5 things to watch in 2025 — BenarNews

5 things to watch in 2025 — BenarNews

The South China sea: Hotspots to Watch in 2025

In recent⁤ years,‌ the South China Sea has become a major flashpoint for geopolitical tensions. China’s assertive claims in this ⁢region have ‌raised concerns among its ​neighbors and international players alike. ​Here‌ are‍ five ‌key areas to ⁤watch​ closely in the year ahead:

Taiwan Strait

tensions in the Taiwan‍ Strait have escalated substantially, -with nearly 3,000 incursions⁤ by Chinese aircraft into‌ Taiwan’s air defence identification zone ‍between January and November ‌2024. ​ Two major ‍military‍ exercises, “Joint Sword⁤ A” and “Joint Sword B”, further heightened tensions, coinciding with vital political⁤ events on‍ the self-ruled island.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated ‍in his New Year’s message that the reunification of Taiwan is ⁢”unavoidable”. Shen ‌Ming-Shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense Security Research (INDSR), ‍believes that “China ​will‌ continue to hold exercises in 2025 if senior Taiwanese officials visit the United States or top U.S.officials visit Taiwan”.

While China will likely continue military​ exercises like joint fire strikes,⁢ blockades, and anti-access and area denial operations, their effectiveness may diminish as​ Taiwan develops stronger countermeasures, according to Shen.‍ Ou Si-Fu, ⁣another ⁣INDSR fellow, believes that⁣ China is not yet prepared for a full-scale invasion⁤ of⁣ Taiwan.

“Xi​ is not‍ confident with his army,” Ou ⁤said,‌ citing recent high-level dismissals​ within the People’s Liberation⁤ Army (PLA). “The⁣ PLA has not​ fought a real war in a ⁤long time, so an‍ imminent invasion of Taiwan is⁣ not expected,” Ou added. ​“They may be⁤ preparing their forces,but we are preparing,too.”

5 things to watch in 2025 — BenarNews
Taiwanese President ​Lai Ching-te⁢ attends ​a flag-raising ceremony‍ in Taipei, ‌January 1, 2025. [Image Source]

Taiwanese President​ Lai ‌Ching-te affirmed his government’s commitment ⁤to enhancing defense capabilities, announcing an ​increase in the defense ⁢budget ⁣in his New Year’s message.

Scarborough Shoal

The⁤ situation at Scarborough Shoal, a chain of reefs within⁢ the Philippines’ exclusive⁤ economic⁣ zone but under de facto Chinese control, is a cause for concern.just before the New⁢ Year, the PLA southern⁣ Theater Command conducted large-scale​ combat readiness drills at the‌ shoal, involving both naval and⁢ air⁢ force ⁢troops. Additionally, china’s coast guard maintains a constant and ‍robust presence in the area.

Tensions​ Flare in the South China Sea: Philippines Locked‍ in Disputes with China

Throughout 2024, the ‍South China Sea remained a ⁣focal point of geopolitical tension⁣ as the Philippines and China found themselves locked in several maritime disputes. Beijing’s assertive ⁤actions have raised concerns among regional stakeholders, ‍with the Scarborough Shoal‌ and Second Thomas Shoal emerging as flashpoints.

The Scarborough Shoal: Encroachment and Assertiveness

in a ‌move seen as provocative, china ‌established baselines around the Scarborough Shoal in November 2024, effectively claiming the disputed territory as its own. This unilateral declaration‍ drew criticism ⁣from the‍ philippines‌ and its‍ ally, the United States, who view ‌the move as a violation of international law. “You ‌cannot draw baselines if you don’t own the⁢ features,” stated former⁣ Philippine‍ Supreme Court justice Antonio Carpio, emphasizing the ⁣illegality of China’s actions. He suggested that the Philippines should challenge this claim at an international tribunal. Despite China’s ⁢actions, Filipino fishermen⁤ continue to face ​restrictions in accessing their⁢ traditional fishing grounds around the shoal. ‌In early December, the Chinese coastguard fired a water cannon at a Philippine‍ fisheries ‌bureau boat, escalating tensions⁣ in the area. RFA-SCS-5-things-3.png Lt. Cmdr. Lee Omaweng, commanding officer⁣ of the Philippine coast guard vessel BRP Sindangan, which serves at both Scarborough and Second⁢ Thomas ⁢Shoal, speaks to reporters on board his ship, Dec. 8, 2024.[RFA]

Second Thomas Shoal⁤ Standoff and Confrontation

The⁢ Second Thomas Shoal, also within the Philippines’ exclusive⁢ economic ‍zone, has​ witnessed ⁣persistent stand-offs between the two countries. ⁤In 1999, Manila ​deliberately⁣ grounded an old warship, the BRP ⁣Sierra Madre, on the shoal to assert ​its claim. China’s coast guard has consistently interfered with ⁢philippine resupply missions⁤ to the BRP Sierra⁣ Madre and the troops stationed there. ⁤Tensions escalated on June 17,2024,when chinese coast guard personnel,armed with‍ pikes ⁣and machetes,attacked Philippine boats,puncturing them‍ and seizing firearms during a ‍resupply operation. A Filipino ⁣sailor⁢ was wounded in ​the unprecedented confrontation. While⁢ both sides later called for de-escalation, the situation remained tense. On December 12, China finally granted permission ​for the Philippines⁢ to resupply the BRP ‍Sierra Madre.

Tensions ⁢Rise in the South China Sea ⁤as‌ Island Building Continues

The South China ‌Sea ⁣remains a flashpoint in the ‌Indo-Pacific region as tensions escalate between China, ⁣the Philippines, and ‍Vietnam ‍over territorial claims and expanding military presence. Recent​ events, including a near-collision between Chinese and Philippine‍ vessels and the​ ongoing construction ⁢of artificial islands, highlight⁢ the complex ‍and increasingly volatile situation in the contested waters. In August, a Chinese coast guard ship came dangerously close to colliding⁢ with ​a Philippine vessel carrying supplies to a grounded warship on Second Thomas ‌Shoal,​ part of the Spratly Islands. ‍The shoal is claimed by⁤ both the Philippines and China, ⁣triggering a diplomatic standoff and raising ‍concerns ​about the potential⁢ for conflict. The Philippines maintains‍ the BRP Sierra⁤ madre, a World War II-era warship, is legally grounded⁤ on the shoal for humanitarian purposes. The incident underscored the ⁤fragility of ‌the region’s security architecture and the growing militarization of ⁣the south China Sea. China,⁤ which claims sovereignty over nearly the entire sea, has been ‍aggressively expanding its military presence in the region, constructing artificial ⁣islands with airfields and missile batteries.⁤ These actions have drawn condemnation from the Philippines ⁣and ⁤other regional actors who see them ⁣as a threat​ to regional stability⁤ and freedom of navigation.

Philippines Enhances Defense Strategy

in response to the‌ increasing challenge ‍posed by China’s⁢ assertive stance, th Philippines⁤ is strengthening⁢ its maritime defense capabilities. ⁣Manila is pursuing ⁣a three-pronged strategy: establishing a robust ‍presence in ⁣disputed areas, bolstering its military deterrence capabilities through modernization, and​ deepening cooperation with⁣ like-minded partners ⁢like the United States and Japan. The U.S. and the Philippines have ‍a longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty, which obligates both nations to support ​each other in the event of⁢ an armed attack.‍ The U.S. military has set up⁤ Task‌ Force Ayungin, named after the Filipino name for Second Thomas ‌Shoal,​ highlighting its commitment to⁤ supporting Manila’s⁤ presence in the ⁤disputed area. ‍ General Romeo Brawner jr., ‌Chief of the Philippine armed forces, emphasized the country’s determination to defend ⁤its territorial claims. He stated that the ‌Philippines will not abandon its​ position at Ayungin Shoal, ⁤showcasing a firm stance against Chinese pressure.

Vietnam’s Island Building Surges

Vietnam,​ another claimant in the South‍ China Sea, is also engaged in considerable island building activities. According to a study by ‍the Asia Maritime Clarity Initiative (AMTI), Vietnam’s land reclamation efforts in the first six‍ months of ​2024 reached historic ⁤highs, equaling the total area created in ⁤both 2022 and ‍2023 combined. Between November ‍2023 and ⁤June 2024,vietnam created 692 acres of new land⁢ across ten ⁢features in the Spratly archipelago. While Vietnam’s land ‌reclamation​ activities are⁤ less extensive ‍than China’s, AMTI notes ⁢that Hanoi continues to surprise observers‌ with the scale and ‍scope of its ⁤dredging and landfill operations ⁤in the⁢ Spratly Islands.

Vietnam Expands Claims in South China Sea with​ New Airstrip

Vietnam’s military presence in the contested South China Sea is expanding rapidly. Satellite images reveal the near-completion⁤ of a new 3,000-meter airstrip on Barque Canada Reef.This growth follows‍ a dramatic increase in land reclamation, with the total area more than​ doubling in just one year to nearly 2.5 square‌ kilometers by October 2024.
satellite image of barque ⁣Canada Reef, May ‍11, 2024. [AMTI/Maxar Technologies]
This latest development follows Vietnam’s previous⁢ construction of a 1,300-meter⁢ airstrip ⁣on Spratly Island. Analysts suggest that Vietnam may ​also consider building runways on Pearson and Ladd reefs, ‍further strengthening its ⁣position in the region. “New bases and ⁣runways ‘would give Vietnam a position on the other side of ​China’s ‘big Three’ islands,’ said Tom ‌Shugart, adjunct senior fellow at ‌the Center for a New American Security. He was referring to China’s largest artificial islands​ in ⁤the South China Sea: Fiery Cross, Subi, and⁢ Mischief reefs. The next four largest artificial islands ⁣belong to Vietnam. “Its ⁣progress in the last five⁢ months suggests that Hanoi is determined to maximize the strategic potential of the features it ‍occupies,” according to the Asia‍ Maritime⁣ Transparency Initiative (AMTI). the association notes that the pace ‌of development makes it difficult to predict when the expansion will end‌ and what new capabilities Vietnam will ultimately possess.

ASEAN​ Grapples ⁣with​ South China Sea Code of Conduct

As malaysia takes over the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast⁤ Asian Nations (ASEAN) from ⁣Laos, ​the perennial question of⁣ a ‌legally binding code‍ of conduct⁤ (COC) for the South China Sea resurfaces. Negotiations ⁤for⁣ a COC between China and ASEAN countries began in 2002 with the signing of the Declaration of Conduct of parties in the South China Sea. Despite Beijing’s​ repeated assurances that progress is being made, more than two decades later, critically important obstacles remain.
“We​ are striving for early conclusion” of the ⁣code of conduct.⁣ Premier Li‍ Qiang‌ told an ASEAN​ summit in October. China lays claim ⁢to nearly 90% of⁤ the south China Sea, overlapping with the territorial claims of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines,‍ and Vietnam.

The South China Sea⁢ Code⁤ of‌ Conduct (COC) negotiations remain stalled,raising concerns about ⁣the future of peace and stability in the ‍region. While‍ China⁣ vehemently opposes any perceived politicization ⁤of‍ the COC or external meddling, its assertive stance has fueled some countries to seek support‌ outside ASEAN.

A Snail’s Pace

“Negotiations on ⁤the COC are progressing at a glacial⁢ pace,” ⁣former Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi suphamongkhon remarked in an October interview with reuters. This sentiment ‌is echoed by others.

Unrealistic Expectations?

Philippine legal expert and former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio believes reaching an agreement is highly improbable. “China will never agree‌ to certain‍ provisions, Vietnam to others, and ⁤so on,” he stated, suggesting a ⁢fundamental lack of consensus. “Therefore, the 2026 target for concluding the COC is unrealistic.”

ASEAN’s Internal Divisions

Complicating matters further is ASEAN’s own internal divisions and perceived weakness. Isha ​gharti, a public⁤ policy professor at Chiang Mai ⁢University ⁤in ⁤Thailand, ⁢highlights the potential‌ solution: “ASEAN could⁢ strengthen its collective bargaining power by aligning the interests of its⁤ member states and speaking with a unified voice in negotiations​ with external powers like China.”

The question remains: how will Malaysia, the ‌new ⁣chair of ASEAN, work to ‍unify the bloc and amplify its voice in the COC negotiations?

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