When the leaders of Finland and Sweden began to openly talk regarding the two countries’ desire to join NATO in the wake of the Russian war on Ukraine, the debate in Moscow and Western capitals focused mainly on the potential repercussions of such accession on Russian-Western relations, especially since accession seemed to Almost settled as soon as the two countries submit a formal request to the alliance. However, what hinders this process is not the Swedish and Finnish concern regarding Russian reprisals, nor the West’s reluctance to escalate the conflict with Moscow, but rather that it is a member state of the alliance itself.
Turkish officials sought to clarify that the reservation was not aimed at closing the door to the two countries joining NATO, but rather to pressure them to respond to Turkish demands to restrict the activities of these organizations and take a clear position on its war on terrorism, as well as lifting the military sanctions imposed by the two countries once morest Turkey in 2019.
Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan surprised Western allies by declaring that Turkey did not view Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid, citing mainly the two countries’ history of hosting supporters of groups Ankara designates as terrorist groups such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, as well as the Fatah organization. Allah Gulen, whom Erdogan accuses of being involved in the failed military coup attempt 6 years ago, and that these organizations enjoy special sponsorship by some Western countries, especially European ones. This has already exacerbated the deterioration of Turkish-Western relations in recent years in particular.
This reservation regarding Finland and Sweden was also surprising at the level of the Turkish position in support of NATO expansion, a position that Erdogan reaffirmed only a few days following the outbreak of the Russian war on Ukraine, in addition to that Ankara has been seeking since the beginning of last year to reform its relations with Western countries. Moreover, Turkish officials sought to clarify that the reservation was not aimed at closing the door to the two countries’ accession to NATO, but rather to pressure them to respond to Turkish demands to restrict the activities of these organizations and take a clear position on its war on terrorism, as well as lift the military sanctions imposed by the two countries once morest Turkey in 2019.
However, the Turkish objection does not seem to be a passing matter of registering a political position or extracting some gains from Finland and Sweden. Rather, it stems mainly from deep differences with most Western countries on many issues; Chief among them is the fight once morest terrorism. In 2019, Turkey prevented the approval of a NATO defense plan for the Baltic states due to the bloc’s refusal to refer to the People’s Protection Units as a terrorist group in its official documents. In addition, many Western countries – including Finland and Sweden – have supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and have extensive political and media activities to “demonize” Turkey in the West. In addition, officials in these countries do not hide their sympathy for the Kurdish units and have repeatedly hosted leaders from the organization.
Given that Turkey’s reservations regarding NATO expansion more broadly reflect the great frustration in Ankara with the approach of most of its Western allies to its bitter conflict with the PKK and the security risks it faces in Syria and Iraq, the new battle launched by Erdogan with the West opens the door to a broader debate on an issue that has long It was a major reason for the tension in Turkish-Western relations during the past years, and the basis for the emergence of other controversial issues later.
For many years, the United States and the European Union have classified the PKK as a terrorist organization, but this classification is nothing more than a dead letter, as it is illogical to designate an armed group a terrorist organization at a time when it politically and militarily supports another group that is organically linked to it and bears the same goals and constitutes The same threat once morest a major NATO ally.
The Europeans and the Americans have long evaded a serious discussion of this issue with Ankara under the pretext of the need to continue supporting the Syrian Kurds to counter any possible return of ISIS, but the political dimensions of the Western approach outweigh the other dimensions. The fact that a serious and fruitful debate will force Westerners to adopt a different approach to combating Turkey once morest the security threats it is facing is the main reason why this issue has become a spoiler in relations.
In the current circumstances, Western countries do not have the luxury of time to continue a game that irritates Turkey and was one of the main factors in shaping its new foreign policy following the first half of the last decade. In light of the new challenges posed by the Ukraine war to European security and global stability, the need for a united and strong NATO is more urgent than ever. The inclusion of new countries in the alliance may contribute to fulfilling part of this need, but its effectiveness will remain weak if the West does not address Turkey’s legitimate security concerns.
It will not be difficult for Finland and Sweden to make promises to Turkey to restrict the activity of organizations that pose a threat to Ankara, but the connection of this issue with a broader view of Turkish-Western relations makes Turkey’s opposition to NATO expansion a matter that will not only impede the project to annex the two states, but might lead to further turmoil in the region. Ankara’s relationship with its Western partners. Over the past years, the deterioration of relations has pushed Turkey to get closer to Moscow and build a broad partnership with it on many levels. The lack of Western response to Turkey’s security needs will dampen its enthusiasm for restoring its partnership with the West. The current circumstances seem appropriate to push this direction if Western intentions exist to make Turkey more effective in NATO.
Ankara’s refusal to join Finland and Sweden should not be seen in the West as political blackmail to gain gains from the West, as Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn said recently. Turkey is an active member of NATO and has not abandoned its view of the alliance even at a time when Western leaders – such as French President Emmanuel Macron – were skeptical of the usefulness of NATO, and that it entered a clinical death.
It is true that Erdogan is exploiting the status quo to impose Turkey’s demands on the Westerners, but Turkish officials have repeatedly made clear that the position on Finland and Sweden is related to the national security requirements of their country and has nothing to do with foreign policy. Such clarification is important so that the objection is not understood as an attempt by Ankara to obstruct the NATO expansion project in order to please Russia.
It is widely believed in the West that the Turkish objection is part of the strategy of the corrupting role that Ankara plays within NATO. No matter how true such a belief is, the West’s disregard for Ankara’s sensitivity to political and military support for the Kurdish units will only lead to this outcome. The dissonance of allies within NATO and the adoption of policies that run counter to the interests of other members spoil the unity and effectiveness of NATO.
It is still inconclusive if Turkey will actually obstruct the project to annex Finland and Sweden during the upcoming public discussions within NATO, given that the Turkish position appeared before these discussions. However, the remaining period for it constitutes an appropriate opportunity for broader and deeper negotiations between Ankara and Western capitals to reach a settlement that generally addresses the outstanding issues between the two parties. Although Sweden, Finland, and Turkey are now at the forefront of the debate on NATO expansion, the main actors in this issue are Turkey and the United States in the first place.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has made great efforts to unify NATO and reconsider it as a political and security system that bears the brunt of the European security architecture. Turkey – which has the second largest army in NATO – bears the brunt of balancing Russian influence in many areas, and it is a strategic partner of Ukraine and the West; Therefore, its desire to increase the effectiveness of NATO should not be questioned, as this will make it stronger in the equilibrium equation with Moscow. The actual starting point for reforming Turkish-Western relations is to address Turkey’s security concerns regarding the relations that bring together Western countries and armed organizations that pose a direct threat to Turkish national security.
