DW: How important is this moment for China and its relationship with the West?
Graham: I think this is a critical moment for China’s foreign policy, especially for Xi Jinping. He’s been in office for ten years, but I don’t think he’s ever faced a choice like this. China has tried to position itself between Russia and the United States in the past, and Xi increasingly sees Putin and Moscow as very important strategic partners. But China has always taken its relationship with the United States seriously, trying to avoid any action that would seriously damage it. But I think Xi believes that the United States now has a strong hostility towards China. He thinks it started with the Republicans under the Trump administration and now carries over to the Biden administration. I think he’s become more focused on Russia as a result and leaned quite decisively and decisively towards Russia in this Ukraine war. Tomorrow (March 18) President Biden and Xi Jinping will have a telephone conversation. I think it’s very important to influence Xi Jinping and his decisions in this war and his relationship with Russia and the United States.
DW: Shall we talk regarding the background first? You mentioned that China or Xi Jinping have been strengthening relations with Putin. Just before the war, Putin went to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping, and the two made a very important statement on Sino-Russian relations. Can you talk regarding what’s in the statement and how important it is?
Gracie: The statement is very comprehensive regarding everything that China and Russia have agreed on, starting with Putin and Xi Jinping. It starts by saying that their two countries have more successful democracies than the West and their governance systems are superior, and also lists many of the things they criticize the West is doing, such as the Caucasus, Australia, U.S.-British exports Nuclear submarine program, American strategy. But what really stands out to me is their agreement on opposing NATO’s eastward enlargement and China’s support for Russia’s proposals for a new security order in Europe. These are China’s new positions. As a result, the Chinese have been opposed to the U.S. alliance, calling it a remnant of the Cold War, and their main focus is on the alliance in eastern China, especially Japan and South Korea. And of course, sometimes Australia. But they usually don’t emphasize NATO. In addition, the two leaders emphasized that Sino-Russian cooperation has no end, which is actually not a new word. It was proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2018, but for the first time it was included in a joint statement by Russia and China.
DW: For Xi, the value of this relationship with Russia lies largely in confronting the US and its allies?
Graham: Yes. I think the increasing competition and confrontation between the US and China, and China’s strengthening of Russia’s position in foreign policy, makes Russia more important to Xi Jinping. I think the two leaders share the same analysis of the world that they think the United States should play a less important role in the international order and oppose American hegemony. They certainly want the world and the international system to be more favorable to authoritarian states like them. This is the agenda that Russia and China are already pushing at the United Nations, for example, they are already working on cyber norms, human rights definitions, outer space treaties, etc., to protect their own interests. This partnership has been strengthening for some time, but it has grown even tighter over the past few years as the U.S.-China relationship intensifies. This trend has accelerated.
DW: Of course this relationship cannot be called an equal partnership, can it? China is much stronger than Russia, especially economically. right?
Graham: It’s definitely not an equal partnership, and China is a stronger player in terms of overall GDP. Russia was once the 11th largest economy in the world. It may have fallen by now, and it will fall further. China is the second largest economy. I think China also surpasses Russia in terms of technology and innovation capabilities. But it is worth noting that China does not see Russia as a small partner, especially as Xi Jinping has given Putin the respect he craved. So when these two get together, I don’t think Putin makes people feel like little buddies. Another point is that the two countries do not agree on all issues. So they have different views, for example, on the South China Sea, the Arctic, Central Asia and other issues. China has the upper hand in the economic realm, but Russia is more important in the security realm. But on all of these issues, they basically compartmentalize these areas of potential difference, not allowing them to influence the areas where they want to collaborate and share common interests. This is unusual for two countries, and they do it very effectively.
DW: Now Russia has started this war. There is much speculation that Putin gave Xi a wake-up call when he met with Xi in Beijing. What’s your guess for this?
GRAYER: I don’t think Putin himself was expecting a massive Russian military action in Ukraine when the two leaders met on February 4th, right before the Olympics. He certainly might have told Xi that he had the intention to use military force, possibly outlining the possibility of a brief invasion, but offered no details. So some people think that Xi Jinping has been deceived or tricked. I myself don’t think Xi Jinping felt he was being deceived or misled in any way, because I don’t think Putin himself was aware of what he was going to do at that moment. Whether Putin later informed Jinping that he had changed his mind and that there would be a major military action, I do not know. But I think Xi Jinping is likely to be sympathetic to Russia’s position because the Chinese really think it’s because of NATO expansion and expansionism. They believe that the five eastward expansions of NATO – as they put it in their statement – are the real cause of the war. They don’t blame Russia.
DW: Now the war is going on. Such a huge scale seriously shakes the political and economic stability of the world. The market is in turmoil. Commodity prices soared. This is bad for the Chinese economy. How happy or unhappy do you think Xi Jinping is with all this happening now?
Graham: I think China is very uncomfortable with the current situation, partly because it is so closely aligned with Moscow, and the Russians are killing a lot of civilians. This will make China’s image bad. Just a day earlier, China voted once morest a ruling by the United Nations International Court of Justice asking Moscow to end the war. Even though Russia is killing civilians, China is once more on Russia’s side. I don’t think this is a comfortable position for China. But you highlighted another important aspect, which is the instability of the global economy. Whether on the phone with German Chancellor Scholz or French President Emmanuel Macron, Xi stressed his concerns regarding the global economy.
A house following the bombing of Kyiv on March 18 is seen by Russian troops in Ukraine with a large number of airstrikes on civilian areas
As you know, China is very connected to the global economy and does not want to see instability in the market, so of course wants to see the end of this war. But what I want to emphasize is that China hopes that the end of this war will not weaken Moscow, Russia as a country has not been seriously weakened, and I think that is important for China. China has indicated that it may be willing to help end the war in some way. But the truth is that it didn’t stand out. China has done very little to help end the war. Of course, over time, if this war continues to rage, I think China’s interests will be increasingly harmed. And Xi Jinping himself will be criticized not only abroad, but also at home. Xi Jinping faces a very important party congress this fall, where he will serve a third five-year term. I believe he doesn’t want to put this at risk.
DW: So can you talk regarding how far China will support Russia? We’ve seen it abstain from voting in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. Just now you mentioned that China cast a veto in the International Court of Justice. To what extent does it tend to openly support Russia?
Graham: I think China is clearly on Russia’s side, although not 100%, in terms of the rhetoric of the declarative policy. As it said, China attaches great importance to the UN Charter and has demonstrated a long-term position to defend or safeguard territorial integrity and sovereignty. China does view Ukraine as an independent sovereign state, but it does not condemn the use of force. It has condemned the use of force by the United States before, and it has condemned Russia. China condemned the use of force when Russia and the U.S. airstrikes in Syria a few years ago, but it has not done so in this war. Moreover, China has repeatedly said that Russia’s legitimate security concerns should be protected. China is certainly trying to balance its interests, but it does clearly side with Moscow. When it comes to action, I think it’s still an area of uncertainty, maybe it’s early days. The Biden administration has suggested that China may have told Russia that it would provide some support for its military. But in fact, we don’t know if that’s the case. Both Moscow and Beijing deny this. I don’t think we’ve seen any evidence that China is trying to provide munitions, surface-to-air missiles, logistical support, or intelligence, as reported by the media. We have not seen evidence of sanctions violations by China. Maybe Russia has made some demands of China, or China is looking for ways to help. China can help the Russian economy without directly violating sanctions. I think that’s another area that people are paying close attention to, but it’s too early. We know that, for example, Chinese commercial banks will not violate sanctions because that would jeopardize their own access to the international financial system, but perhaps through smaller Chinese banks or China lending some of their reserves, or by development banks or Export-Import banks, etc. Chinese policy banks provide loans directly to Russian companies. China can do something. I think the Biden administration is trying to prevent China from doing anything to help Russia, even if it doesn’t directly violate sanctions.
Beijing said they would engage in trade and financial interactions with Russia as usual. But saying it is one thing, doing it is another. We have to look once more at what decision China has made, whether China wants to part ways with Russia, or whether it wants to continue balancing these interests and maintaining relations with the United States, especially with Europe. I think China should see Europe as a very important player in the future because China wants to continue to maintain trade and economic ties with Europe. Moreover, China sees Europe as an important pole in the international system that has not always been aligned with the United States. Therefore, the holding of the EU-China Summit on April 1 is very important and is another development to watch in the future.
Kyiv was bombed on March 17
DW: We have talked regarding various areas in which China may support Russia, and the military area is obviously particularly sensitive. If China does start to provide some form of military support. What will that mean and how far will China go?
Graeme: If Ukrainians find out that Russian ballistic or cruise missiles are marked with Chinese markings, that would be huge. Once the ammunition they provide is used to attack hospitals and maternity wards, that will really change the relationship between China and Russia. We saw reports of Russians targeting civilians. If the Chinese become complicit, I think it will have a huge negative impact on China’s relations with the rest of the world.
DW: Under what circumstances do you think China will abandon Putin? We’ve seen Putin doing very, very dangerous actions, seeing Putin and his forces targeting civilians. When do you think the Chinese can’t take it anymore? Say involving the use of chemical or tactical nuclear weapons, or more Mariupol scenes?
Gladys: I don’t think more scenes like what we’ve seen from Mariupol are enough to change China’s stance. However, if the Russians use chemical, biological weapons or use nuclear weapons – God forbid that happens – that will really cause the Chinese to reconsider the downsides of being so close to Moscow. I think they may have felt a little uncomfortable, but the latter would be overkill for China. I don’t think it’s something they can ignore. But even without such a catastrophe, some understanding between the United States and China is likely. There is a small chance that Biden and Xi have reached some consensus in this conversation that this war has to stop, it has to end. If Xi is looking for some way to keep a little distance from Moscow — I don’t think he’s going to cut ties entirely — if he sees it’s in China’s interest, if we give him a chance to take a step back, he’ll do it. I think that’s what we should probably try, and we have this responsibility to the Ukrainian people and the rest of the world to test the possibility that China doesn’t continue to side with Russia and support its reprehensible actions once morest Ukraine.
DW: What’s the smartest approach from an American perspective, as well as from a European perspective? I mean, especially in the U.S., there has been a growing bipartisan consensus that the U.S. must fight back aggressively once morest China and must muster allies to counter the Chinese-led dictatorship in the world. Are you seeing more voices saying that the West really has to try to get China on the side once morest Russia. It’s a twist on the previous debate over whether the West should reach out to Russia to keep it out of China.
Gladys: I don’t know if the right strategy is to strip China out at this point, but maybe it should point Beijing to two different paths that they face. One is that Xi Jinping feels he is too close to Moscow and needs to take a step back. Maybe actually take a neutral stance and agree to abide by all sanctions, even if China is unwilling to play a role in encouraging Putin to back down. It will stop playing an unhelpful role and start signaling that it is time to end this war. The other path is negative: the United States and Europe must make it clear to China that if it helps Russia’s military efforts, or its economy, it will face punitive measures from the United States and Europe. If China does not comply with sanctions, then China will face secondary sanctions. I hope, at this time, the dialogue is already underway between Europe and the United States. I hope we can be on the same page because we all know that sanctions once morest China are very different from sanctions once morest Russia.
DW: If China doesn’t move in this direction — you also mentioned just now that China has shown no signs of trying to mediate so far, can you imagine China playing some kind of mediation role, especially considering it’s a minority One of several countries that may have some influence on Russia’s behavior?
Graham: I don’t think we should support China’s role as a mediator, because China is not a disinterested role, it’s not neutral. It has a very strong interest to hope that Russia will not be weakened by this war and to see the effect of protecting important Russian interests. Therefore, I don’t think China should play the role of mediator. Unless Xi and Putin have private conversations that encourage him to agree to more substantive negotiations, an actual ceasefire, and some negotiating outcome. I’m sure everyone will welcome this. But I just don’t think China is a neutral observer. I don’t think it should play a mediating role. There are other countries that have come forward, such as Israel, that may be better suited and better able to play this role.
DW: You often focus on the Taiwan issue in your research. Over the years, many have compared the situation to China’s desire to control Taiwan. There is also a lot of talk regarding the difference between the two conditions. As this crisis unfolds, what do you think China will learn from its aspirations for Taiwan?
Gracie: We know that China studies previous wars and learns from them. The Chinese military certainly studied the Gulf War and applied some of its lessons to its own modernization and planning. The war in Ukraine may indeed teach China some lessons, but the war is not over. So we don’t know exactly what lessons it will learn. But at least for now, I think we can expect China to learn some lessons from the Ukrainian resistance, recognizing that even if a country has a very strong conventional military advantage, like Russia’s over Ukraine, that doesn’t mean it can be easily obtained victory. Of course, the flip side of this coin is that Taiwan should learn its own lessons and need to prepare for civil resistance, because Taiwan does not have a territorial defense force like Ukraine does. Taiwan is starting to build up its reserves, but has yet to develop a civilian defense force.
This is an interaction lesson that Taiwan and China themselves may learn. I think China can also learn some lessons from the willingness of the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea and many countries in the world to unite and sanction Russia. Unlike Russia, China may not have as much willingness to impose sanctions on China. China’s expectation is that the American alliance is unraveling, the East is rising, and the West is declining. I think these are an analytical judgment made by China before. So I hope they will rethink trends in the global balance of power and their own relative to other countries.
There is one experience that I don’t think China will learn. Some people say that the US is not helping Ukraine militarily, so it will not help Taiwan militarily either. This is false information that Beijing wants to tell Taiwan, it wants to tell Taiwan that the United States will abandon you. The Chinese understand that Ukraine is very different from Taiwan. Let’s be clear, President Biden, even before the conflict started, made it clear that the U.S. would not engage militarily in this war if Russia invaded. But we still continue to have a policy of strategic ambiguity (on Taiwan), and I think it’s increasingly likely that the United States will intervene, even though we haven’t given Taiwan an ironclad commitment that we’ll defend it. But I think it’s almost inevitable that the US will defend Taiwan given the growing competition between the US and China. So I think China does have to take that into account. They will look at the future of this military operation and the U.S. alliance to see what the U.S. and its allies are willing to pay for themselves. If China were to attack Taiwan, maybe they would too. So China will study this issue in the next period of time. I don’t think Beijing has made the decision that it has to use force once morest Taiwan. I think they are quite confident in their huge toolbox of coercive actions once morest Taiwan, economic, diplomatic, military. They know that they can prevent Taiwan’s independence. For China, reunification is a longer-term goal.
(Interview is abridged)
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