The French presidential elections of 2022, the challenges of the June legislative elections, the challenges of Emmanuel Macron’s new mandate, the chances of the National Rally, but also Franco-Moroccan relations. So many subjects dissected by Akram Zaoui, expert in international issues at the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS).
How can we characterize the current French political sequence in the followingmath of the presidential election and the approach of the legislative elections?
This electoral sequence seems to mark an accentuation of features that already existed in the French political scene of the Fifth Republic. We thus have a form of trichotomy, expressed in the first round of the presidential election by the scores achieved by three poles: the liberal pole, the popular pole, and the nationalist pole. Thus, first, there is an extreme right, a meeting of social disarray in the periphery of France, less densely populated areas, areas hit by deindustrialization, etc., and a nationalism whose roots go deep into the modern history of France: it is the National Rally (RN) of Marine Le Pen.
Then, a left more “assumed” than that of the socialist party as it governed under the mandate of François Hollande, and which found an incarnation in the figure of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Finally, what might be described as the “extreme center” (Pierre Serna), coagulation of the left and the right of government rallied to a technocratic and market option with an authoritarian tendency. This configuration must be seen as the result of a period marked initially by the collapse of 20th century socialisms, then by the mixed results of a policy that took as postulates what might be described as “logical of the market “.
There clearly seems to be a France of the elites and a France of the people. A figure that best expresses it in the second round is the number of people who voted by rejection of the opposing candidate rather than by membership: between 40% and 50% of the votes. Against Macron, this figure clearly indicates a rejection of policies perceived as favorable to the wealthy. On the other hand, once morest Le Pen, he expresses a fear of the extreme right. In fact, it is an intersection that is interesting here: the sum of those who voted to block Le Pen and those who voted for Le Pen once morest Macron form a significant minority of French people, who to varying degrees reject policies considered socially aggressive; if we add those who voted for Le Pen by membership, the number of French people who voted by conviction for Emmanuel Macron, if it remains relatively high, designates the number of voters who come under “France who wins”.
Will Emmanuel Macron’s next term mark a break or a continuity?
The conditions for forming the future majority will largely determine government action. Many unknowns remain (participation in legislative elections, resilience of traditional parties in the territories, chances of the National Rally, etc.) but these legislative elections are undoubtedly interesting to follow. It is according to the balance of political power and his success in the legislative elections that we can determine whether or not President Macron’s promise to “change” will be followed by effects.
But, whatever the case, the next five-year term should be marked by a series of themes such as those of the climate and the environment, the revalorization of territories, and reindustrialization, the democratic revitalization of institutions, etc.
What foreign policy for Macron during his second five-year term, particularly in Africa?
France is imbued with the idea of being a power to be reckoned with, but otherwise a power in decline – at least if it goes it alone.
The relationship with Africa is special for various reasons: African immigration in France is much more significant than in other industrialized countries (significance of Caribbean and Indo-Pakistani immigration in the United Kingdom, Latin American in the United United, Turkish and more recently Eastern Arab in Germany, etc.). Africa is therefore a question that is also internal: for example, African immigration, very stigmatized politically and largely marginalized economically, had largely voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of the presidential election. As a corollary, there is consensus on the issue of development in Africa. Beyond that, the affirmation of French power in the world must go through a re-foundation and a deepening of its relations with Africa, starting from its most anchored partnerships (in North, West and Central Africa French speakers) to radiate to other regions (Egypt, Ethiopia, English-speaking countries of West, East and Southern Africa). It should be noted that President Macron’s latest attempts to target the continent have been distinguished by a dual approach: involvement of Europe (for example within the framework of the Union to Union dialogue) and of civil societies and entrepreneurial ecosystems of Africa .
What future for Franco-Moroccan relations?
There is a basic trend of affirmation on a new mode of Moroccan sovereignty internationally. We have also witnessed a diversification of partners or, at least, a consolidation, a desire to renew existing relations, extended to new areas of cooperation. One of the fields on which this has been translated, with the highlighting of the “win-win” theme, is of course the continental field.
Taking all this into consideration, there may have been friction in recent years with France. One of the questions that will structurally arise is in particular that of the modalities of “co-opetition” between France and Morocco in Africa, in different areas (we can think of the banking sector for example).
However, deep down, the relations between the two countries are deep, and pragmatism should prevail. France is the country where the most Moroccans residing abroad (MRE) live, and where the largest number of Moroccan students abroad are established. It is also the leading country in terms of flows (one-third) and stocks of foreign direct investment in Morocco. In the followingmath of the pandemic, discussions on the regionalization of value chains have also seen the dialogue between Morocco and France intensify in industrial matters. Nearly a third of the tourists who visit Morocco each year are French (MRE included). A number of other discussions will also continue to link the two countries: cooperation in matters of intelligence, migration, even in religious matters with the ongoing reform of the organization of Islam in France.
*International Relations Specialist at the Policy Center for the New South