who will stand firm in this confrontation: the French or the political class? Will the French insist this time on exerting sufficient pressure, forcing the Lebanese forces of corruption to acquiesce to the requirements of reform, or will they acquiesce once more to the Lebanese “sweetness” and agree to round the corners?
There are those who say: The French feel danger to Lebanon, and they may have information regarding dark days awaiting it, as a result of the regional-international conflict over its land, which may actually threaten its fate. Therefore, today they are in a state of relentless alert. They have nothing to lose, while the greatest loss is the Lebanese entity that they are keen on, and the privileges they enjoy that are difficult to replace throughout the Middle East and the Arab world.
