ⓒ JoongAng Ilbo / JoongAng Ilbo Japanese version2022.08.31 10:16
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the biggest international political event of the year that has shocked the world. The mere fact that such a full-scale war might break out in the 21st century shocked the people of the world. After Putin’s Russian army invaded Ukraine, causing innocent casualties and fundamentally changing the international political order, the world’s media, as well as people from all walks of life, including politics, academia, and culture, Condemning Putin’s war all at once.
In addition to this, media and experts inside and outside South Korea said, “Russian forces are far less capable of waging war than their competitors had already anticipated in this war. It will not be possible,” expressed the dominant opinion. But such a claim seems hollow to me. It’s like a pointless moral argument that the aggressor should be internationally condemned and ultimately defeated in the war. Judging the actual war only by moral scales like this makes it difficult to analyze calmly and objectively. A new approach is still needed to get an accurate picture of this war.
◆Distinguish between reality and moral imperative
From the outbreak of the war in February this year until now, international public opinion has continued to condemn the aggressor Putin and Russia, followed by a moralistic war analysis, namely, that the Russian army, the “evil army,” has committed crimes once morest the good victim, Ukraine. I was supposed to lose because I did. Opinions abounded that the international community with Ukraine would win, unable to separate moral accusations from realistic analysis. But the moral legitimacy and wishful thinking that the aggressor Putin and Russia must be defeated cloud a cold perception of reality. It interferes with deriving the right strategies and policies in relation to this war vision. Let’s check them one by one.
First, there is a great misunderstanding of Russia’s method of waging war. First, the premise is wrong. In the Western world, in order to minimize the damage to human life and equipment through war and to minimize the criticism of public opinion at home and abroad, it is premised on the war goal to end the war early through decisive fighting. ing. However, such war goals have been the dominant form of warfare in the first and second world wars of the 20th century, as well as during the Cold War, when nuclear weapons and air power became possible. Germany’s blitzkrieg during World War II, and the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the United States dropped several atomic bombs to crush the will of enemy Japan, complete this concept. This concept of modern warfare is possible only if the premise of wanting to quickly end the war in a matter of weeks or months with overwhelming military superiority is true.
But Russia is different. Of course, we have this modern war concept, but at the same time, we have a tradition of warfare culture that distinguishes us from other countries. That is the tradition of what strategic thinker Alexander Svetin calls the “War of Attrition.” In the past, when Russia was invaded by foreign powers such as Napoleon, it is a method that makes full use of its vast territory, resources, harsh winters and rainy seasons as weapons. For example, by keeping the enemy stuck in the quagmire of the enemy’s movement path, problems such as munitions, manpower, and transportation will arise. This would lead to a prolonged war, but the result would be exhaustion of the people and the military, weakening public opinion and the will to fight at the same time. Just at this moment, Russia launches a decisive counterattack on its weary enemy and emerges victorious. It’s a method of waging war that Russia developed when it was in a defensive role on Russian territory.
The Russian tradition is a long-term war of attrition
The concept of prolonging the war and undermining the enemy’s will, morale and public opinion does not apply only to wars that take place on Russian territory. The same was true when Russia was not in a defensive position. For example, the same method was used during the Korean War (Korean War). For the security interests of the Soviet Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe, Stalin kept the US military on the Korean peninsula and prevented them from concentrating on Europe. At the same time, he pursued his own national interests by prolonging the war (such as delaying the ceasefire agreement) so that anti-war public opinion might grow in the United States.
Thus, Russia and the West have different views on war. Western Europe, centered on the United States, aims to end the war as soon as possible, but Russia has a unique tradition of warfare that takes a long time and takes a long-term view and uses it to its advantage when the war actually goes on. have. It is unclear whether Russia planned a long-term war from the beginning, but at least it is clear that it is a country accustomed to long-term warfare.
After the international economic sanctions that followed the invasion, Russia’s blow hasn’t been much. While Russia is reaping economic benefits from rising energy prices, European powers are facing the threat of regime change due to skyrocketing electricity prices ahead of winter. Russia would have fully anticipated the situation in these countries. In a nutshell, the interpretation that Russia is failing because it failed to end the war quickly is likely to be a distortion of reality entwined with moral discourse.
[I accuse]Will Putin’s Russia lose the Ukraine war? Isn’t it a “hope” of the West? (2)
