On September 14, at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee composed of 22 senators from the Democratic and Republican parties of the United States, following two hours of discussion, the Taiwan Policy Act was passed with 17 votes in favor and 5 votes once morest, and passed the Senate for the bill. paved the way. Since the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have included Democrats and Republicans, the opinions of the two parties have been consolidated, and the bill has been advanced step by step, with a considerable chance of being passed in the House of Representatives.
This bill is regarded as the most comprehensive reorganization of US-Taiwan relations since the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.
This bill has been full of anti-China colors from the very beginning. It was originally proposed by the Republican Senator Rubio, who has a strong anti-China stand, in 2020. At that time, he proposed the “Taiwan Relations Strengthening Act” together with the Democratic Senator McLee, claiming that The purpose of the bill is to enhance US-Taiwan relations in many ways. The bill failed to make it to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee’s agenda before the end of the last Congress, and it ultimately failed. In March last year, the bill tried to make a comeback, but there was no progress.
As the Biden administration’s intention to play the “Taiwan card” becomes more and more obvious, and the mid-term elections are approaching, Menendez, chairman of the Democratic Foreign Affairs Committee, personally shot, and Republican Senator Glenn Mu joined hands to propose the “Taiwan Policy Act”, which was successfully placed on the agenda of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
The current “Taiwan Policy Act” is very similar to the “Taiwan Relations Strengthening Act” proposed by Rubio in those years, both in terms of foreign affairs, military affairs, economy, culture and education, etc. to enhance US-Taiwan relations.
The “Taiwan Policy Act” is 107 pages long and involves many key points. The final passed version also made some amendments:
First, the original version of the bill pushed the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States” to be renamed the “Taiwan Representative Office”. The original version listed the matter as “U.S. policy”, while the revised version diluted it into a “congressional opinion” of a suggested nature. . In addition, the original bill required that the appointment of the director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) should follow the general nomination process for US ambassadors abroad, subject to the approval of the Senate, and the title should also be changed to “Representative”, which is equivalent to the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States. , disguised recognition of Taiwan. But the revised version removes this part entirely.
Second, in order to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities, the original bill proposed to provide the Taiwan authorities with US$4.5 billion in military financing in the next four years. The revised version not only retains this part, but also specifies that it is free military assistance, and provides an additional US$2 billion in the fifth year. . The bill calls for prioritizing and expediting the processing of Taiwan’s military purchase requests, and requires the US Department of Defense to establish a comprehensive training program for the Taiwan military to help it improve its ability to confront the Chinese mainland.
The original bill designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” status, equal to Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. The revised version removes the requirement to list Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” and replaces it with the same treatment as a “major non-NATO ally.”
Third, the bill requires the United States to help Taiwan participate in various international organizations, and even requires the U.S. executive agency to question UN Resolution 2758 and re-raise the so-called “Taiwan representation” issue.
This bill completely hollows out the one-China principle. Even though the revised version slightly lowers the tone, but strengthens military assistance, it still touches the red line of mainland China’s policy toward Taiwan in all aspects, and also violates the “three joint communiques” that established diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
First, the name of the representative office in the United States was changed to “Taiwan Representative Office”, which violated the principle in the “Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States” that the United States recognized that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. Unless the U.S. government does not accept this “congressional opinion,” it will cross the line once it is accepted.
Second, the increase in arms sales and military assistance to Taiwan violates the principle stated in the 817 Communiqué, namely the Sino-US Announcement on Solving the Issue of US Arms Sales to Taiwan, that the US is “ready to gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan.”
Third, the designation of Taiwan as a “non-NATO ally”, the word “ally” contains the meaning of military alliance. That is, when one side is attacked by the other side, the other side must defend. Taiwan is part of China, and the United States and Taiwan have entered into a military alliance once morest mainland China, which completely violates the “one China principle” of the “Three Joint Communiqués”.
Qin Gang, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, had previously issued a serious warning to the United States, saying that if the law was passed, Sino-US relations would face collapse. The Biden administration’s current attitude towards this matter is ambiguous. In August this year, Bloomberg reported that the White House believed that the content of the Taiwan Policy Act was sensitive and lobbied Congress to step on the brakes. White House National Security Council spokesman Watson confirmed at the time that the White House was indeed concerned regarding some of the provisions of the bill. Passing the bill may undermine and contradict the provisions of the “one China policy” that the United States has long advocated. However, as Sino-U.S. relations continue to deteriorate, even if the bill is slightly revised and lowered in tone, it is unknown whether the White House will block the passage of the bill, or if it feels that the slightly revised version will pass and take effect.
If the “Taiwan Policy Act” is passed in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, and finally signed into law by the President, even the current revised version would be a disaster, as the U.S. unilaterally tore up the “Three Joint Communiques”, It will seriously impact Sino-US relations, and mainland China is expected to make a tough response. Or Biden has another trick, delaying the US mid-term elections in November to make plans.
