The first round of negotiations between Kinshasa and the armed groups active in the East ended on April 27, in Nairobi. What should be remembered? Does the exclusion of a branch of the M23 compromise its chances of success? Researcher Christoph Vogel responds to JA.
© Sebastien KITSA MUSAYI / AFP
A Congolese FARDC soldier in Semuliki, December 10, 2021.
Can talking help bring peace to eastern DRC? At the end of a summit of the presidents of the East African Community (EAC), Felix Tshisekedi accepted, on April 21, the principle of talks with the representatives of a certain number of groups armed forces operating in Ituri and the Kivus – talks whose first round ended on April 27, in Nairobi, Kenya playing the mediator.
Does peace have a chance in the East? Answers with Christoph Vogel, author of Conflict Minerals, Inc. (Hurst & OUP, 2022) and research director of the Insecure Livelihoods project at the University of Ghent (Belgium).
To read M23 in the DRC: why tension is rising between Tshisekedi, Kagame and Museveni
Jeune Afrique: Can the fact that a branch of the M23, the one that is loyal to Sultani Makenga, is kept out of the discussions compromise the dialogue?
Christopher Vogel : This dialogue raises questions anyway, if only because the participants were selected in a rather opaque way. The M23 is not even among the strongest or most violent armed groups at the moment. Its claims, on the other hand, are old, even older than the movement itself, and their persistence is a sign that a certain number of problems have never been resolved.
If we invite certain armed groups to discuss and not others, we can hardly hope to convince them all to lay down their arms.
Can these negotiations lead to a ceasefire?
A complete and comprehensive ceasefire is not a realistic scenario. There are over a hundred armed groups, the majority of which operate in North Kivu and Ituri. Most of them are not at the negotiating table in Nairobi. I’m not saying that we should have rolled out the red carpet for them, but if we invite some and not others, we can hardly hope to convince them all to lay down their arms.
To read DRC: the specter of a return of the M23
War and violence have flourished in the East for nearly three decades. Thousands of men fought for different armed groups, collecting passages in this or that faction like others the “professional experiences” on their CV. However, I am convinced that it is never too late to build a real and lasting peace, but this will not be done by force.
Was it under pressure that President Tshisekedi accepted the principle of these discussions?
The Head of State has made the pacification of the East a priority for his five-year term and time is running out: the next elections must take place in 18 months. My feeling is that Kinshasa wants to try everything: there was a state of siege [décrété en mai 2021]joint military operations, a new DDR [Désarmement, démobilisation, réinsertion] and now regional negotiations.
Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, which are now all members of the EAC, plan to form a joint military force to neutralize groups active in the east that refuse to surrender. Is it doable?
Beyond the announcement that was made at the end of the EAC Summit [du 21 avril], few details have leaked out regarding this initiative and its possible outlines. Many points remain to be clarified. However, it is interesting to point out that most of the countries mentioned already have men on Congolese soil. Sometimes officially, but not always.
The record of the state of siege and cooperation with Uganda remains poor
If a regional military force is envisaged, does this mean that the state of siege has failed, like the operations carried out jointly with Uganda since last November?
We can also think that these different strategies complement each other. That being said, it is true that the record of the state of siege and of cooperation with Uganda remains meager. The Congolese deputies have also made the observation: the violence attributed to the ADF [Forces démocratiques alliées] and at Codeco [Coopérative pour le développement du Congo] have not diminished in intensity since the arrival of the Ugandans who, according to several testimonies, are mainly focused on securing the road works between Uganda and the DRC.
Isn’t the idea of a regional force utopian, given the old mistrust that exists between the countries concerned?
It’s all a matter of perspective. There was a time when the countries of the region were diplomatically and militarily united. The last days, signs of rapprochement are multiplying, especially between Kampala and Kigali. Now, does this mean that a strong EAC can emerge and that this can be a solution is yet another question.
To read DRC-Rwanda: the confidential report of Congolese intelligence on the M23 rebels
How do you interpret the resurgence of M23 in recent months?
It’s not really a resurgence. The branch of the M23 which is under the command of Makenga has been relocating to the DRC since the end of 2016, along the volcanic chain linking the Sabinyo and Mikeno mountains. In early 2017, two Congolese army helicopters crashed [dans le territoire de Rutshuru] while they were looking for M23 rebels. Clashes have taken place regularly, including over the past year.
On the other hand, one can think that the simultaneous advent of the state of siege, a new DDR and Ugandan-Congolese operations have led this armed group to increase its activities since March.
Are the accusations that Rwanda supports the M23 credible?
Simple answers are risky. Rwanda has a long history of supporting rebel movements active on Congolese soil. However, this support has changed over the years, becoming more and more indirect and in pursuit of specific objectives.
The genealogy of rebellions “close to Rwanda” has also evolved. The M23, for example, is much more “skeptical” of its alleged sponsor than the RCD has ever been. [Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie] during the Second Congo War. Many M23 members still view Laurent Nkunda’s arrest in 2009 as a betrayal of Kigali.
The support you speak of is not easy to gauge and, although many observers are convinced of this, hard evidence is scarce at this stage.