Tony Issa – Republic
In principle, Hezbollah has no fears regarding the parliamentary elections. Tested machines estimate that he will have an absolute majority, at least. So, what prompted its Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to throw “Sousse” the postponement once more, without any preliminaries, following everyone was convinced that it would take place on time?
Analysts believe that the parliamentary elections will be an ideal opportunity for Iran to score an easy ball in the basket of Americans who are demanding it in Vienna to reduce its regional influence. As Washington insists on holding the elections at any cost, the result will most likely not serve it but will serve Iran, as it will consolidate its influence in Lebanon, through legitimate democratic means, and will show in numbers that the “party” enjoys comprehensive Lebanese coverage: almost the majority of Shiites, and a large part of Christians, Sunnis, and Druze.
However, there are those who read Nasrallah’s words from the angle of the breakfast meeting that was called, a few days ago, by the head of the “Free Patriotic Movement” Gibran Bassil and the head of the “Marada” movement, Suleiman Franjieh, regarding a month away from the elections. He wanted to restore relations between the two Maronite allies, so that the defect would not weaken the team as a whole in the battle.
However, in a special way, the “party” wants to make the allies clear that the time is not right for one of them to take revenge on the other. In other words, if Franjieh decides to put all his weight once morest Basil in the elections of the third northern district, in light of the division of the “Syrian Social Nationalist Party” and the dynamics of the “forces” and other Christian forces, Basil may be personally defeated in the elections.
This electoral defeat is not simple in its political significance. If it happens, it will be difficult for the head of the “current” to raise the slogan “the strongest and most representative of the Christians”, especially if this coincides with the decline in the size of the Aounist parliamentary bloc, in exchange for a possible expansion of the size of the “force” bloc. Hezbollah considers that this kind of defeat for Bassil and the current that gives him Christian coverage, as offensive to its interests.
In fact, Hezbollah tested President Michel Aoun over a period of five and a half years, and remained satisfied that the man did “nothing wrong” in dealing with him throughout this period. Therefore, he prefers to continue dealing with him in the presidency, either by remaining in the position in any way possible, or by electing Basil. But if the two options are not possible for any reason, there is no problem for the chair to remain vacant until the process of Bassil’s election matures. This is what happened between 2014 and 2016, when the vacancy prevailed until Aoun’s “cooking” was ripe.
Of course, this does not mean that the “party” absolutely prefers Basil over Franjieh. On the contrary, for him, Franjieh is the preferred and trusted Christian ally always and undisputedly, and the “party” has a deep relationship with him that goes back decades. However, the party’s interest, to this day, still requires the dependence of Aoun and his team to provide Christian coverage.
If Hezbollah supports Franjieh for the presidency, Aoun will be upset and will consider that he has become on the sidelines of an alliance with him. This will put the “party”, in one way, in confrontation with all Christian forces. Franjieh will only be able to provide him with Christian coverage that is limited in size and geographical breadth.
As for the “Free Patriotic Movement”, it is able to give the “party” a wide Christian coverage, so that it cannot be questioned. The evidence is what Aoun is providing him with in the current era. There are those who believe that it is in the party’s interest to support the Aounist bloc and to provide the appropriate environments for Bassil to reach the presidency. It is this view that allows Aoun and his team to “raise the ceiling” of negotiations with all allies, including the “sworn ally” President Nabih Berri.
Accordingly, close to the “party” and “the current” are calling for the election of the president in the current assembly. This requires a technical delay in the parliamentary elections of a few months. This exit relieves “the current” because it can provide Basil’s access to Baabda. After that, there is no need to filter it in Batroun.
However, there are those who ask: Can the “party” bear the consequences of postponing the elections, just in order to get Bassil to the presidency?
In the assessment of some quarters, the election of a president in Lebanon is a matter of the party’s strategic choices. The issue is not related to the election of Basil as a person. The party delayed the presidential elections for two and a half years between 2014 and 2016 until it was able to deliver President Aoun. What prevents him from repeating the ball today?
In their assessment, the “party” is able to put everyone in front of two options: either respond to its conditions or go to the Iraqi scenario, where Iran’s opponents were able to win the legislative elections, but they were unable to form a government and elect a president.
Today, Iraq is in a confusing constitutional situation. The term of the president has expired, and the last attempts to elect a replacement before April 6th have failed. Today, Iraq is on the verge of either dissolving the parliament or entering into chaos, the consequences of which are unknown.
If “Hezbollah” fears surprises at the level of Basil and “the movement”, especially in light of the sudden attack of Arab and Western ambassadors, it is possible that it will re-shuffle the cards. The Iraqi model can be repeated in Lebanon.
