Halfway between modernity and the Middle Ages, the Crown of The Catholic kings It did not have a strong and stable state to meet its objectives, but, as a shortcut, like other monarchs of the period, with a private network of relatives and allies who had military and economic resources for large companies. The war in Granada, the last Muslim stronghold on the Peninsula, is a good example of how this Crown had to search even under the stones to carry out a campaign of attrition rather than spectacular battles with an approximate cost of some one billion maravedis. Since 1480, the entire economy of the country has been focused on maintaining the contest.
They make war, and wars make states. The conquest of Granada served the Catholic Monarchs to improve the administration, create military units directly subordinate to the Crown and increase the collection capacity. It served to lay the foundations of the modern Spanish state that already in the times of the Habsburgs would begin to bear its first fruits. However, most of the efforts of the conflict were carried out with properly feudal resources or, like the financing of this war, with extraordinary income and loans with high interest.
In the first stage of the war, between 1482 and 1484, the improvisation and isolated performances of great Andalusian nobles, among them the Duke of Medina-Sidonia The the Count of Goat, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba’s older brother, set a slow pace in the conflict. Until the campaigns of 1485, the war was practically only in the hands of the Andalusian aristocrats, although well coordinated and supported by the Kings.
The phases of the war
With hardly his own forces or artillery train, Fernando was unable to take large places in the early years. A border war with more lows than highs, and some resounding defeat. This was the case in Loja in 1482, a city that resisted all the assaults, or in the campaign of 1483, where a Castilian army of 4,000 soldiers was defeated by the Granadans and where 1,500 soldiers fell into Muslim hands. The situation only began to improve in the autumn of 1483, with the taking of Zahara and the maintenance of the Christians in Alhama.
The war was at that time, within the medieval tradition, a long series of confrontations and riots isolated in time, so that the combatants returned home to rest from time to time. There were no major pitched battles and, throughout the conflict, periods of war alternated with periods of peaceful coexistence between the two worlds. Diplomacy, as well as weapons, was a crucial element in taking seats that were sold to the highest bidder. As the traveler recognized Jerome Münzer: “Granada fell into his power, part by surrender, part by agreement and part due to the gold and silver with which he anointed many Moorish wardens of many forzalezas.”
When Boabdil, son of the King of Granada, fell prisoner of the Christians trying to take Lucena, the Christian Kings made a pact with him to weaken his father and sow even more discord on the Muslim side. As in the Conquest of America, the Spanish used division to achieve their objectives.
Christian luck improved in the second stage, in 1488 and 1490, because the armies of Isabel and Fernando increased the professionalism of their forces and conquered the valleys of Ronda, Loja, Marbella, Malaga, an essential port for the reception of supplies and reinforcements from North Africa, and Baza. The Catholic Monarchs worked to establish permanent forces and seize heavy artillery from Italy and Flanders, under the command of Milanese and German masters. At the naval level, Fernando hired a small fleet of Genoese ships to reconnoitre the coastline with Africa and obtained from his Catalan subjects, with the support of the Neapolitans, a fleet that played an important role in that siege of Malaga, which lasted for four bloody months.
The third and last stage, with Boabdil Postponing month following month fulfilling its promise to surrender the city of Granada, it was characterized by the meticulous planning of each annual campaign in a very modern sense. In 1491, the Kings were able to raise an army of 10,000 horsemen and around 50,000 pawns, which reveals that in the course of seven years – between 1484 and 1491 – the Crown had doubled its contingent of cavalry and, at least, tripled in size. of his infantry forces.
In the spring of that year, a powerful Castilian army entered La Vega seeking the final encounter with the Muslims and further isolating Granada, which had become an island for the most radicalized refugees from the conflict. To intensify the pressure on the emir, The Catholic kings In the summer they began the construction of the Santa Fe camp, designed in a square in front of Granada, with the firm decision that they would only build it following the fall of the city. They did not bring artillery on this occasion, since in no case did they intend to destroy the city.
On November 25, 1491, the Kings signed with Boabdil the definitive agreement to surrender the city. The Monarchs promised to respect the goods and people who lived in Granada, to guarantee freedom of worship and to continue using Koranic law to settle conflicts between Muslims. The capitulations, likewise, included the promise that there would be no punishment for the tornadoes, elches and Marranos refugees in Granada, who would be facilitated the transfer. to North Africa. At the beginning of the new year, the officials of the Catholic Monarchs took the city.
How did the Kings get the money?
Pope Sixtus VI supported the military enterprise from the beginning by instituting a Crusade, by way of financial assistance. The bull of Crusade was extended every two years until reaching in its last year, 1492, a collection of 500 million maravedíes. It is estimated that three-quarters of the funds that financed this war, rich in episodes of great violence on both sides, came from church taxes. Not just the Pope. According to the so-called “tenth”, all the estates of the Church had to contribute one-tenth of all their income. In addition there were the important contributions of the three great Military Orders, Santiago, Alcántara and Calatrava.
The high clergy, the Italian bankers, the Jewish communities, who were to be persecuted just when the conquest was concluded, and the nobles provided the rest of the funds. Specifically, the aristocrats granted a series of loans called loans that the Crown had to return with an interest of 10% or in exchange for conquered lands. Montefrío, for example, was given directly to Don Alonso Fernández de Córdoba, lord of the House of Aguilar, in exchange for a loan of 7,000,000 maravedíes. Not surprisingly, the nobles who contributed the most to the war were the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the Count of Benavente.
The Italian bankers of Seville paid for entire campaigns such as the siege of Baza (1489), which was financed by forty Genoese from the city of Seville and more than twenty from Cádiz. Also with the backing of the Genoese, the King hired Swiss mercenaries, considered the most reputable infantrymen in Europe. The chronicler Hernando de Pulgar, described them in great terms:
«These are warlike men, and they fight on foot, and they have the purpose of not turning their backs on the enemies: and for this reason the defensive weapons are placed in the front and not in another part of the body, and with this they are lighter in the arms. battles. They are people who go to earn wages for the lands and help in wars that they understand are more just. They are devout and good Christians.
In addition, important economic remittances arrived from different European countries and, above all, came German, English, Burgundian, German knights and adventurers … willing to participate in the last crusade of the christian west.
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